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Glossing the Gloss of “Envois” in 
The Post Card
The Post Card invites glossing of all sorts. It is an immensely 
complex and rich text, one of Derrida’s most fascinating and 
challenging. La carte postale is full of specific historical and 
personal references that will puzzle many readers. Many formu-
lations and allusions are enigmatic or counter-intuitive. They 
need explanatory glossing. Derrida uses just about every rhe-
torical device and figure of speech in the book. You name it, 
it is there (il y a là): puns (calembours), metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche, catachresis, apostrophe, prosopopoeia, hyperbole, 
prolepsis, analepsis, ellipsis, paradox, aporia, and of course a 
constant pervasive destabilizing irony. How can you tell when 
this joker is telling the truth or speaking straight, if ever? 
“Envois,” moreover, is full of complex wordplay that is not 
exactly “figurative” in the usual sense. This wordplay is often not 
easily translatable from French to English. One tiny example: 
In the last entry for February 1979, Derrida writes: “La séance 
continue, tu analyse ça comment? Je parle grammaire, comme 
toujours, c’est un verbe ou un adjectif?” (“La séance continue, 
how do you analyze that? I’m talking grammar, as always, is it 
a verb or an adjective?” [PC, 178/193]) Derrida here plays on an 
untranslatable ambiguity on whether “continue” in the French is 
verb or an adjective. In the first case, the locution would mean: 
“The session continues.” In the second, “The continued session.” 
It makes a lot of difference which way you read it, as a duck or as 
12
going postcard
a rabbit, as in the famous Gestaltist diagram that oscillates un-
predictably before the viewer’s eyes between those two animals. 
The reader (you! [singular]) will note the second person singu-
lar pronoun in “tu analyse ça comment?” This is an example of 
the endless play on the difference between “tu” and “vous” that 
pervades the “Envois.”
You(!), dear reader, can easily imagine a glossed La carte 
postale that would be immensely longer than the original. If 
the glosses were marginal, the result might be like one of those 
Renaissance glossed Bibles or theological treatises in which the 
margins on both sides and at the bottom are filled with glosses 
on specific points of a few lines of the original text. The glosses 
are much longer than the glossed text.
I presume, however, that before glossing a given text, it is 
helpful to decide just what sort of text it is. That is not so easy 
to decide for the “Envois” in The Post Card. My remarks here 
will focus on that apparently limited and presumably answer-
able question. To what genre does “Envois” belong? “La loi du 
genre” (“The Law of Genre”), a wonderful essay in Parages on 
Blanchot’s récit, La folie du jour (The Madness of the Day), begins 
by asserting firmly that genres should not be mixed: 
Genres are not to be mixed.
I will not mix genres.
I repeat: genres are not to be mixed. I will not mix them.
(NE PAS MÊLER les genres. 
Je ne mêlerai pas les genres.
Je répète: ne pas mêler les genres. Je ne le ferai pas.)1
Is this a constative assertion or a performative speech act, fol-
lowed by a promise? Derrida of course goes on to break his 
promise and also to show that Blanchot extravagantly mixes 
1 Jacques Derrida, “The Law of Genre,” in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek At-
tridge, 221–52 (New York & London: Routledge, 1992), 223; “La loi du gen-
re,” in Parages, 249–87 (Paris: Galilée, 1986), 251. 
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genres. Nevertheless, it sounds like a sensible idea that a given 
text should have an ascertainable genre and that decisions about 
appropriate glosses should be made on the basis of that certain-
ty. Let me see if I can do that.
***
“Envois” appears from many clues to be autobiographical, to be 
made up of real letters, and to be full of representations of events 
that did actually take place. I can testify that the episodes that 
mention me really did happen as Derrida describes them. Of 
course I might be lying, even though I swear I am telling the 
truth, giving accurate testimony.
Paul de Man and I did go year after year to pick Derrida up 
after his flight from Paris and take him to one or another of the 
Yale residential colleges where he was to stay while giving his 
annual five-week seminar series. It is the case that Derrida, after 
we met him at the arrivals gate, used to go to make a phone call 
to someone or other. (Perhaps his wife? Who knows? He never 
said. None of our business.) 
It is the case that Derrida and I visited on one occasion Joyce’s 
tomb in the cemetery next to the zoo in Zurich. We did encoun-
ter on our walk back through the cemetery the gravestone of 
one Egon Zoller, “der Erfinder des Telefonographen,” the inven-
tor of the ticker tape, or of some device to turn telephone signals 
into graphic ones that can be printed out. A ticker-tape machine 
is carved on Zoller’s tombstone with tape going from alpha to 
omega. We both stood for several minutes contemplating this 
tombstone. It fascinated Derrida (me too), partly because he 
was working at that time on communication technologies, a big 
topic in The Post Card. At Derrida’s request I asked a Zurich 
friend to take a photograph of this gravestone and send it to 
Derrida. I heard recently that this photo is still among his Nach-
laß. We looked for the grave of Peter Szondi but did not find it, 
as one of the “postcards” says. 
It is a fact that during one of Derrida’s visits to Yale I took 
him sailing on Long Island Sound in my 18.5 foot Cape Dory 
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Typhoon, the “Frippery.” I did not tell Derrida, however, that the 
“Small Craft Warnings” were up for strong wind and waves. We 
had no great difficulty with those, however, and returned safely 
to the mooring up the river in Branford.
I have in my possession a precious original of the post card 
from the Bodleian showing Plato, absurdly, instructing Socrates 
in what to write (or to erase). Whoever writes those postcards in 
The Post Card spends much time, as you readers will know, exu-
berantly trying to interpret this enigmatic graphic. The postcard 
writer says Jonathan Culler and Cynthia Chase took him to the 
Bodleian to let him discover the postcard for himself. Cynthia 
Chase sent me my exemplar on June 10, 1977. In tiny but quite 
legible handwriting she begins by mentioning her wonderful 
essay on George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda (referred to by “Der-
rida” in The Post Card). It had just been accepted by PMLA, the 
Publications of the Modern Language Association. She then goes 
on to say, “Derrida was here last week to talk informally in Jona-
than’s seminar, where he began in very slow but precise English, 
and spoke about parisitage and the more amusing features of his 
lengthy response to Searle in a forthcoming Glyph.” This seems 
to confirm that the account in The Post Card of Derrida’s dis-
covery of the postcard in the Bodleian is historically accurate. 
It really did happen just as that particular post card says it did. 
Here are recto and verso of my postcard. You can see from the 
postmark that it was in truth sent from Oxford on June 10, 1977. 
The postmark on the recto has what seems to be the beginning 
of the word “Remember.” Remember what? The rest is cut off. It 
seems a provocative exhortation:
15
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Those external confirmations, my own and Cynthia Chase’s, 
lead me to believe that other episodes in the “Envois” are “true 
to life” too. A drunk did wander around the phone booth on 
one occasion while “Derrida” was trying to make a call. Some-
one did phone him collect at home claiming to be “Martini 
Heidegger.” He did encounter an American graduate student, 
perhaps Avital Ronell, and suggest to her that she write her PhD 
dissertation on the telephone in modernist literature (Proust 
etc.): “and then asking the question of the effects of the most ad-
vanced telematics on whatever would still remain of literature. 
I spoke to her about microprocessors and computer terminals, 
she seemed somewhat disgusted. She told me that she still loved 
literature (me too, I answered her, mais si, mais si), Curious to 
know what she understood by this” (PC, 204). That “me too, 
[…] mais si, mais si,” is wonderfully ironic. “Mais si” is a more 
or less untranslatable French idiom that is positive and nega-
tive at the same time, something like, “Yes. But nevertheless. But 
nevertheless,” or colloquially, “Yeah, but.”
I associate this interchange with the unnamed American 
graduate student, which I believe to have occurred “in the real 
world,” with a passage a few pages earlier. That passage is of 
great importance for me. It leads me to endless reflection. In 
it “Derrida” asserts that “an entire epoch of so-called literature, 
if not all of it, cannot survive a certain technological regime of 
telecommunications (in this respect the political regime is sec-
ondary). Neither can philosophy, or psychoanalysis. Or love let-
ters” (PC, 197). Literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and love 
letters will be destroyed by the computer, the Internet, email, 
and those other features of our present (2012) prestidigitaliza-
tion that Derrida could not yet foresee in 1977: email, Facebook, 
Twitter, iPhones, iPads, Kindle, etc. 
Whether or not what Derrida says is really the case as hy-
perbolically as he says (the complete disappearance of these 
four forms of discourse) is an immense question, but Derrida 
gets an A+ for prophetic insight. His very first interview, out of 
hundreds given over his life time, was in 1968 for a now long-
18
going postcard
defunct journal called Noroît. It was called “Culture and écrit-
ure. La proliferation des livres et la fin du livre.” That puts our 
present situation in 2012 in a nutshell. The printed book indus-
try is thriving, but even so Amazon since 2011 has been selling 
more e-texts than printed books. I take it Derrida in 1968, long 
before e-texts became common, meant by “livre” a printed book 
that you can hold in your hand and read by turning physical 
paper pages. 
I conclude from these examples that it seems easy to decide 
that The Post Card belongs to the genre of confessional autobi-
ography and needs to be glossed as such. You would do that by 
adducing as much factual and contextual information as pos-
sible, as I have done with a few examples. Doing this will make 
the text more perspicuous and more believable as truth-telling 
testimony. 
***
Matters are not quite so simple, however, as a little more atten-
tion to the text of The Post Card will show. Derrida gave me my 
copy of the French original. He has charmingly, but a little alarm-
ingly, added to the title of the first section, “Envois”: “à Hillis, à 
Dorothy,” as though all those post cards were addressed and sent 
to us. “Telepathy” is a section of “Envois” that was mysteriously 
omitted and then published separately. There is a long story to 
tell about that omission and about “Telepathy” itself. I have tried 
to tell that story in The Medium is the Maker: Browning, Freud, 
Derrida and the New Telepathic Ecotechnologies.2 My little book 
is an extended gloss on a section of “Envois,” “Télepathie,” that 
is present there only in its ghostly absence, though published 
separately. Does an omitted section of “Envois” deserve a gloss 
for readers of “Envois”? I think the answer must be yes, but the 
mind boggles at the thought of glossing a spectral absence/pres-
ence. As you readers of “Telepathy” will know, Derrida claims in 
2 J. Hillis Miller, The Medium is the Maker: Browning, Freud, Derrida and the 
New Telepathic Ecotechnologies (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009). 
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that essay that a postcard, in part because it is open for anyone 
in the world to read who comes upon it, makes any one who in-
tercepts it as it travels through the postal system into the person, 
the “you [tu]” for whom the postcard is intended. The reader, 
whoever he or she might be (Hillis, or Dorothy, or whoever), is 
transmogrified into the addressee of the postcard. 
That is what I mean by “alarmingly”! I’m not at all sure I 
want to be transformed into the person those postcards in the 
“Envois” invoke into being by a magic telepathic or hypnotic 
hocus pocus, by an irresistible “transfer” in the psychoanalytic 
sense. I just want to go on “being myself,” thank you very much. 
Part of me, however, knows that each of those poems, novels, 
and other texts I have read and taught and written about for 
so many years, including La carte postale, has dispossessed me, 
turned me, at least temporarily, into someone other than myself, 
perhaps into someone of a different gender. In reading Eliot’s 
Middlemarch I become Dorothea Brooke or the personified 
narrator, “George Eliot” “himself.” In reading Gerard Manley 
Hopkins’s poems, prose works, and letters I become Hopkins. In 
reading The Post Card I become the person “Derrida” addresses 
as “tu.” (The reader needs always to remember how much is lost 
in translation when La carte postale is turned into The Post Card. 
Derrida, for example, as I have said, in the “Envois” section car-
ries on a complex play between French second person singular 
and second person plural, tu and vous. English makes no such 
distinction. I shall return to this.)
Nevertheless, the reader wonders just whom these so cir-
cumstantial-sounding letters were really meant for, to whom 
they were originally destined as envois, sendings, to whom they 
were mailed. Surely, in spite of the discretionary total absence 
of any proper names, these are real love letters sent by a male 
named Jacques Derrida to some never-named intimate female 
beloved. Derrida’s short untitled preface, however, dashes all our 
hopes for a certain identification of either sender or addressee, 
as I shall show. A preface is a species of anticipatory gloss. My 
gloss in this essay will focus on glossing that gloss. Prefaces are 
usually intended, like glosses, to guide or orient the reader for 
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the proper reading of the text to come. Derrida’s preface, in this 
case, however, only makes matters more complicated and puz-
zling, as I shall show.
***
Let me take the “Envois,” for the moment, as perhaps an exam-
ple of yet another venerable genre, not an autobiography, but an 
epistolary novel. In one place within “Envois” Derrida claims to 
have had just this genre in mind as a set of conventions to paro-
dy, as well as the detective story, yet another genre. “Envois,” he 
writes, will be “a kind of false preface, once again. Which, while 
parodying epistolary or detective literature (from the Philo-
sophical Letters [by Voltaire, 1733] to the Portuguese nun [Let-
ters of a Portuguese Nun, 1669, believed to be fictions composed 
by Gabriel-Joseph de La Vergne, comte de Gulleragues], from 
the liaisons dangereuses [1782, by Choderlos de Laclos] to Mile-
na [Franz Kafka, Briefe an Milena, 1952]), would also obliquely 
introduce my speculations on Freudian speculation” (PC, 179). I 
suppose “Envois” is a kind of detective story in the way it hides 
the mystery of just who the sender(s) and receiver(s) of these 
letters are and just what romance the letters covertly reveal. That 
gives two more possible genres for “Envois”: novel in letters and 
detective story.
It is easy to identify the generic laws of the epistolary novel, 
from Richardson, Marivaux, and Rousseau in the eighteenth 
century on to more recent examples. These laws are a special 
case of the standard conventions of the Western novel from Don 
Quixote to Ian McEwan. Those conventions, for either sort of 
novel, are a version of what Derrida, notoriously, called “log-
ocentrism.” Logocentrism is a coherent system of concepts or 
presuppositions that centers on the notion of the logos. Logos is 
a multivalent word in Greek meaning Being, transcendent and 
simultaneously immanent ground, discourse, word, mind, ra-
tio, rhythm. Jesus is the Logos in Christian theology. He is the 
second person of the Trinity, both transcendent and immanent 
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deity, the God/man in whose name the creation was created and 
is upheld in being. 
In the case of the conventions of the Western novel, whether 
epistolary or not, the stress is especially and in manifold ways 
on the unity of the self, subject, or ego. The Western novel as-
sumes that the selves of the author, narrator, and characters are 
unified and remain the same through time, however much they 
may evolve. A not so latent sexism assumes that authors and 
narrators are most likely male. Some form of intersubjective 
communication, however limited it may be in some novels, is 
presumed. A good novel tells a unified story with a beginning, 
middle, and end. Within the fiction of a given novel, it is possi-
ble to understand the other person, to some degree at least, and 
to sympathize with him or her. The pleasure of reading novels 
is to a considerable degree the pleasure of an intimate access to 
the interiority of other (fictive) persons such as we do not have 
in “real life.” 
Marian Evans became a novelist when she adopted a male 
pseudonym and called herself George Eliot. Her Middlemarch 
(1872), that prototypical Victorian novel, is told by an imaginary 
male narrator who has telepathic insight into the minds and 
feelings of the imaginary characters, both male and female, and 
can speak for them in that logocentric form of narration, free 
indirect discourse. The narrator transfers that telepathic knowl-
edge to the reader. George Eliot’s narrator speaks in the third 
person past tense for what Dorothea Brooke and all the other 
characters are presumed to have experienced in the past and 
in the first person, present tense. Though the characters evolve 
through time, the cores of their selfhoods remain the same. The 
name “Dorothea” goes on referring to something unified and 
perdurable. Dorothea’s insight into other people is at first lim-
ited and laughably mistaken, as in her radical misreading of her 
first husband, Mr. Casaubon. Gradually she learns to read oth-
ers more accurately and to sympathize with them. That change 
leads to the happy ending and makes it possible. 
An epistolary novel differs from novels like Middlemarch in 
having, typically, no overt narrator. Nevertheless, the presence 
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of a supervising and ordering consciousness is implied in the 
way the letters are put in a sequence that tells a unified story. A 
vestigial narrator is implied, in some cases, in the identification 
of the sender and receiver of each of the letters in some imper-
sonal, exterior, notation. An example is that belated epistolary 
short story by Henry James, “A Bundle of Letters” (1879). I say 
“belated” because the eighteenth century was the heyday of the 
epistolary novel in Europe. Relatively few were published in the 
nineteenth century, though hardly a Victorian novel exists that 
does not cite at least one or two letters. An example of the latter 
convention is the inclusion of letters in the novels of Anthony 
Trollope. The sender and receiver of each letter in James’s “A 
Bundle of Letters” are labeled by some impersonal external au-
thority: “Miss Miranda Hope in Paris to Mrs. Abraham C. Hope 
at Bangor Maine”; “From Mrs. Violet Ray in Paris to Miss Agnes 
Rich in New York,” and so on. The letters are dated. They are ar-
ranged (by that effaced narrator) so as to tell a latent story. The 
letter-writers’ unity of selfhood in an epistolary novel is indi-
cated by the way they are signed and by the unity of a personal 
style that the author invents for them. James has evident fun in 
imitating what he imagines to be the epistolary style of Miss Mi-
randa Hope, an intelligent young woman from the exceedingly 
provincial town of Bangor, Maine, traveling alone in Europe, 
e.g., “I guess we don’t know quite everything at Bangor.”3 Though 
hardly a novel of either sort from Don Quixote on does not in 
one way or another challenge the assumptions I have been iden-
tifying, the regime of logocentrism remains relatively sovereign, 
relatively untouched, except in special notorious cases like Don 
Quixote itself or like Tristram Shandy.
In Derrida’s “Envois” every single one of the conventions I 
have named is defiantly, exuberantly, systematically, and overtly 
transgressed, except for the dating of each entry, a convention 
3 Henry James, “A Bundle of Letters,” in Lady Barbarina, The Siege of London, 
An International Episode, The Pension Beaurepas, A Bundle of Letters, The 
Point of View, The New York Edition of Henry James, vol. 14 (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907–9), 481.
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he obeys. The reader cannot tell for a given entry who is writing 
and to whom, or whether a single “je” wrote them all to a single 
“tu,” since neither salutation nor signature is ever given. Moreo-
ver, the assertion that these long entries are all being written on 
numerous postcards seems extremely unlikely. At a minimum 
of four postcards a page it would take over a thousand post-
cards at least for the whole of the “Envois,” something highly 
implausible. See how few words Cynthia Chase was able to get 
on the postcard from the Bodleian she sent me, even with her 
miniature handwriting. 
The letters in “Envois” are punctuated by seemingly random 
breaks of 52 characters each, so that parts do not even make 
grammatical sense. If these are supposed to be love letters, all 
the learned discussion of Plato, Socrates, Freud, psychoanalysis, 
the history of the postal system, the constant word play and use 
of obscure allusions, etc., seems an exceedingly odd and prob-
ably ineffective way to say, “I love you,” in spite of the constant 
circumstantiality of detail about the writer’s or writers’ daily ac-
tivities that might plausibly make up part of “real” love letters. 
I say Derrida’s defiance of conventions is “exuberant” to bring 
into the open Derrida’s evident ironic joy in subverting logo-
centric expectations. Just in case you might not notice this for 
yourself, the unnamed preface, or, as I have called it, proleptic 
gloss, makes these wholesale transgressions explicit.
***
That anticipatory gloss of four pages, which I shall now partly 
gloss, is an exceedingly odd and even exasperating document, 
for a commonsensical person like me, someone who wants uni-
vocal certainty. That makes me what Derrida calls in this fore-
word a “bad reader” (PC, 4). What characterizes a bad reader, 
according to Derrida, is an impatient desire for certainty, for 
knowing ahead of time what to expect. I cite the whole wonder-
ful paragraph because it is so splendid a description and de(con)
structive analysis of the sort of reader that is certain to get “En-
24
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vois” wrong through what John Keats called, in a letter to Bailey, 
a “hunger […] after Truth”:
Because I still like him, I can foresee the impatience of the 
bad reader: this is the way I name or accuse the fearful read-
er, the reader in a hurry to be determined, decided upon de-
ciding (in order to annul, in other words to bring back to 
oneself, one has to wish to know in advance what to expect, 
one wishes to expect what has happened, one wishes to ex-
pect (oneself)). Now, it is bad, and I know no other definition 
of the bad, it is bad to predestine one’s reading, it is always 
bad to foretell. It is bad, reader, no longer to like retracing 
one’s steps. (PC, 4)
The canny reader (you!) of this distinctly insolent paragraph 
(who would want to be a bad reader, even if Derrida says he 
likes them?) will note that Derrida begins by saying that he fore-
sees the impatience of the bad reader, but ends by saying it is 
always bad to foretell. He does what he forbids, perhaps by an 
unavoidable law. You must have some sort of expectations in 
order to be able to read at all. You may also remember, perhaps 
on a re-reading (praised here as an escape from bad reading), 
that the famous postcard from the Bodleian of plato dictating 
to Socrates, that begat the whole of “Envois,” is from a fortune-
telling book of the thirteenth century, by one Matthew Paris, 
Prognostica Socratis basilei. The “Envois” proper have a lot to 
say about the ambiguities of fortune-telling, of prognostication. 
Psychoanalysis is a form of fortune-telling, with Dr. Sigmund 
Freud as the all-knowing telepathic medium receiving postcards 
from the patient’s unconscious and from the future. 
I say the post card of plato (small “p” on the postcard) and 
Socrates “begat the whole of Envois.” Derrida says just that in an 
entry of 9 March 1979, in what follows the entry about epistolary 
and detective fiction already cited: “The entire book, accordion 
astrologies of post cards, would initiate into speculation via the 
reading of Sp [Socrates/plato]. Finally that is all there would be, 
everything would come back and amount to the patient, inter-
25
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minable, serious and playful, direct or detoured, literal of figura-
tive description of the Oxford card” (PC, 179). That gives you yet 
another genre. The whole of “Envois,” from beginning to end, is 
nothing but a glossing of that postcard, a reading of it, or anno-
tation of it. It is certainly the case that Derrida has a wonderful 
time imagining different readings of the somewhat sinister or 
even obscene intercourse that he finds to be going on between 
Socrates and plato. Just what, for example, is that long cylindri-
cal object sticking out from under Socrates’s right leg? 
In its scrupulous care for the significance of graphic detail, 
“Envois” resembles (in parody perhaps) yet another genre: the 
learned essay in art historical interpretation of a graphic art-
work, for example the endless essays reading Dürer’s Melenco-
lia I or the learned quarrels over Van Gogh’s paintings of shoes. 
(Are they female peasant shoes, as Heidegger claimed in a fa-
mous sentimental passage about peasant life, or are they the art-
ist’s own shoes?)
***
The first sentence of the preface gives the reader a distinctly 
anomalous genre for the “Envois” to add to those I have already 
identified. It is the first of many proposed genres: “You might 
read these envois as the preface to book that I have not written” 
(PC, 3). There is an odd genre for you! Derrida (I don’t know 
what else to call whoever wrote these words; he speaks as an “I,” 
a “je,” throughout what you might call a preface to the preface 
or a proleptic gloss)… Derrida, you will note, does not say that 
the “Envois” is the preface to a book he just never got round to 
writing. He says, “Vous pourriez lire ces envois comme la pré-
face d’un livre que je n’ai pas écrit”: “You (second person plural: 
any “you” whatsoever) might [pourriez] read these sendings as a 
preface to an unwritten book [PC, 3/7]. It is up to you to decide 
whether or not to do so. It’s a free country, and I’m not going to 
make up your mind for you.” 
Here, already, it has taken me a paragraph to gloss the gram-
mar and rhetoric of the very first sentence. If I were to go on 
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like this, which you will be happy to know I shall not, a truly 
monstrous interminable gloss would result. 
Derrida goes on to say that the unwritten book would have 
“treated that which proceeds from the postes, postes of every 
genre, to psychoanalysis.” He makes this more precise by add-
ing: ”Less in order to attempt a psychoanalysis of the postal ef-
fect than to start from a singular event, Freudian psychoanaly-
sis, and to refer to a history and a technology of the courrier, 
to some general theory of the envoi and of everything which 
by means of some telecommunication allegedly destines itself ” 
(PC, 3). The problem of course is that the “Envois” do in great 
detail just what he says the unwritten book would have done. 
This is especially the case if you include the mysteriously omit-
ted section on “Telepathy,” not to speak of the six essays added 
after the “Envois.” These are primarily on Freud, though one is 
the splendid and definitive put-down of Lacan, “Le facteur de la 
vérité.” What Derrida calls the preface to an unwritten book is 
in fact that book itself, in a species of what Derrida calls “invagi-
nation,” the outside becoming the inside, the preface the text 
proper, in a perpetual oscillation. 
Having proposed that you can, if you like, consider the “En-
vois” as the preface to an unwritten book, “Derrida,” if that is 
who it is, goes on to say that he does not know whether read-
ing them “is bearable” (“est soutenable”) (PC, 3/7). “Soutenable” 
means “bearable” all right, but it has, to my ear, an overtone, of 
“sustainable,” “able to be carried on,” as in “sustained discourse.” 
The “Envois” may be both unbearable to read and impossible to 
read in a sustained fashion. 
***
“Derrida” then proposes yet another genre for the “Envois” that 
you might wish to consider: “You might consider them, if you 
really wish to (si le cœur vous en dit, if the heart tells you to do 
so), as the remainders (les restes) of a recently destroyed cor-
respondence” (PC, 3/7). You can do so if you really want to, but 
I do not authorize your choice. In any case, the remainders of a 
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recently destroyed correspondence is another odd genre, to say 
the least. “Reste” or “restes” are key words in Derrida, as I have 
elsewhere shown.4 The word “restes” always has an overtone of 
dead body, “remains,” as well as of archived writings, Nachlaß, as 
in the double word “corpus,” corpse and body of writings. 
Derrida goes on to say that what we read in the “Envois” is 
just what is left over, what remains, of a much more extensive 
correspondence, much of which has been “destroyed by fire or 
by that which figuratively takes its place, more certain of leaving 
nothing out of the reach of what I like to call the tongue of fire, 
not even the cinders if cinders there are [s’il y a là cendre]” (PC, 
3). What could be “more certain” than fire? A shredder? Derrida 
tells in one place in “Envois” the story of how at some time in 
the past he took a huge correspondence in his car and first tried 
unsuccessfully, beside the Seine, to tear it into illegible scraps 
and throw it in the river. It would have taken far too long. He 
then drove to a suburb of Paris that was unfamiliar to him and 
burned the whole collection beside the road. What a wanton 
act of vandalism! I know of nothing like it except Henry James’s 
burning of his accumulated correspondence.
Much later in “Envois” “Derrida” describes circumstan-
tially the process whereby he decided which parts of the cor-
respondence to destroy, which parts to save by typing them on 
his electric typewriter for publication in the book you are now 
reading. He observes that the rule of leaving out everything 
private, everything that would identify the sender and receiver, 
was unworkable, since everything was both private and at the 
same time relevant to the general project of the “Envois” and 
of his desire to make a book open to everyone. “Before all else 
I wanted, such was one of the destinations of my labor, to make 
a book—in part for reasons that remain obscure and in part for 
other reasons that I must silence” (PC, 5). That phrase about 
“leaving nothing out of reach of what I like to call the tongue 
of fire” is of course completely double-faced, or fork-tongued. 
4 J. Hillis Miller, “Derrida’s Remains,” in For Derrida, 72–101 (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2009).
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A tongue of fire is totally destructive. You speak about the way 
“flames licked the roof of the burning house.” At the same time 
that “tongue of fire” speaks, as in the tongues of fire that in the 
Book of Acts in the New Testament settled on the apostles at 
Pentecost and gave them the gift of tongues, the ability to speak 
all languages so that they might spread the Gospel through all 
the world: “And there appeared unto them cloven tongues like 
as of fire, and it sat upon each of them. And they were all filled 
with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues, as 
the Spirit gave them utterance” (Acts 2:3–4). 
As for intending to destroy even the cinders of the confla-
grated parts of the correspondence, if cinders there are [s’il y 
a là cendre]: a cinder may be dead ash, or it may hide a secret 
glow ready to burst into flame again. The reference is to another 
extremely enigmatic book by Derrida, feu la cendre (1982; 1987, 
apparently written in 1971). The title of the Italian translation by 
Stefano Agosti links this book to “Envois”: ciò che resta del fuoco, 
“what remains of a fire.” A cinder is what remains of a fire, just as 
“Envois” is what remains of a destroyed correspondence. 
Feu la cendre is a meditation on a phrase that Derrida says 
has been haunting him for fifteen years: il y a là cendre. To gloss 
just the preface to “Envois” you would perhaps need also to 
gloss the whole of feu la cendre, another virtually interminable 
task. Just part of the leitmotif, il y a là, is extremely difficult to 
translate, though, or perhaps just because, it is idiomatic French. 
Literally it means “it has there there,” nonsense in English. Il y a 
is the French equivalent of German es gibt, or of English “there 
is” or “there are.” “There are/is some[thing] there.” “Cinder there 
is, there is, there, cinder.”5 
Derrida plays on the complexities of his phrase in the strange 
and enigmatic dedication to feu la cendre. He gives the dedica-
tion the strange and ominous name of “Animadversiones.” I am 
included as a dedicatee (to my great honor) along with several 
others, listed in carefully non-hierarchical alphabetical order, 
5 Jacques Derrida, Cinders, ed. and trans. Ned Lukacher (Lincoln and Lon-
don: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 21.
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and followed by “d’autres,” “among others.” An animadversion is 
in modern French or English “hostile criticism” or “a critical or 
censorious remark.” Really? Does Derrida mean he is making a 
hostile criticism of us, or that we are doing so with him. Neither 
makes good sense. Happily, however, the first meaning given in 
the OED for “animadversion” is neutral: “the turning or direct-
ing of the attention.” “Animadversiones,” moreover, is neither 
French nor English, but the nominative, accusative, or vocative 
plural of the Latin word, animadversio, which means initially 
perception, observation, paying attention to, that is, “turning 
the mind toward.” Only secondarily does the word mean pun-
ishment, censure, or blame. Peter Ramus wrote in 1543 a book 
called Aristotelicae animadversiones. The word animadversiones 
has the meaning in biblical studies of commentary or gloss on 
a particular problematic word or passage in the Bible. So Der-
rida most probably intends no more than to name, in dedicatory 
acknowledgment, turnings of his mind toward, paying attention 
to, those who have read him or whom he has read (“their read-
ing, “leur lecteur”), to his benefit. I rather like, however, trying 
to take animadversiones as somehow vocative. “O Animadver-
siones” might be an apostrophe addressed by Derrida to those 
who have turned their minds toward his work, that is, the dedi-
catees. My tentative glossing of animadversiones is a good ex-
ample of how Derrida habitually says much in little by way of 
word play and of how that much in little is likely to be puzzling 
or contradictory, perhaps even “undecidable.”
I cite below part of these animadversions, since the part I cite 
links with the idea in “Le facteur de la vérité” in The Post Card 
that since a letter may always not reach its destination, it never 
does. The first part of the dedication asserts, in a way that echoes 
the preface to The Post Card, that writing absents itself from its 
author as soon as it is written, resulting in the “effondrement 
extrême de la signature” (“the extreme disintegration of the sig-
nature”). You wrote it, but you cannot sign it. The second para-
graph is also counter-intuitive: “Que la lettre soit forte en cette 
seule indirection, et de toujours pouvoir manquer l’arrive, je 
n’en prendrai pas prétexte pour m’absenter à la ponctualité d’une 
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dedicace: R. Gasché, J-J. Goux, J.-C. Lebensztejn, J.-H. Miller, 
d’autres, il y a là cendre, reconnaîtront, peut-être, ce qui intervi-
ent ici de leur lecture. Décembre 1971” (“Though the letter gains 
strength solely from this indirection, and granted that it can al-
ways not arrive at the other side, I will not use this as a pretext to 
absent myself from the punctuality of a dedication: R. Gasché, J. 
J. Goux, J. C. Lebensztejn, J. H. Miller, others, cinders there are 
[il y a là cendre], will recognize, perhaps, what their reading has 
contributed here. December 1971”) (C, 14/30).
This entire “dedication” has always made me more than a lit-
tle uneasy, greatly honored as I am by it. What in the world, for 
example, does Derrida mean by adding that “il y a là cendre” 
after our names, in all its ambiguity or undecidability as a lo-
cution? Does he mean that those named or perhaps just their 
names are the dead cinders of past friendships, or that his writ-
ings have never reached us as their destination, that we haven’t 
really ever understood a word of what he has written (a distinct 
possibility), or does he mean that the names are live coals that 
might burst into cloven tongues of flame if breathed upon by a 
dedication or even by an animadversion. “De leur lecture” is also 
undecidable in meaning. It could mean the dedicatees’ reading 
of Derrida, or it could mean Derrida’s reading of what they have 
written, perhaps including what they have written about his 
writing. You must decide that for yourself, dear reader, though I 
incline to the latter, since it hardly makes sense that my solitary 
reading of Derrida in those far-off days could have contributed 
anything to feu la cendre.
That some positive reading ought to win the day over the 
negative implications of “animadversion” is suggested not only 
by Derrida’s almost forty years of generosity and friendship for 
me, but also by the dedication he inscribed in the copy of the 
1987 reprint of feu la cendre he gave me in Laguna Beach in 
1987: “pour Hillis/(la dedicace, depuis plus de 15 ans, est/ dans 
le livre)/affectueusement/Jacques./Laguna Beach, 6/avril 1987.” 
He means, I think, that the book was apparently first written, 
with the dedication, more than fifteen years before the revised 
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I am now beginning to be seriously anxious. I have somewhat 
partially glossed in almost twenty-four pages only about two-
thirds of the first page of the unnamed “preface” to “Envois,” and 
I have by no means yet got to the most important part of that 
preface, for my purposes of genre-identification. Clearly I must 
pick up the pace or I’ll never reach even a provisional answer to 
my initial apparently simple and straightforward question, “To 
what genre does ‘Envois’ belong?”
After having said that “Envois” is the remains of a destroyed 
correspondence, Derrida goes on to say that to say that is to say 
too much or too little, since “it was not one (but more or less) 
nor very correspondent. This still remains to be decided” (PC, 
3). This is another example of the putting in question of any kind 
of presumed or decidable unity. It is more or less than a single 
correspondence and it does not successfully correspond to boot.
He then asserts that the partial saving was “due to a very 
strange principle of selection” (PC, 3). This “due to” and “saved” 
raises the ghost of the word “registered.” All three are postal 
words, as in “postage due,” or “registered mail.” After having 
said that only part of the correspondence was “saved” Derrida 
adds an odd parenthesis: “(j’entends murmuer déjà ‘accusé’ 
comme on dit de réception).”. Sure enough, the phrase “accuser 
[signaler] réception” means to give notice that one has received 
something,6 so Alan Bass’s translation is correct: “I already hear 
murmured ‘registered,’ as is said for a kind of receipt” (PC, 4/8). 
The saved part of the conflagrated correspondence is registered 
in the sense that the recipient has confirmed receipt by return-
ing a receipt. I suppose that means that “Derrida” may have kept 
a tally of the remains or registered them by typing them out, as 
he evidently did in preparing the manuscript for publication. If 
they were actually sent, by the way, how come he has them and 
has the right to burn some and save some by some secret prin-
ciple of selection or filtering? He speaks of “the grate, the filter, 
and the economy of sorting” (“la grille, le crible, l’économie du 
tri”) (PC, 4/7). “To filter fire?” he asks, but continues: “I have not 
6 Le Petit Robert, 15b. 
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given up doing so” (PC, 4). What a monstrous mélange of mixed 
metaphors, as bad as mixed genres!
Derrida then says that he finds the principle of selection he 
has used “questionable.” Well, why did he use it then? He goes 
on to say, “I rigorously do not approve of this principle. [I wish 
he would say what that principle of selection was! Why not tell 
us outright?] I denounce it ceaselessly [Really? Where?], and in 
this respect reconciliation is impossible” (PC, 4). Reconciliation 
of whom with whom or with what? Another extremely odd sen-
tence follows: “But it was my due to give in to it [j’ai dû y céder: 
‘I had to give in to it’], and it is up to you to tell me why” (PC, 4). 
Why can he not tell us why himself? This question raises in me a 
cascade of questions, not helpful answers to the question of the 
genre of “Envois” or directions for how to read it.
A separate one sentence paragraph follows that puts the ball 
definitely in the reader’s court: “Up to you [toi, first person sin-
gular] first. I await only one response and it falls to you” (PC, 
4). How in the world can you decide on the basis of the slender 
evidence Derrida gives? He puts the you, the addressee, that is, 
me the reader, in an impossible position. I have the responsibil-
ity to decide when there are no solid facts on the basis of which 
to decide. How can you know whether he was or was not right 
to destroy what he did destroy if we can no longer see and read 
the destroyed parts and do not know what the principle of selec-
tion was?
***
The next paragraph suggests yet another genre for “Envois.” It 
can be taken as an extended apostrophe, an interpellation of the 
you that reads. Derrida in effect says: “You decide. You must de-
cide.” In an apostrophe the speaker breaks off the constative dis-
course and turns to address some “you” directly, someone either 
present or absent, as in Cicero’s direct address to Catilina. “O” 
is often the sign of an apostrophe, though only in the transla-
tion in this case: “Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia 
nostra!” (“When, O Catiline, do you mean to cease abusing our 
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patience?”) Apostrophe is closely associated with prosopopoeia. 
An apostrophe personifies the “you” to whom it is addressed, 
as in Wordsworth’s apostrophe in “The Boy of Winander”: “ye 
knew him well, ye cliffs and islands of Winander.” “Thus I apos-
trophize,” writes Derrida. “This too is a genre one can afford 
oneself, the apostrophe. A genre and a tone. The word—apos-
trophizes—speaks of words addressed to the singular one, a live 
interpellation (the man of discourse or writing interrupts the 
continuous development of the sequence, abruptly turns toward 
someone, that is, something, addresses himself to you), but the 
word also speaks of the address to be detoured” (PC, 4). The last 
phrase reminds the reader that apostrophe involves a turning 
away as well as a turning toward. Cicero turns away from his 
primary audience to address Catilina directly rather than mak-
ing a reasoned argument for Catilina’s condemnation to that 
primary audience, the Roman Senate. The whole of “Envois” 
can be taken as a huge extended apostrophe. That possibility 
is kept before the reader by the pervasive use of direct address 
(“tu”) in the letters. If Derrida is right to say that an intercepted 
letter or post card turns the accidental reader into the “you” to 
whom the missive is addressed, then any you as reader of “En-
vois” becomes the apostrophized addressee of the letters, with 
all the responsibilities to respond and decide that Derrida so 
much insists on.
Then follow that paragraph about the bad reader (already 
discussed) and then several more paragraphs about the way he 
indicates in the text something of any length left out of a given 
letter by a 52 character space, though he swears he no longer 
remembers the long calculations that led to this “clever crypto-
gram”: “If I state now, and this is the truth, I swear, that I have 
totally forgotten the rule as well as the elements of such a cal-
culation, as if I had thrown them into the fire, I know in ad-
vance all the types of reaction that this will not fail to induce 
all around” (PC, 5). Derrida claims to be like someone who has 
carefully protected a file or a memory disk with a password and 
then has destroyed and completely forgotten the password. That 
certainly can happen, but nevertheless (mais si!), I as bad reader 
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find myself muttering, in an apostrophe to the dead, “Come on, 
O Jacques, you can’t expect me to believe that!”
***
Then at last follow the paragraphs that perhaps interest me most 
in this short preface. This is the sequence that resolutely disman-
tles, or, dare I say, “deconstructs,” for “Envois” at least, all the 
logocentric narratological certainties about the separate unities 
of author, narrator, and characters I began by briefly summariz-
ing. Derrida says in no uncertain terms that you cannot be cer-
tain who or how many different persons is/are writing these let-
ters or whether the destined recipients are one or more persons, 
whether the author of the whole thing (presumably Jacques 
Derrida) is one person or many, whether any given “I” or “you” 
is male or female, or both, whether the sender is the same as the 
writer, or the receiver the same as the destined recipient. Even 
“Derrida” swears that he does not know. Here, nevertheless, is 
what “Derrida” says, in one of his most intransigent disaffirma-
tions, or assertions of dispossession, of disappropriation. You 
must, I think, take him at his word:
Who is writing? To whom? And to send, to destine, to dis-
patch what? To what address? Without any desire to surprise 
[Uh huh; there’s a denegation for you!], and thereby to grab 
attention by means of obscurity, I owe it [there again is that 
notion of debt, of obligation, of what is due, as in “postage 
due”] to whatever remains of my honesty to say finally that 
I do not know. Above all I would not have had the slight-
est interest in this correspondence and this cross-section, I 
mean in their publication, if some certainty on this matter 
had satisfied me. (PC, 5/9)
This is an extravagant and implausible confession of ignorance, 
of uncertainty. It’s implausible because he has told you, the read-
er, that he has removed the names of addresser and addressee, 
along with other evidence of what hidden love story lies behind 
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these letters. Nevertheless, he must have known these facts, and 
he is not likely to have forgotten them. Now he wants to claim 
that the law of adestination is such that he really does not know 
who is writing and to whom in what remains of this destroyed 
correspondence, a correspondence that is not one (unified) and 
not correspondent. Perhaps the partial burning of the corre-
spondence frees what remains of its ties to its original circum-
stances and makes the remains float in the air, so to speak, or 
perhaps lie dormant in some dead letter repository such as Mel-
ville makes much of in “Bartleby the Scrivener,” a work known 
to Derrida. He uses the postal phrase “left unclaimed” (“laissé 
pour compte”) in the first of the letters in the “Envois” proper 
(PC, 7/11).
Derrida then goes on to say that this radical uncertainty is 
not only disagreeable, but also even tragic. It is “tragic” presum-
ably because it deroutes all the certainties and calculated dis-
tances on which ethical decision and responsible interpersonal 
relations depend, not to speak of that coherent reading of the 
text that you as a student of literature, or perhaps as a teacher 
of literature or as a writer about literature, depend. How far 
would you get if you said, “I haven’t the slightest idea what this 
text means or how to talk or write sensibly about it.” How could 
this publication be justified if it was just made up of a collective 
shrugging of shoulders in despair?
That the signers and the addressees are not always visibly 
and necessarily identical from one envoi to the other, that the 
signers are not inevitably to be confused with the senders, 
nor the addressees with the receivers, that is with the readers 
(you [toi] for example), etc. — you will have the experience of 
all this, and sometimes will feel it quite vividly, although con-
fusedly. This is a disagreeable feeling that I beg every reader, 
male and female, to forgive me. To tell the truth, it is not 
only disagreeable, it places you [vous; note he says “you” the 
reader, not the imaginary persons in the story] in relation, 
without discretion, to tragedy. It forbids that you regulate 
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distances, keeping them or losing them. This was somewhat 
my own situation, and it is my only excuse. (PC, 5/9)
“Well, OK,” you say to yourself. “I can take that as a kind of elab-
orate set of fictional uncertainties achieved by leaving out signa-
tures and proper names, but I am certain at least of one thing: 
Jacques Derrida himself wrote this preface and uses ‘I’ and ‘me’ 
with calm certainty, as though these pronouns indubitably refer 
to one singular person whose given name was Jacques (actually 
‘Jackie’ when he was a child in Algiers) Derrida.” The final para-
graph of the preface seems reassuringly to confirm this, or at 
least somewhat reassuringly, since the opening of this final sen-
tence is a little uneasy-making: “Accustomed as you [vous] are 
to the movement of the posts and to the psychoanalytic move-
ment, to everything that they authorize as concerns falsehoods, 
fictions, pseudonyms, homonyms, or anonyms, you will not be 
reassured, nor will anything be the least bit attenuated, softened, 
familiarized, by the fact that […]” (PC, 5–6/9–10). Not at all re-
assuring. Psychoanalysis and the movement of the posts (not to 
speak of all the fabrications of fictional selves these days by poli-
ticians, by email, by Facebook, and so on) have made us all sus-
picious readers, on the lookout for falsehoods, fictions, etc. We 
are unwilling to assume that anyone is who she or he says they 
are. Nevertheless, what follows “by the fact that” seems to make 
a wholesale reversal: “by the fact that I assume responsibility for 
these envois, for what remains, or no longer remains, of them, 
and that in order to make peace within you [vous] I am signing 
them here in my proper name, Jacques Derrida” (PC, 6/10). A 
date (7 September 1979) follows on the next line in a parody of 
legal confirmation of a signature.
“Whew!” you say, “At least one thing is certain. Jacques Der-
rida was one single person and took responsibility for having 
written the whole of ‘Envois,’ even the parts left out, burned 
away.” This certainty is reinforced in my copy of the French 
original that Derrida dedicated to me and to my wife. (See scan 
above.) He also signed his first name on the last page of the pref-
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ace in his own unmistakable handwriting, or perhaps it is the 
work of a cunning forger. Here is a scan of that:
Alas, even this certainty is dashed by a footnote to that print-
ed signature at the end of the preface. Note that small super-
script 1. The appended footnote, with its characteristic cheer-
ful Derridean irony, takes away even the residual unification of 
Jacques Derrida the putative author that has momentarily reas-
sured you or me as readers: 
I regret that you [tu] do not very much trust my signature, on 
the pretext that we might be several. This is true, but I am not 
saying it in order to make myself more important by means 
of some supplementary authority [as when a critic, theorist, 
or philosopher says, for example, “we shall show” rather than 
“I shall show.” Derrida habitually uses this professorial “we.”]. 
And even less in order to disquiet. I know what this costs. 
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You [Tu] are right, doubtless we are several, and I am not as 
alone as I sometimes say I am when the complaint escapes 
from me, or when I still put everything into seducing you [à 
te séduire]. (PC, 6/10)
That might add yet another genre. The “Envois” are an attempt 
to seduce you, that is, me, as the reader, any reader, of “Envois.”
***
My apparent search has been for an answer to the question, “To 
what genre does ‘Envois’ belong?” I need to know this in order 
to know how to gloss it and what to gloss. Far from reaching 
certainty about this, I have instead encountered, in what Der-
rida himself says in the “preface,” a long series of possible but 
incompatible genres. Far from obeying his own command not 
to mix genres, Derrida mixes genres big time. “Envois” may be 
a disguised autobiography, or the remains of a destroyed cor-
respondence, or the preface to a book he has not written, or an 
extended interpretation of that post card from the Bodleian, or 
an extended gloss of that unwritten book, or a strange apostro-
phe to you the reader, or an attempt at seducing that you, or 
a history of the postal system in its relation to psychoanalysis, 
or an epistolary novel, or a detective story. In the end, to your 
dismay, “Derrida” is saying that it is up to you to choose which 
genre it is, to take responsibility for that choice and to gloss on 
that basis. 
If Derrida is right to say that something is literature if it is 
taken as literature, that there is no “essence of literature,” no dis-
tinctive linguistic markings that justify you to say “This is a liter-
ary work,”7 it follows that you are to a considerable degree free 
to assign a genre to any text you gloss, teach, read, or interpret. 
7 Derek Attridge, “‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’: An Interview 
with Jacques Derrida,” trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, in 




Each choice would determine what and how to gloss. You would 
gloss differently if you took “Envois” as an extended apostrophe 
rather than as a somewhat disguised autobiography. 
I myself lean toward taking “Envois” as belonging to a genre 
that had, in 1980, when La carte postale was published, only re-
cently been given a name, and that Derrida himself does not 
suggest: the so-called post-modern novel. That sort of novel, 
from proto-post-modern narratives by Beckett, Borges, and 
Woolf (especially The Waves) down through more recent work 
by Pynchon, Doctorow, Delillo, McEwan, Coetzee, et al., has 
had as one of its goals a wholesale putting in question, not just 
in theory but also in practice, of those logocentric assumptions 
about the unitary selfhood of author, narrator, and characters, 
and those assumptions about intersubjectivity, that formed 
the standard conventions of the novel from Defoe to Conrad. 
Though those conventions were always in one way or another 
problematized in any given novel from Don Quixote on, nev-
ertheless they had a considerable degree of sovereign author-
ity over readers’ expectations. Postmodern novels take material 
from the real world and even from the life of the author to create 
a non-realistic fictive world of one sort or another that questions 
unitary selfhood and the coherence of beginning, middle, and 
end in a narrative. Putting the “Envois” in that context and tak-
ing it as a post-modern novel would make possible productive 
choices about what to gloss in that text.
Deer Isle, Maine
July 14, 2012, revised August 28, 2016
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The reader of The Post Card is surely to be excused for drawing 
a blank from time to time. It’s not easy going — a Derrida text 
rarely is — and “To Speculate — on ‘Freud’” and “Le facteur de 
la vérité” are among Derrida’s most challenging works. But pa-
tience and rereading almost always have their rewards when it 
comes to Derrida. However difficult these essays may be at first 
glance or at a first reading, they are not impenetrable, as some 
have wanted to pretend, and multiple readings almost always 
yield a coherent if not convincing reading of Freud or Lacan 
on themes such as repetition, legacy, language, the unconscious, 
or the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy. 
Even if the reader winds up drawing a blank now and again, the 
goal nonetheless remains and should remain to interpret and 
to understand, in a word, to gloss — the argument as well as the 
rhetoric, the organization as well as the themes, everything from 
the theses that are put forward to the language and terms used 
to support them. To arrive at a reading of these works — that 
should remain the goal of every reader who enters the ring or 
the arena of interpretation, every reader who agrees to going 
postcard.
When it comes to the “Envois,” however, something else 
seems to be at work. More prosaic, comprehensible, sometimes 
even pedestrian — at least on their surface — the envois display 
another sort of blank, one drawn not by the reader but by the 
author or author/editor of these envois. Unlike the blanks drawn 
by the reader of the essays of The Post Card, the blanks of the en-
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vois are marked as blanks and so have to be read as such. Like a 
text written in invisible ink, these blank spots or white blotches 
on the page seem to erase what was once there, making invisible 
what was once visible — and then making this very invisibility 
itself visible for a stretch of some 52 spaces. Derrida speaks of 
these blanks in this way in his preface to The Post Card:
Whatever their original length, the passages that have dis-
appeared are indicated, at the very place of their incinera-
tion, by a blank of 52 signs                                                    and 
a contract insists that this stretch of destroyed surface remain 
forever indeterminable. In question might be a proper name 
or punctuation mark, just the apostrophe that replaces an 
elided letter, a word, one or several letters, in question might 
be brief or very long sentences, numerous or scant, that occa-
sionally were themselves originally unterminated. Obviously 
I am speaking of a continuum composed each time of words 
or sentences, of signs missing from the interior, if it can be 
put thus, of a card, of a letter or of a card-letter. For the totally 
incinerated envois could not be indicated by any mark. I had 
first thought of preserving the figures and the dates, in other 
words the places of signature, but I gave it up. […] As for 
the 52 signs, the 52 mute spaces, in question is a cipher that 
I had wanted to be symbolic and secret — in a word a clever 
cryptogram, that is, a very naïve one, that had cost me long 
calculations. If I state now, and this is the truth, I swear, that I 
have totally forgotten the rule as well as the elements of such 
a calculation, as if I had thrown them into the fire, I know 
in advance all the types of reaction that this will not fail to 
induce all around. (PC, 4–5)
Derrida’s comments help clarify the artifice of these blanks, 
Derrida’s art of drawing blanks — the “contract” he would have 
drawn up with himself in order to publish these quasi-auto-
biographical envois, these “remainders,” as he writes earlier, 
“of a recently destroyed correspondence” (PC, 3). It is not that 
the text was already “there,” printed or formatted, already laid 
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out in page proofs, as it were, and that 52 characters were then 
erased — whited out — at strategic places throughout the envois. 
No, a blank of 52 characters was inserted each time to efface 
anything from a single character — a single letter or punctua-
tion mark — to short or very long sentences. The 52 characters 
thus impose a kind of measure or regularity on what is irregu-
lar and of unequal measure. Beneath the blanks of equal length 
are — were — texts of unequal length that have become through 
their erasure equally unreadable.
As for the location of these blanks, they can be found, it would 
seem, more or less anywhere in an envoi or sentence. Looking at 
just the first three envois, those of 3 June 1977 (PC, 8–9), we see 
that the 52 blank spaces can be found at what appears to be the 
beginning of a sentence (“                                                    we have 
asked each other the impossible, as the impossible, both of us.”), 
the middle of a sentence (“Never taken, in sum, the time to write 
you what I would have wanted, it has never been left to me, and if 
I write you without interruption                                                    I 
will have sent you only cards.”), the end of a sentence (“Even if 
they are letters and I always put more than one in the same enve-
lope                                                    ”), and even at the beginning 
and end of a sentence (“                                                    I love all 
my appellations for you and then we would have but one lip, one 
alone to say everything                                                    ”). If there 
is a rhyme or reason for the placement of these blanks, it will 
take a mighty clever reader to discover it.
As for the content of the blanks, the text or writing that has 
been blotted out, Derrida gives us some indication of this in 
the preface — though only in general and as a sort of tempta-
tion for interpretation: “a proper name or punctuation mark,” 
he says. Presumably, most of these blanks were drawn, as we 
say, to protect the innocent, or to protect their author, as a way 
of practicing or exercising discretion by concealing a proper 
name, an identifying mark, or a compromising detail. What is 
blanked out could be a name, a date, a place, or a declaration of 
some kind, and unless there is some key or code for decipher-
ing these blanks — a hypothesis that would need to be demon-
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strated — the reader is condemned each time to frustration, that 
is, to drawing or redrawing blanks.
In the “Envois,” drawing blanks is thus not a preliminary 
stage on the way to a fuller understanding, something to be 
overcome in principle if not in fact. It is an essential element of 
the text and an unavoidable experience of reading. The blanks in 
the program are, as it were, part of the program, part of the text, 
interruptions of meaning that ultimately cannot be parsed or 
filled in, lacunae for which no reader can compensate or make 
amends. It is one of the reasons why Derrida writes on the first 
page of The Post Card, “As for the ‘Envois’ themselves, I do not 
know if their reading is bearable” (PC, 1).
Not unlike what are called by grammarians “irrecoverable el-
lipses,” these blanks do not suggest or convey some hidden or 
absent or implicit meaning (as in Diderot’s line to Sophie Vol-
land cited at the outset of Memoirs of the Blind, “wherever there 
will be nothing, read that I love you”); they erase or inciner-
ate meaning — with no promise of recovery or return. Unlike 
the blanks drawn by the reader of the essays, the blanks of the 
“Envois” — the letters, words, names, phrases, or sentences that 
have been, for whatever reason, effaced or erased, excised or 
incinerated — must remain blank in principle and not only in 
fact. We can only ever guess — we can never know — what was 
written there, what event is being recalled, what names invoked. 
In these “open letters,” there is something that will remain for-
ever closed. Assuming that no trace of what was once written 
there remains to be discovered in the archive — drafts of these 
letters before the insertion of blanks, at IMEC or at Irvine — these 
blanks will continue to resist our reading, and Derrida’s death in 
October 2004 will have forever drawn a veil over even the prom-
ise of one day discovering their secret. What was once secret to 
Derrida alone, and yet still able to be revealed while he was still 
living, will have become with his death forever concealed — like 
a crypt.
One thus cannot know what is contained in these crypts, and 
even speculation about them is dangerous, prone to all kinds of 
phantasmatic projections. As for this word crypt, it seems jus-
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tified by Derrida’s own reference to a “clever cryptogram” that 
would have governed the making of these blanks of 52 spaces. 
While it is impossible, therefore, to discover what is in or behind 
these crypts, it is hard not to ask about the nature of the crypt 
itself, to ask, for example, “What is a crypt?,” a question that 
Derrida himself asked just a year before the first of the envois, 
in 1976, in his forward to Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s 
The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy.1 Derrida begins that 
essay: “What is a crypt? What if I were writing on one now?” 
(“Fors,” ix) This theme of the crypt will have been central to 
much of Derrida’s work from at least Glas (1974) onward. To cite 
just the first of many references to crypts in Glas, especially since 
it — and the letter of Genet folded within it — seems to bear an 
uncanny relation to the situation of the envois: “You are still on 
the stairway, on the way to a crypt that always expects you to 
come in advance of just what it seems to conceal. ‘It was then 
that we began to exchange the love letters in which we spoke of 
ourselves […]. He signed his first letter ‘Illegible,’ as a matter of 
caution, and I began my reply with ‘Dear Illegible’” (G, 33b).2
The blanks drawn throughout The Post Card are, it would 
seem, so many crypts, where names and places and who knows 
what else have become illegible, erased or effaced, or else locked 
away, sealed from the inside, as it were, with no possibility of 
ever being revealed. But, again, it seems appropriate to ask, since 
Derrida asks this not once but several times throughout “Fors,” 
“What is a crypt? Not a crypt in general, but this one, in its sin-
gularity, the one I shall keep coming back to?” (“Fors,” xiii) The 
first answer to this question would obviously have to be that 
every crypt defies the generality of the “What is…?” or ti esti 
1 Jacques Derrida, “Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok,” in Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: 
A Cryptonymy, trans. Barbara Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1986), xi–xlviii. The essay initially appeared in French in 1976; 
henceforth, “Fors.”
2 Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., and Richard Rand (Lincoln: 




question. As Derrida argues on the same page: “it remains that 
the question ‘What is a crypt?’ can no longer, it seems to me, be 
posed” (“Fors,” xiii).
And yet certain traits of the crypt remain to be deciphered, 
even glossed. For example, still in “Fors,” and right on the next 
page, after again posing the “What is…?” question, Derrida 
gives us something of an answer: “What is a crypt? No crypt 
presents itself. The grounds [lieux] are so disposed as to disguise 
and to hide: something, always a body in some way. But also 
to disguise the act of hiding and to hide the disguise: the crypt 
hides as it holds” (“Fors,” xiv). And then a couple of pages later: 
“What the crypt commemorates, as the incorporated object’s 
‘monument’ or ‘tomb,’ is not the object itself, but its exclusion, 
the exclusion of a specific desire from the introjection process. 
[…] The crypt is the vault of a desire” (“Fors,” xvii).
These passages are illuminating, clarifying, at the same time 
as they multiply the difficulties and ambiguities. To do full jus-
tice to this question of the crypt — something that is beyond 
the ambitions of this modest reading of the blanks of The Post 
Card — would involve, clearly, a reading of Derrida’s entire re-
lationship to psychoanalysis, a rethinking, for example, of the 
nature of the unconscious, of desire, loss, introjection and in-
corporation, the distinction between mourning and melan-
choly, and so on. Let me instead underscore just a few traits of 
the crypt in relationship to the passage from The Post Card that 
I have been following here. We will then see, I think, how these 
blanks — these crypts — communicate in a subterranean way 
with not only the essays of The Post Card but Derrida’s corpus 
more generally.
The first essential trait of the crypt is that it is not natural. 
In The Post Card Derrida emphasizes, as we already saw, that 
the blanks he drew were the result of a “contract.” In “Fors,” he 
says even more forthrightly with a nod toward Heraclitus: “A 
crypt is never natural through and through, and if, as is well 
known, physis has a tendency to encrypt (itself), that is because 
it overflows its own bounds and encloses, naturally, its others, 
all others” (“Fors,” xiv). The crypt is thus never purely and sim-
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ply natural but the place, the contrived, artificial, non-natural, 
always historically determined place, where a desire or a force 
becomes encrypted, entombed, sealed away by a process where-
in nature folds back on itself, as it were, after a detour through 
language and history.
Second, if the crypt passes always by way of encryption, it 
is itself mute or is itself a place of mute forces. Again in The 
Post Card Derrida speaks of “the 52 signs, the 52 mute spaces,” 
and in “Fors” he writes: “The violence of the mute forces that 
would thus be setting up the crypt does not end with the trauma 
of a single unbearable and condemned seduction scene — con-
demned to remain mute” (“Fors,” xv). This muteness is related, 
clearly, to secrecy, to the need for keeping or remaining silent, 
the need for these remains to remain silent: “‘Secrecy is essen-
tial,’ whence the crypt, a hidden place, a disguise hiding the 
traces of the act of disguising, a place of silence” (“Fors,” xvii).
Third, and perhaps most obviously, the crypt is always re-
lated to death — even as it always calls into question the very 
notions of life and death and the limit between them: “the cryp-
tic place is also a sepulcher,” and “the inhabitant of a crypt is 
always a living dead, a dead entity we are perfectly willing to 
keep alive, but as dead, one we are willing to keep, as long as 
we keep it, within us, intact in any way save as living” (“Fors,” 
xxi). If the blanks of the “Envois” are indeed crypts, well beyond 
the artifice of the 52 blank spaces, well beyond, therefore, the 
controlled and calculated intentions of their author, they also 
conceal a “living dead” that cannot, by definition, make it into a 
text or into consciousness without having to declare itself living 
or dead but never both at once. To try to fill in these blanks or 
open these crypts would thus be nothing short of a violation of 
their very logic or force: “To track down the path to the tomb, 
then to violate the sepulcher: That is what the analysis of a cryp-
tic incorporation is like” (“Fors,” xxxiv). This line alone goes a 
long way to explaining Derrida’s resistance to a certain psychoa-
nalysis, to one that does not know, for example, how to leave the 
crypt intact, or how to think a genuinely radical unconscious, or 
how to fail to mourn.
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The crypt is, therefore, a sepulcher — or an urn — contain-
ing remains that have been buried or burned, incinerated. This 
would be yet another trait of the crypt: it is not just the place 
where a body is buried but the site of an incineration. In a pas-
sage from the preface to The Post Card where we find encrypted, 
as it were, the name of this other text on the crypt that we have 
been reading (“Fors”), as well as a signature phrase from the end 
of Dissemination (“il y a là cendre”), Derrida says that the envois 
are like the remains of a correspondence recently destroyed by 
fire:
You might consider them, if you really wish to, as the remain-
ders of a recently destroyed correspondence. Destroyed by 
fire or by that which figuratively takes its place, more certain 
of leaving nothing out of the reach of what I like to call the 
tongue of fire, not even the cinders if cinders there are [s’il y 
a là cendre]. Save [fors] for a chance. (PC, 3)
If the envois are like what remains after a fire, then the blanks are 
like what is still smoldering or burning within them — disrupt-
ing their order and their logic and so introducing incalculability 
into their numbers and their chronology. For the crypt, like the 
blank, is ultimately incalculable — a fifth characteristic of the 
crypt. Even if the blanks of The Post Card are the result of cal-
culation, each time exactly 52 characters, what is burned or bur-
ied there is beyond calculation. Derrida writes in “Shibboleth,” 
another important text on the crypt: “[T]here is something of a 
crypt, one that remains incalculable; it does not conceal a single, 
determinate secret, a semantic content waiting behind the door 
for the one who holds a key. If there is indeed a door, […] it does 
not represent itself in this way.”3
3 Jacques Derrida, “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan,” in Sovereignties in Question: 
The Poetics of Paul Celan, trans. Joshua Wilner, revised by Thomas Dutoit 
(Bronx: Fordham University Press, 1995), 33; henceforth, “S.” This essay is 
dated October 14, 1984.
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Sixth, the crypt — like the blank — always raises the ques-
tion of singularity and repetition. While what is encrypted is 
always absolutely singular and unique, absolutely unrepeatable, 
in order for that uniqueness to be read, in order for it to be en-
crypted, precisely, it must appear in a series. Unique, unrepeat-
able, unreadable, the crypt must be readable as what is each 
time unreadable, repeatable as what is each time unrepeatable, 
in a series with other singularities that always resist serializa-
tion — just like a date, the seventh and final trait of the crypt 
that I will follow here, the seventh and final seal of the crypt to 
be opened.
It is no coincidence — or rather, it is in order to think coin-
cidence otherwise, at the intersection, as always, of nature and 
chance — that the envois are each time preceded by a date. The 
date at once marks the envoi’s singularity, its absolute unique-
ness, that which will remain incalculable and unrepeatable about 
a unique event or encounter, and the place where that event is 
put into relation to another — into a calendar or a journal with 
52 × 7 days, as a way of ordering, precisely, unique events that 
have no “natural” order. The crypt — like the date — seems to 
mark the place where the incalculable repeats itself and thus be-
comes calculable, the place where the unique and unrepeatable 
event encounters itself and so gets repeated. 
In “Shibboleth” again, a text written seven years after the first 
envoi, Derrida treats the question of the date in a way that is very 
similar to the way he treated the crypt. He asks, for example, 
“What is a date? Do we have the right to pose such a question, 
and in this form? The form of the question ‘What is…?’ is not 
without provenance” (“S,” 14). The date, like the crypt, seems 
to resist the “What is…?” question of classical ontology insofar 
as it too marks a singularity that cannot be gathered under any 
concept other than that of singularity. And, like a crypt, a date is 
not purely natural. Hence Derrida in “Shibboleth” uses the same 
Heraclitus he used to speak of the crypt to speak, seven years 
later, of the date.
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It is necessary that, in a certain manner, the unrepeatable di-
vide itself in repeating itself, and in the same stroke encipher 
or encrypt itself. Like physis, a date loves to encrypt itself. It 
must efface itself in order to become readable, to render itself 
unreadable in its very readability. For if the date does not sus-
pend in itself the unique marking that connects it to an event 
without witness, without other witness, it remains intact but 
absolutely indecipherable. (“S,” 15)
To think the date we thus need to rethink everything associated 
with the crypt. Notice in the following passage from “Shibbo-
leth” the way in which Derrida brings together the date and the 
crypt through the themes of uniqueness or nonrecurrence, rep-
etition, unreadability, incineration, and ash: “Consumption, be-
coming-ash, burning up or incineration of a date: on the hour, 
in the hour itself, at each hour. This is the threat of an absolute 
crypt: nonrecurrence, unreadability, amnesia without remain-
der, but nonrecurrence as recurrence, in recurrence itself ” (“S,” 
46). It is as if the crypt were always dated and the date were 
always a kind of crypt.
To return to the place from which I set out, it can be said that 
the blanks of The Post Card remain — like a crypt — unreadable, 
secret, not only in fact but already in principle, beyond all her-
meneutical or interpretative keys. Each time, it remains unique, 
each time — that is, repeatedly — it is unreadable, undecipher-
able. To cite “Shibboleth” again:
The crypt remains, the shibboleth remains secret, the passage 
uncertain, and the poem unveils a secret only to confirm that 
there is something secret there, withdrawn, forever beyond 
the reach of hermeneutic exhaustion. A non-hermetic secret, 
it remains, and the date with it, heterogeneous to all interpre-
tative totalization. (“S,” 26)
What the blanks of The Post Card “signify,” in the end, is not or 
not only that a determinate content has been lost but that there 
is something incalculable and unreadable, a blank, precisely, 
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even there where there is no blank, a crypt that encrypts itself 
even in those places where there is no “obvious” crypt. What 
remains in The Post Card, then, are the remains of a correspond-
ence — one that is dated and pockmarked by blanks or crypts 
that will have made visible an invisibility that haunts the vis-
ible as well. The crypt encrypts itself not just in the blanks but 
in all those places where a singular event is marked. In other 
words, what the blank makes visible is that there is a drawing 
of blanks within writing itself, an incineration of the remains 
from within, a crypt even in those places — especially in those 
places — where names are recalled and dates are given. To cite 
“Shibboleth” one final time:
[T]he experience of ashes in the incineration of the date, 
from within the experience of the date as incineration. The 
latter will no longer designate, in this place, the operation at 
times decided on or rejected by whoever asks himself wheth-
er or not to proceed with the cremation, with the destruction 
by fire, leaving no remains other than ashes, of this living 
being or of this archive. The incineration of which I speak 
takes place prior to any operation, it burns from within. (“S,” 
41–42)
What remains, then, are the remains of a correspondence and a 
certain relationship between the unreadable and the readable, 
between remains and what remains, between incalculable ashes 
and the calculable spaces — each time 52.
But why the number 52 — since the “choice” of number was, 
after all, Derrida’s, a choice imposed upon him perhaps by other 
factors but one that was more or less freely taken up by him and 
used as an ordering principle? The first thing to note about 52, 
the first thing that Jacques Derrida would have no doubt noted, 
is that 5 and 2 add up to 7, not just the number of days in a week 
but the number of letters in both “Jacques” and “Derrida”. The 
number 7 was thus important to Derrida for reasons of both 
the name and the date — and for the fact that it is typically on 
the seventh day of life that a Jewish boy is given his secret name 
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during the ritual of circumcision. Some 14 years after the pub-
lication of The Post Card (1980), Derrida in Archive Fever (Mal 
d’archive) (1994) cites the beginning of a letter from Jakob Freud 
to his son, Sigmund, that recalls this fact: “Son who is dear to 
me, Shelomoh. In the seventh in the days of the years of your 
life the Spirit of the Lord began to move you and spoke within 
you: Go, read my Book that I have written and there will burst 
open for you the wellsprings of understanding, knowledge, 
and wisdom.”4 But one does not need to go out twice 7 years 
from The Post Card in order to learn of the importance of the 
number 7 (sept) for Derrida. Already near the very end of the 
“Envois,” Derrida speaks most eloquently about his own “set 
theory” — his sept theory or theory regarding the number sept. 
After a blank of 52 spaces, we read:
                                                    and on the card’s itinerary, 
short pause, you encounter Aristoteles: the male who begins 
to have sperm at twice 7 years, the gestation of fish that cor-
responds to a period divisible by 7, the death of newborns 
before the 7th day and this is why they receive their name on 
the 7th, and the foetus that lives if it is expulsed at 7 months, 
and not at 8 months, etc., so only circumcision was missing 
from this history of animals. The first telephone number in 
El-Biar, the unforgettable one I had told you, 730 47: in the 
beginning was a seven, and at the end, and in the middle 3 + 
4, and it turns around zero, the central. (PC, 254)
And then, just a bit later, at the beginning of the penultimate 
envoi, as if the number 7 and the 52 blanks were crypts for an 
unnameable god: “7, my god                                                    ” 
(PC, 255).
4 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press), 1996, 23; henceforth, AF. First published in French as Mal 




As for 52, which is not, alas, divisible by 7, it is a natural 
choice insofar as it recalls the return of the year after a 52 week 
cycle, a “natural” number, therefore, that is nonetheless cultur-
ally determined, at once dating and dated, determined, in some 
sense, by nature and by chance, a good number, then, for the 
total number of cards in a deck — like the kind Derrida’s mother 
Georgette would have used to play her favorite game of poker. 
Between the cycle of the year and the cards of a deck, between 
nature and chance, calculability and incalculability, it is surely 
not by chance that the number 52 should be found at the center 
of a work whose letters or postcards are both the random re-
mains of a correspondence and a carefully ordered sequence of 
cards dealt out chronologically from 8 June 1977 to 30 August 
1979.
But the number 52 must have been important to Derrida for 
other reasons as well, since The Post Card would not be the last 
time he would use the number 52 as an ordering device. Seven 
years after the French publication of The Post Card, Derrida 
published, in 1987, a short text on architecture entitled “Fifty-
two Aphorisms for a Foreword,” a text which begins with this 
aphorism on the aphorism: “1. The aphorism decides, but as 
much by its substance as by its form, it determines by a play of 
words.”5 And then seven years later again, in 1994, in the writing 
of his important essay “Faith and Knowledge,” Derrida would 
divide his text into 52 numbered parts, 52 unequal sequences.6
The number 52 thus seems to have imposed itself upon Der-
rida in a rather unique way. In the preface to The Post Card, 
Derrida says that he “had wanted [this number] to be symbolic 
and secret — in a word a clever cryptogram, that is, a very naïve 
5 Jacques Derrida, “Fifty-Two Aphorisms for a Foreword,” trans. Andrew 
Benjamin, in Psyche 2: Inventions of the Other, eds. Peggy Kamuf and Eliza-
beth Rottenberg, 117–26 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 117.
6 Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at 
the Limits of Reason Alone,” trans. Samuel Weber, in Religion, eds. Jacques 
Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, 1–78 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998). Though this text was not completed and signed until April 1995, it 
was first presented at a conference on the Island of Capri in February 1994.
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one, that had cost [him] long calculations.” But he then goes on 
to say, to confess or to feign to confess, that he has “forgotten the 
rule as well as the elements” of the calculation that got him to 52. 
He wanted it to be a “cipher” for him alone, it seems, “symbolic 
and secret” only for him, a “clever cryptogram” that would be 
readable only by him, which is no doubt why it was necessary 
for him too to forget it. For it to become a crypt, it would have 
to be, like all crypts, forever unreadable for him as well as for us.
The cipher, the crypt, must remain forever indecipherable. 
And yet Derrida tells us enough about the cipher in general to 
allow us to speculate a bit, to calculate, to try to make an edu-
cated guess not about each and every blank but at least about 
the principle of 52 that marks the headstone of each. As Der-
rida writes, for instance, in “Shibboleth”: “The date (signature, 
moment, place, gathering of singular marks) always operates as 
a shibboleth. It shows that there is something not shown, that 
there is ciphered singularity: irreducible to any concept, to any 
knowledge, even to a history or tradition” (“S,” 33). Since Der-
rida relates the “ciphered singularity” here to the date, which is, 
as we have seen, always absolutely singular, each time absolutely 
unique, repeatable as unrepeatable, we might speculate that the 
number 52 also encrypts a date, one close or dear to Derrida, 
the sum, in sum, of a birth date — July 15, 1930, that is, 7 + 15 + 
30 — a date, a crypt, “symbolic and secret,” that would be abso-
lutely unique, like every other date, and that would return, like 
the year, every year in an anniversary.
But this is, of course, just speculation, since all we can do 
today is speculate — speculate and then perhaps wonder with 
regard to Derrida what Derrida in Archive Fever once wondered 
about Freud:
We will always wonder what, in this mal d’archive, he may 
have burned. We will always wonder, sharing with compas-
sion in this archive fever, what may have burned of his secret 
passions, of his correspondence, or of “his life.” Burned with-
out him, without remains and without knowledge. With no 
possible response, be it spectral or not, short of or beyond 
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a suppression, on the other edge of repression, originary or 
secondary, without a name, without the least symptom, and 
without even an ash. (AF, 101)
We will always wonder about the blanks he will have drawn. But 
if those blanks are also always the source of our wonder or our 
compassion, then perhaps we must learn not to fill them in but 




Troubling Lines: The Process of Address in 
Derrida’s The Post Card
There is a line in The Post Card that has always bothered me. 
Now, to be clear, I do not hate this line. It does not keep me up 
at night. I do not have to suppress the urge to burn the book 
every time I read it. But I have never understood its phrasing 
or placement. It is, for me, in tension with the constellation of 
claims and concepts around which it circulates. This line comes 
in the second entry marked 6 June 1977 (PC, 16–17/20–22). In 
this passage, Derrida gives a reading of the postcard that in-
spires his text. One will recall that the image on this card is of 
Socrates seated at a writing desk, pen in hand, with a smaller 
Plato standing behind him, seemingly dictating. Derrida spends 
the majority of this passage analyzing a number of the peculi-
arities of this image (the positioning of the figures, the fact that 
it is Socrates writing and not Plato, the seeming confusion of 
master and pupil, teacher and student, etc). In the middle of 
this analysis, however, Derrida interjects the following state-
ment, apparently in response to the question, “[t]o whom do 
you think he [Socrates] writes?” Derrida states, “[f]or me it is 
always more important to know that [to whom one writes] than 
to know what is being written; moreover I think it amounts to 
the same, to the other finally” (PC, 17/21). This is the line that 
has always troubled me, particularly because of the privilege it 
grants to knowledge of addressees over that of content. Allow 
me to elaborate. 
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In this line, Derrida claims an epistemological privilege of 
the who of a letter over its what. It is more important, he con-
tends, to know the addressee of a letter rather than its content. 
What I find initially troubling about this claim is that it reso-
nates a little too closely with a certain history of privileging the 
subject at the expense of the object. This resonance is extended 
with the introduction of an identity between addressee and con-
tent. According to the final clause of Derrida’s assertion, knowl-
edge of a letter’s addressee is ultimately identical to knowledge 
of its content — they, in the end, “amount to the same.” The mix-
ture of these two claims, that, on the one hand, there is a certain 
epistemological privilege of the addressee and, on the other, that 
ultimately addressee and content form an identity, suggests that 
even in their identity content is somehow subordinate to its ad-
dressee. They are identical. And yet, the addressee remains su-
preme. It is this double logic of identity and privilege that, for 
me, moves this claim in the direction of an idealism that, at least 
since Hegel, would mark the what as subservient and, ultimately, 
reducible to the who. Such idealism is, of course, one of the tar-
gets of Derrida’s critique of logocentrism, where the ideological 
superiority of speech, voice, logos, and the Enlightenment sub-
ject is put in question precisely by the figure of writing. Thus, 
it seems odd that Derrida would endorse the epistemological 
privilege of the addressee over the written text, the privilege of 
the who of a letter over its what, and, ultimately, the subordina-
tion of the what to the who. The oddness of this claim is fur-
thered by the fact that it does not seem readily explained.
There is little in the context of the passage in which this claim 
emerges that directly speaks to it. Derrida’s statement neither 
answers the question that precedes it, concerning to whom 
Socrates might write, nor is it developed in the remainder of the 
passage. In addition, it seems impossible to justify this privilege 
purely on the grounds of otherness, since, insofar as otherness 
forms the identity between addressee and content, it cannot, 
simultaneously, serve to justify the epistemological privilege 
of the addressee. In fact, this claim reads like a methodological 
interjection, as though, having asked the question of Socrates’ 
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intended audience, Derrida simply wanted to remind us of his 
general approach to such issues: “don’t forget,” he seems to be 
saying, “I prefer knowledge of addressees to that of content.” Yet, 
while there is little in this passage that directly explains the priv-
ilege afforded to the addressee, there is at least one additional 
element with which it is at odds, namely, the issue of violence. 
The passage in question begins with a discussion of the vio-
lence involved in the act of addressing. Derrida writes: 
[O]ut of this atrocious exclusion that we make of all of 
them — and every possible reader. The whole world. The 
worst of “final solutions,” without limit, this is what we are 
declaring, you and I, when we cipher everything [chiffrant 
tout], including our clothes, our steps, what we eat, […] 
write, “signify,” etc. And yet the opposite is not less true. All 
those left out have never been so alive […]. (PC, 16/20–21) 
The stakes of deciding whom one will address, in the broadest 
sense, always involves the risk of violence. The selecting of one 
addressee over another, the encoding of a message to a specific 
audience, effectively excludes an entire world of other readers, 
an act that Derrida associates with the holocaust. When one ad-
dresses a letter, one engages in a process of exclusion and vio-
lence, which, in principle, has no limit to its destructive force. 
Hence, addressing necessarily involving the risks of violence, 
exclusion, death, and annihilation. Yet, while these risks remain 
necessarily immense and irreducible, they also remain, at root, 
indecipherable. 
Although the process of addressing contains the possibil-
ity of the worst kinds of violence, it does not guarantee violent 
ends. Rather, the indecipherability of this process means that 
those excluded may, in fact, not be harmed at all. They may, on 
the contrary, be made more alive than ever, insofar as they re-
main outside the classificatory grasp of this logic. Hence, select-
ing an addressee involves both the denial and extension of life: 
the ultimate affirmation of life and its absolute negation. What 
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seems particularly powerful about this claim is the way in which 
it highlights, in its indecipherability, the stakes of this process. 
The addressing of a letter is not, for Derrida, merely an act 
of inclusion or exclusion. It is an action that encodes the very 
determinations of inclusion and exclusion, violence and non-
violence, and, most radically, life and death. Insofar as every 
act of addressing involves both the denial and extension of life, 
this process also clandestinely demarcates the border separat-
ing life from death, living from non-living. Those to whom one 
addresses a letter are inscribed on the side of life, while those 
excluded remain, in some sense, indeterminate in relation to life 
and death. This inscription and indeterminacy introduces the 
notion that while every addressing marks a possible moment 
of violent exclusion, a determination of life, and a demarcation 
of who or what can be counted among the living, this inscrip-
tion is also necessarily put into question by this process. Hence, 
addressing inscribes and destabilizes the categories of life and 
death, living and non-living, animate entity and inanimate ob-
ject. It marks a certain definition of life while suggesting that 
there could always be “life” outside this definition. Hence, to re-
turn to the question of a letter’s addressee and its content, what 
Derrida’s analysis shows is that it is precisely the border between 
addressee and content, who and what, that is put in play by this 
logic. It is in this context that one must, I think, reevaluate Der-
rida’s claim concerning the privilege of addressees. 
Although the logic of Derrida’s argument suggests that fun-
damentally at stake in the process of address is a determination 
of the categories of living/non-living, addressee/content, who/
what, the epistemological privileging of the addressee seems to 
bypass this logic. There is little evidence on which to justify Der-
rida’s claim concerning the privilege of the addressee, insofar as 
it is the process of addressing that, for him, establishes and desta-
bilizes the distinction between addressee and content as such. It 
is this radical possibility that grounds the fascinating claim that 
those excluded in the act of address are, indeterminately, alive 
and dead, utterly animate or totally inanimate. However, it is also 
this possibility to which the question of identity and otherness 
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alludes, as such an identity destabilizes the superiority of the ad-
dressee. The inability to absolutely differentiate addressee from 
content, the always active confusion between living/non-living, 
who/what undermines the privilege of the addressee. Hence af-
ter this analysis, I return to the impasse with which this gloss 
began: unwilling to simply throw this line out and yet unable to 
justify it. Faced with this impasse, I think it is more important 
to hang on to the radical implications of Derrida’s discussion of 
addressing. It is more important to follow out the logic of ad-
dress as establishing the determination of what it means to be 
“alive,” since this concern is at the heart of Derrida’s critique of 
logocentrism and the logic of deconstruction generally. Thus, 
the troubling line remains troubling. It remains at odds with the 
critical thrust of everything Derrida has to say in this passage 
concerning violence and the logic of address. And yet, perhaps 
one can take some comfort in its obstinate persistence, in this 
line’s refusal to square up or back down. Perhaps one can take 
comfort in the thought that there is something important about 
lines that refuse clear explanation, as this refusal entices us to 
continue to think. After all, it seems to me that there is perhaps 





How construe commentary on a postcard that is specifically 
figured as “a pictorial performative which never ends” (PC, 
98/108) — especially if it must reckon, at the same time, with 
that fragmentary phantom supplement published later as 
“Telepathy”1? I have been trying to read a bit of one of your post-
cards, one of several dated 6 June 1977 (I note in passing that my 
own record of that day reveals that I too was in Oxford, and in 
the evening went to watch Yellow Submarine — Oxford can be a 
lonely place on a Monday night):
What is going on under Socrates’ leg, do you recognize this 
object? It plunges under the waves made by the veils around 
the plump buttocks, you see the rounded double, improb-
able enough, it plunges straight down, rigid, like the nose of 
a stingray, to electrocute the old man and analyze him under 
narcosis. You know that they were both very interested in 
this paralyzing animal. Would it make him write by paralyz-
ing him? All of this, that I do not know or do not yet want 
to see, also comes back from the bottom of the waters of my 
memory, a bit as if I had drawn or engraved the scene, from 
the day that, in an Algiers lycée no doubt, I first heard of 
those two. Do people (I am not speaking of “philosophers” or 
1 Jacques Derrida, “Telepathy,” trans. Nicholas Royle, in Psyche: Inventions of 
the Other, vol. 1, eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg, 226–61 (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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of those who read Plato) realize to what extent this old couple 
has invaded our most private domesticity, mixing themselves 
up in everything, taking their part of everything, and mak-
ing us attend for centuries their colossal and indefatigable 
anaparalyses? (PC, 18/23) 
Anaparalyses: is it you? Perhaps you imagine I am invoking the 
name of a woman, the figure of Derrida’s nonexistent daugh-
ter, Anna Paralyses. In any event, it is a question of the reserves 
opening up in the wake of this bizarre portmanteau neologism, 
as if coming back up from the bottom of the waters of memory. 
Paralysis analysis. Analysis of paralysis, analysis as paralysis. Pa-
ralysis up or back (ana-). Anaparalysis as paranalysis. Irreduc-
ibly pluralized. Anasemic.
Much has been said about the 52 spaces on the page and the 
effects of disjunction produced, but the sting of the envois is 
there at every turn, comma, word. Even more perhaps than 
“Circumfession,” it is a bewildering practice of touching, or al-
most touching, and evading. Rather than seek to multiply the 
examples, let’s try to repose, just for a little while, on this weird 
numbing of all analects. 
It is all about the ray. Or at least its nose (la nez d’une torpille). 
(But what kind of nose? And when is a nose a nose? So many 
nose stories in Derrida, starting perhaps with the question of 
being on the “scent” of the trace in Of Grammatology2: another 
interminable work of commentary deconstructing commentary 
to be sniffed out there.) Just prior to this moment he has been 
talking about the multiple erections, the impression of Plato 
“getting an erection in Socrates’ back,” and the assortment of 
the “phallus sheaf, the points, plumes, pens, fingers, nails and 
grattoirs” (PC, 18/23). But this torpedo (also called in English 
the cramp-fish, the cramp-ray, and the numb-fish) — let’s not 
get completely marinated in a discussion of the law of genre, 
2 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 162; De la grammatologie 
(Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967), 233.
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genus and species, translation of fish between one language and 
another, what kind of narkē Plato or Socrates had in mind and 
whether it would have had a nose like the one Derrida sees in 
the fortune-telling postcard picture — this fish is nose-down, 
erection tomb, miming Socrates’ writing instrument or (unde-
cidably) figuring as the thing to be imitated. 
And when Derrida observes that “you know that they were 
both very interested in this paralyzing animal,” you know that 
he is recalling, among other things, that passage in “Plato’s 
Pharmacy” in which he talks about “the Socratic pharmakon” 
in Meno 80a–b: “Socrates’ pharmaceutical charms provoke a 
kind of narcosis, benumbing and paralyzing into aporia, like the 
touch of a sting ray (narkē).”3 It is one of the countless examples 
of analectic shock, quasi-magical transmission between texts, 
a postcard telepathy that, in this case, carries on as if unseen 
through the waters all the way up into “the ray that therefore I 
am.” 
3 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: Chicago 




Post by a Thousand Cuts
Le 8 juin 1977
L’émission de sens ou de semence peut être rejetée (tampon, timbre 
et retour à l’envoyeur). Imagine le jour où, comme je l’ai déjà fait, 
on pourra envoyer du sperme par carte postale, sans passer par un 
chèque tiré sur quelque banque du sperme, et que ça reste assez vivant 
pour que l’insémination artificielle donne lieu à fécondation, voire 
à désir [The emission of sense or of seed can be rejected (postmark, 
stamp, and return to sender). Imagine the day, as I have already, that 
we will be able to send sperm by post card, without going through a 
check drawn on some sperm bank, and that it remains living enough 
for the artificial insemination to yield fecundation, and even desire.] 1
At the turn of the twentieth century, foreign visitors to China 
could purchase postcards with photographs or illustrations of 
“Chinese tortures” (les supplices chinois) and mail them home. 
The particular artifact in figure 1, sent from China to France 
in 1912, depicts a man being executed by lingchi (凌遲 “slow 
slicing,” or “death by a thousand cuts”). This postcard is one it-
eration of the West’s persistent horror at and fascination with 
lingchi. Another example is a post-execution photograph of 
dismembered body parts reproduced in Henry Norman’s The 
Peoples and Politics of the Far East in 1895 (fig. 2).2 As histori-
1 PC, 24/29.




ans point out, foreign military occupation of Beijing following 
the Boxer Rebellion allowed Europeans, especially those able to 
afford a camera, to roam the country more or less at will. Im-
ages of lingchi executions began to circulate as curiosities and 
mementos — especially in the form of postcards — in Europe.3
Photographs of lingchi, such as those printed on postcards, 
would leave Georges Bataille both terrified and enraptured, 
as he confessed repeatedly his obsession with the “young and 
seductive [jeune et séduisant] Chinese man” (fig. 3), most fa-
mously in his 1961 book The Tears of Eros (Larmes d’Eros) but 
also throughout the 1940s.4 Bataille writes in Inner Experience 
(Expérience intérieure): 
I focused on the photographic image — and sometimes just 
my memory of it — of a Chinese man who must have been 
3 Timothy Brook, Jérôme Bourgon, and Gregory Blue, Death by a Thousand 
Cuts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 22, 29–32.
4 Georges Bataille, Inner Experience, trans. Leslie Anne Boldt (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1988), 120; The Tears of Eros, trans. Peter Con-
nor (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1989).
Fig. 1. A postcard of Les Supplices Chinois (1912), as reproduced in Shouxiang 
Chen, Jiu meng chong jing: Fang Lin, Bei Ning cang Qing dai ming xin pian xuan 
ji (1989). © Guangxi mei shu chu ban she. By permission.
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tortured within my own lifetime. I had several prints of this 
torture representing successive stages. By the end of it, the 
figure twists away, his chest flayed out, his arms and legs cut 
off at the knees and elbows. His hair standing on end, hid-
eous, haggard, striped with blood, beautiful as a wasp.5
What attracts Bataille is the apparent ecstatic expression on the 
victim’s face, with his eyes turned up, head thrown back, and 
trembling lips that bare the teeth. For Bataille, photographs of 
lingchi function as a medium, a meeting place of eroticism and 
religious ecstasy through terror.
The turn-of-the-century lingchi postcards and photographs 
conjure up, for me, an image of cannibalistic Mongols drawn by 
Matthew Paris in his thirteenth-century chronica maiora (fig. 4). 
(Are not illuminated manuscripts postcards from the past?) Me-
dieval Mongols, it turns out, have everything to do with Bataille’s 
photographs of lingchi. While the origin of lingchi remains ob-
5 The translation is by Bill Burgwinkle in Bill Burgwinkle and Cary Howie, 
Sanctity and Pornography in Medieval Culture: On the Verge (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2010), 32.
Fig. 2. China: “Death by the Thousand Cuts,” as reproduced in Henry Norman, 
The Peoples and Politics of the Far East (1895).
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scure, the practice is probably dated to the tenth-century Liao 
dynasty of the Khitans in the Central Asian steppes. The Mon-
gols’ Yuan Dynasty, in fact, was the first Chinese regime that 
codified lingchi into law; the execution method was listed as one 
of the Five Punishments in the penal code.6
Bataille’s insight into the commingling of horror and ecstasy, 
pain and pleasure, is facilitated by a postal system from the East; 
through photographs of lingchi, he completes the geo- and tem-
poral-circuit of love. The postal relay systems of the Orient — in 
both the Near and the Far East — were legendary institutions 
that frequently earned the admiration of the West in the Midle 
Ages and beyond. Marco Polo, for instance, meticulously de-
tailed in his Travels the lavish hostels that played host to for-
eign ambassadors and merchants in the fabled city of Cambaluc 
(current day Beijing) during the reign of Kublai Khan. Emanat-
ing from the imperial center was a network of post-stations that 
6 Brook et al., Death by a Thousand Cuts, 73–74.
Fig. 3. The lingchi of pseudo-Fuzhuli, as reproduced in Georges Bataille, Tears 
of Eros (1989). © City Lights Books. By Permission.
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served the messengers in the Great Khan’s efficient postal sys-
tem. At every post (yizhang 驛站), called yam (from the Mon-
golian jamci, Chinese zhanchi 站赤), was a “palatial hostelry” 
worthy of royalties.7 While, strictly speaking, post-stations were 
not necessarily hostels or inns, the two became intertwined in 
the yams spread throughout the medieval Mongol empire.
Curiously, the Mongolian yam was also understood by some 
medieval travelers from the West to mean a “manager of postal 
relay stations.”8 The term denotes both a body and an architec-
tural structure. The polysemy of the medieval yam uncannily 
anticipated Derrida’s deconstructive play with the postal. The 
narrator of The Post Card, under the sign of “Jacques Derrida,” 
sees himself as resembling “a messenger from antiquity […] a 
runner, the courier of what we have given one another” (PC, 8). 
As Alan Bass points out, Derrida fully explores the rich ambigu-
ity and polyvalence of the term poste, which derives from the 
7 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. Ronald Latham (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1958), 151.
8 For instance, William of Rubruck referred to yams as “the men stationed at 
intervals of a day’s journey for the reception of envoys,” in The Mission of 
Friar William Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke 
1253–1255, trans. Peter Jackson (London Hakluyt Society, 1990), 166. See also 
Wan-Chuan Kao, “Hotel Tartary: Marco Polo, Yams, and the Biopolitics of 
Population,” Mediaevalia 32 (2011): 43–68, at 52.
Fig. 4. Matthew Paris, Chronica majora. Corpus Christi College, MS. 16, fol. 




Latin ponere, meaning “to put, to place,” and is linked to the 
word position. The French la poste denotes mail, while le poste 
can mean a position to be held, like a soldier’s post, or a sta-
tion (PC, xxv–xxvi). The word’s complex associations and his-
tories are also evident in Marco Polo’s Travels. In both the origi-
nal Franco-Italian version of Rustichell and in the first French 
translation in 1310, poste is used to designate the Mongol yam.9
Derrida’s interest in all things postal derives from a particular 
postcard that he came across by chance in the Bodleian Library, 
9 See Marco Polo, Milione: Le divisament dou monde. Il milione nelle redazio-
ni toscana e franco-italiana, ed. Gabriella Ronchi (Milan: Mondadori, 1982), 
130; and Marco Polo, La description du monde, ed. Pierre-Yves Badel (Paris: 
Livre de Poche, 1998), 244–45.
Fig. 5. Matthew Paris, opening of a fortune-telling tract. Oxford, Bodleian 
Library MS. Ashmole 301, fol. 31v. © Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford. 
By permission.
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one that reproduced, for retail purchase, a detail of Matthew 
Paris’ illumination depicting Plato and Socrates (fig. 5). What 
intrigues Derrida are the positions of Socrates and Plato in re-
lation to each other in the image: Plato stands behind a seated 
Socrates, who, instruments in hands, is ready to mark a blank 
parchment page. The scene both affirms and upends Western 
philosophy’s assumed origins, teleologies, directions of commu-
nication, and the interplay between the spoken and the yet-to-
be-written (or is it pictured?) words.
As staged, Derrida’s obsession with this postcard shares 
many affective and spiritual parallels with that of Bataille and 
his photographs of lingchi. First, both men experience moments 
of ecstatic epiphanies in their respective encounter. Like Bataille 
before the photograph of a lingchi victim, Derrida records his 
reactions to the postcard: “I stopped dead, with a feeling of hal-
lucination […] and of revelation at the same time, an apoca-
lyptic revelation” (PC, 9). Second, for both, these revelatory 
moments are inseparable from eroticism. Derrida reads the 
postcard as “obscene,” for he sees “Plato getting an erection in 
Socrates’ back and […] the insane hubris of his prick, an inter-
minable, disproportionate erection traversing Paris’s head like a 
single idea and then the copyist’s chair” (PC, 18). The medieval 
writing desk becomes a giant phallus; the encounter between 
Socrates and Plato, homoerotic. Compare this to Bataille’s own 
phallic moment in the midst of his meditation upon the image 
of the Chinese lingchi victim:
[S]uddenly, I felt myself become an erect penis. […] Like a 
torture victim, I had to have my eyes turned up and my head 
thrown back. In this state, the cruel representation of the tor-
ture victim, of the ecstatic gaze, of the bloody bare flanks, 
gave me a lacerating convulsion: a spurt of light crossed 
through my head from bottom to top as voluptuously as the 
passage of semen through a penis.”10
10 Georges Bataille, Guilty, trans. Stuart Kendall (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2011), 188.
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Whereas Bataille’s vision climaxes in an imploding inner death 
as a metamorphosis of the self into an ejaculatory conduit, Der-
rida’s reverie culminates in a fantasy of the posthuman postcard 
as a reproductive organ from the future that, like a pollinator, 
would instantly inseminate the recipient upon contact: “Imag-
ine the day, as I have already, that we will be able to send sperm 
by post card […] and that it remains living enough for the arti-
ficial insemination to yield fecundation, and even desire” (PC, 
24).
Ecstasy, Wayne Koestenbaum explains, is a condition out-
side of stasis: “The word ‘ecstasy’ comes from the Greek eksta, 
stem of existanai, ‘put out of place.’ Histanai means to place. The 
Greek ekstasis incorporates stasis, from sta-, the base of histanai 
(stand).”11 Etymologically, ecstasy implies a state of exile from the 
usual place. Hotel, Koestenbaum suggests, is ecstasy’s territory 
precisely because it is a spatial and temporal displacement from 
home. I would add that the positionality of ecstasy reveals it to 
be fundamentally a postal experience.
There is a bit of Derrida in Bataille, and there’s a bit of Bataille 
in Derrida. Between the two of them, there is a lot of Matthew 
Paris. Unwittingly, the two engage in a male collaboration via 
the scenes and histories of violence depicted on postcards. 
In addition to ecstatic epiphany, homoerotic discharge, and 
heightened self-reflexivity in Bataille and Derrida, there are a 
few more visual cross-inseminations between their respective 
fetishes. Michael Camille has observed that Socrates’ hat (fig. 5), 
which Matthew Paris uses throughout his repertoire to indicate 
the pagan status of medieval Jews and unbelievers, is strikingly 
curled and “eastern-looking.”12 We see a similar hat on the head 
of the cannibalistic Mongol soldier in Matthew’s other illustra-
tion (fig. 4), and also a modified version of the headgear worn 
by Manchu executioners in Bataille’s lingchi photo (fig. 3). The 
11 Wayne Koestenbaum, Hotel Theory (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2007), 50.
12 Michael Camille, “The Dissenting Image: A Postcard from Matthew Par-
is,” in Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, ed. Rita Copeland, 115–50 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 127.
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instruments held by Socrates — the stylus and the scraper — also 
resonate visually with the axe in the Mongol cannibal’s hands, as 
well as with the blade held by the Manchu executioner, poised 
before it touched the naked flesh of the victim. That image of the 
blade entering the flesh, Bataille recounts, is “so great a horror” 
that it faithfully lays bare your nature, “what you are.”13 Derrida’s 
Socrates is not only a pagan but also an Easterner, a Mongol, and 
an executioner in the act of laying bare a different nature upon 
a parchment skin.
If I have been attempting to chart a genealogy here, I want 
to dramatize (à la Bataille), post (à la Derrida), and picture (à 
la Matthew Paris) different deliveries, addresses, senders, and 
recipients. That is, different postcards, ecstasies, and scenes of 
horror. What if Bataille had received the Bodleian postcard of 
Matthew Paris’ Socrates and Plato? And what if Derrida had 
stumbled across a postcard of a Chinese lingchi execution? 
These are the essential pair in the chiasmus: Socrates and Plato; 
the executioner and his victim; and Derrida and Bataille. As 
Bataille meditates upon the Socrates/Plato postcard, who is the 
executioner? Socrates with an oriental hat? Who is the sacrifi-
cial victim? Plato, or the blank parchment? And with whom will 
Bataille have a direct ecstatic union? As Derrida faces the lingchi 
postcard, there is the Chinese victim’s prick and the execution-
er’s blade. But in this scene, who stands behind whom? Who is 
displacing whom? Positionality is a postal ecstasy.
Koestenbaum argues that hotel existence is an uncanny sus-
pension above groundedness: “To be in hotel is to float.”14 When 
in a hotel, one does not stay but stray. The guest at a hotel needs 
to “check in” and, though not always necessary, “check out.” The 
postcard is a time-space compression of the hotel experience. 
Upon delivery, the recipient gazes and touches it, front and 
back. Moreover, the recipient uses the postcard to hallucinate, 
to arouse, to climax, to disembody, to inseminate, and to ecsta-
size. Are these not hotel activities? In other words, to behold a 
13 Bataille, Guilty, 33.
14 Koestenbaum, Hotel Theory, 7.
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postcard is to check into and then check out of the hotel experi-
ence. To be in possession of a postcard is not to stay but to stray, 
float, and suspend. Hotel time is the time of abeyance, or, as 
Derrida might put it, the time of the postal: “the Postal Principle 
as differential relay, that regularly prevents, [and] delays” (PC, 
54). Hotel, Koestenbaum reminds us, is the desired elsewhere; “a 
communication from a hotel comes from nowhere.”15 The post-
card is the technology that makes possible the simultaneity of 
the elsewhere, the nowhere, and the here.
A postcard is a hotel text. The lingchi photocard (fig. 1) is a 
talisman of magical thinking, or rather, magical feeling. Bataille’s 
responses — as envois — are symptomatic of his impulse to col-
lapse medieval technology of hagiography, with its figurations 
of eroticized saints in pain, and modern dispositif of enchant-
ment. The young Chinese man on the 1912 postcard is a courier 
of history: his is a dismembered body of the cannibal, the mes-
senger, the criminal, and the saint. And might we not arrive at a 
similar understanding of Derrida’s reading of the Plato/Socrates 
postcard, simply substituting the proper noun “Derrida” for 
“Bataille,” and “Plato/Socrates” for the dying Chinese beauty?
In his postal narrative, Derrida recounts how he stumbled 
across the Matthew Paris postcard in Oxford’s Bodleian Li-
brary. The encounter was nothing short of serendipity. As for 
Bataille, his claim that he had received a photo of lingchi from 
his analyst, Dr. Adrien Borel, remains unsubstantiated in the 
correspondence between them. It is possible that Bataille acci-
dentally discovered, on his own, an image of lingchi execution 
in the Bibliothèque nationale in December 1934.16 The archive, 
then, is simultaneously the birthplace and burial ground of 
postcards. Derrida desires “to reassemble an enormous library 
on the courier, the postal institutions, the techniques and mores 
of telecommunication, the networks and epochs of telecommu-
nication throughout history — but the ‘library’ and the ‘history’ 
themselves are precisely but ‘posts,’ sites of passage or of relay 
15 Ibid., 10.
16 Brook et al., Death by a Thousand Cuts, 233.
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among others” (PC, 27). For him, and for Bataille as well, librar-
ies and histories are already yams and hotels, places and artifacts 
of magical thinking.
I want to close by returning to Henry Norman’s photograph 
of a Chinese lingchi execution (fig. 2). The page where the photo 
is located is perforated at the inner edge, and the caption reads: 
“This page is perforated at the side in order that it may be de-
tached, without mutilating the volume, by any reader who pre-
fers not to retain permanently so unpleasant an illustration of 
the condition of contemporary China” (fig. 6). Perhaps this is 
what Socrates would have written in Matthew Paris’s imagining 
(fig. 5). Maybe Matthew’s Socrates is also attempting to perfo-
rate the parchment in front of him, making a postcard out of 
Western philosophy. As for Norman, the desire to protect his 
book from mutilation is premised on the mutilation of a page. 
Each tiny puncture on the page is a prick. Or, as Roland Barthes 
would call it, each piercing is a punctum (point): a detail, a “mark 
of something” in a work of art that provokes “a tiny shock” in the 
viewer and overwhelms its perception.17 Note that in Bataille’s 
formulation, the punctum is the point before ecstasy, and the 
projection of the point is the act of affective devotion.
As devotion, the monastic practice of compunctio cordis 
(piercing of the heart) blossomed into the tradition of the 
Charter of Christ in both literature and the visual arts in the 
late Middle Ages. In an illumination of the Charter of Human 
Redemption on folio 23r of British Library MS. Add. 37049 (fig. 
7), the wounds of Christ are almost indistinguishable from the 
words of the poem. Words and wounds become puncta, pricks, 
17 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard 
Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 49.
Fig. 6. Detail. China: “Death by the Thousand Cuts,” as reproduced in Henry 
Norman, The Peoples and Politics of the Far East (1895).
80
going postcard
Fig. 7. The Charter of Human Redemption. London, British Library MS. Add. 
37049, fol. 23r. © The British Library Board. By permission.
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and perforation. The reader becomes Matthew Paris’s Socrates 
with instruments in hand. Salvation is a perforated postcard, as 
Christ proclaims: “ȝit wald I eft be al to-torne” (“yet would I 
again be all torn apart”).18 For Bataille, Christ on the cross is the 
point that would “radiate arms, cry out, set itself ablaze.”19 And 
Norman, in his description of the stages of lingchi execution, 
also evokes the rhetoric of the Passion, for “[t]he criminal is fas-
tened to a rough cross.”20 The same posture is seen in Bataille’s 
photographs of the young Chinese victim of lingchi and in Mat-
thew Paris’s illustration of Mongol cannibals. In Matthew’s ren-
dering, the naked victim, forever waiting to be dismembered 
and consumed, is tied to a tree with his hair standing up and 
is confronted with a horse’s visible prick (fig. 4). No one stands 
behind him.
The perforation on Norman’s page is a concatenation of 
pricks. In it, we see Christ’s wounds, Matthew Paris’s cannibals 
and philosophers, Bataille’s punctum, and Derrida’s serial rep-
lication and displacement. The photograph is imminently de-
tachable, addressable, post-able. An image of death by lingchi, it 
may yet remain “living enough” to engender desire or rapture, 
albeit only through mutilation. 
It is waiting to become a postcard.
18 Line 20, “The Short Charter of Christ.” London, British Library MS. Add. 
37049, fol. 23r.
19 Bataille, Inner Experience, 118.





I would like to highlight an important connection between Der-
rida’s use of the term “autoimmunity” in his later work and the 
postal principle of The Post Card. Specifically, I want to point out 
that the notion of the stamp (stretching from “stamp” to “tim-
bre” and the “post card” itself in “Envois”), which resonates in 
the associations of sending at the heart of the postal principle 
itself, connects to the logic of the immunis which generates “au-
toimmunity.” The connection is articulated in the historical con-
struction of the name of stamp collection, or love of the stamp 
as “philately,” which is constructed with the help of the Greek 
ateleia. Both terms, ateleia and immunis, refer to tax exemption.
This is an important connection because in the recent sec-
ondary literature autoimmunity has gained the status as not 
just the last of Derrida’s terms for deconstruction, but also as 
in many ways especially apt for conveying the project of de-
construction, better perhaps even than “deconstruction” itself,1 
which, coupling “deconstruct” with the “-ion” suffix, attracts too 
easily a facile understanding of a negatively critical project of 
general myth-debunking. To highlight this connection between 
ateleia and autoimmunity serves a double purpose. First, to 
demonstrate an important mark of the consistency that Derrida 
1 See Michael Naas, “‘One Nation… Indivisible’: Jacques Derrida on the Au-
toimmunity of Democracy and the Sovereignty of God,” Research in Phe-
nomenology 36 (2006): 15–44, at 18; Geoffrey Bennington, “Foundations,” 
in Not Half, No End: Militantly Melancholic Essays in Memory of Jacques 
Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 27–28.
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himself considered an important feature throughout his work, 
by showing the continuity between the conceptual framework 
of Derridean deconstruction in its so called early/mid phase 
(which is often seen as primarily occupied with allegedly apo-
litical philosophy) and the later so-called ethical phase (which is 
seen as more overtly political since it features key terms which 
are conventionally considered more explicitly political). The 
second purpose is to emphasize, with the help of this link, the 
Derridean significance of what he called “life in general,” i.e., 
that the concept of life cannot be securely placed as originating 
in the “biological” or the “organic.”
Importantly for the purposes of the present collection, Samir 
Haddad has traced Derridean autoimmunity in the The Post 
Card by connecting it to an anecdote with the motif of suicide 
in “Envois.”2 Autoimmunity as suicide kills not merely the self, 
but kills that which would guarantee the organism’s oneness 
through its boundedness, and thereby it compromises the con-
ventional meaning, and stakes, of suicide itself. Let me briefly 
quote from Rogues:
For what I call the autoimmune consists not only in harming 
or ruining oneself, indeed in destroying one’s own protec-
tions, and in doing so oneself, […] but, more seriously still, 
[…] in threatening the I [moi] or the self [soi], the ego or 
the autos, ipseity itself, compromising the immunity of the 
autos itself […]. Autoimmunity is more or less suicidal, but, 
more seriously still, it threatens always to rob suicide itself its 
meaning and supposed integrity.3 
I would like to suggest that the reference to suicide is not the 
only connection between autoimmunity and “Envois.” Let me 
demonstrate this connection by putting side by side the mean-
2 Samir Haddad, “Reading Derrida Reading Derrida: Deconstruction as Self-
Inheritance,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14, no. 4 (2006): 
505–20. For the anecdote, see PC, 14–15.
3 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault 
and Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 45.
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ing and associated notions of ateleia as provided by Derrida in 
“Envois,” and the footnote in the later “Faith and Knowledge” 
which inaugurates his use of autoimmunity:
ateleia:
Ateleia is franking, the exemption from taxes, whence the 
stamp. It is true that it maintains therefore a relation with 
one senses of telos: acquittal, exemption, payment, cost, ex-
penditure, fee. From acquittal one could go to gift, offering, 
and even, in Sophocles, marriage ceremony! Phila-tely then 
is love without, with/without marriage and the collection of 
all the stamps, the love of the stamp with or without stamped 
love. (PC, 55)
autoimmunity:
The “immune” (immunis) is freed or exempted from the 
charges, the service, the taxes, the obligations (munus, root 
of the common of community). This freedom of this exemp-
tion was subsequently transported into the domains of con-
stitutional or international law (parliamentary or diplomatic 
immunity), but is also belongs to the history of the Christian 
Church and to canon law; the immunity of temples also in-
volved the inviolability if the asylum that could be found there 
(Voltaire indignantly attacked this “immunity of temples” 
as a “revolting example” of “contempt for the laws” and of 
“ecclesiastical ambition”); Urban VIII created a congregation 
of ecclesiastical immunity: against police searches, etc. it is 
especially in the domain of biology that the lexical resources 
of immunity have developed their authority. The immunitary 
reaction protects the “indemnity” of the body proper in pro-
ducing antibodies against foreign antigens. As for the process 
of auto-immunization, which interests us particularly here, it 
consists for a living organism, as is well known and in short, 
of protecting itself against its self-protection by destroying 
its own immune system. As the phenomenon of these an-
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tibodies is extended to a broader zone of pathology and as 
one resorts increasingly to the positive virtues of immuno-
depressants destined to limit the mechanisms of rejection 
and to facilitate the tolerance of certain organ transplants, we 
feel ourselves authorized to speak of a sort of general logic of 
auto-immunization. It seems indispensable to us today for 
thinking the relations between faith and knowledge, religion 
and science, as well as the duplicity of sources in general.4 
We can see that tax exemption is the shared feature of both at-
eleia and the immunis. Ateleia, whose significance in “Envois” 
exceeds the mere choice for naming philately in the nineteenth 
century by connecting exemption with laws, paralysis, and love, 
reminds us of the political link. We can think of this as the 
stamp, between the postal principle of sending and receiving, 
and the concept of the immune. Autoimmunity, in the footnote 
from “Faith and Knowledge,” is first and foremost a body’s pro-
tection against its own immune system. The immune system is 
understood here as the sum of the processes that “protect” the 
body from alien bodies understood as coming from the outside 
and always considered as potentially threatening. Autoimmun-
ity, then, is an immunization against limiting the body to itself. 
It is a logic which acts to undermine the principle of immunis. 
Other such terms in “Faith and Knowledge,” are “unscathed,” 
“heimlich,” and “indemnis”: these terms all denote a lack of hav-
ing suffered “damage or prejudice,” or a lack of contamination, 
in other words, a state of being “safe and sound,” unthreatened, 
clean or proper, and whole, all of these terms are marked by 
the principle of ipseity.5 In later texts explicitly thematizing the 
immune, autoimmunity becomes such an important term due 
to the tension between the auto and the embedded immunis, a 
4 Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at 
the Limits of Reason Alone,” in Jacques Derrida and Gil Anidjar, Acts of 




tension destabilizing the privilege of ipseity within the concept 
of the immune. 
Ann Smock has traced ateleia of “Envois” to the significance 
of the figure of the stamp foreshadowed in Of Grammatology by 
commenting on the quote above from “Envois”:
Philately has to do with atéléia, we read: acquittal of a charge. 
Whence the stamp (timbre): an official indication payment 
has been made. Unless the stamp exempts from paying. For 
to stamp, to frank — affranchir — is to free from a charge, 
dissolve an obligation. A stamp, in other words, is never 
just one; philately is stamp collection. And it is love (philos, 
friend) — it is love of the stamp with or without it. Love of the 
bond that also unbinds and by dismissing engages. It is love 
with or without love — stamped and validated conjugal love 
(“l’amour timbré”) or “l’amour timbré,” crazy love.6
Here the exemption and acquittal from the postal principle in 
ateleia is linked to bonds, binding and unbinding, terms which, 
for Derrida, all concern the notion of paralysis in The Post Card. 
In “Paralysis” he writes “To borrow is the law” (PC, 384). In “En-
vois,” we read the following about paralysis:
Paralyzed: paralysis does not mean that one can no longer 
move or walk, but, in Greek if you please, that there is no 
more tie, that every bind, every liaison has been unknotted 
(in other words, of course, analyzed) and that because of this, 
because one is “exempt,” “acquitted” of everything, nothing 
goes anymore, nothing holds together any more, nothing 
advances any more. The bind and the knot are necessary in 
order to take a step. (PC, 127)
6 Ann Smock, “Estampe (OG 208–9, DG 296–7),” in Reading Derrida’s Of 
Grammatology, eds. Sean Gaston and Ian MacLachlan, 136–37 (London and 
New York: Continuum, 2011), 137.
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The idea of binding and ties, notions of constraint, are posited as 
the very condition of movement, of process. Mechanisms which 
(en)force movement, and here we can add the concept of law, 
are necessary for movement. Exemption from the law—which 
in “Paralysis” decrees debt—entails a standstill. Exemption and 
acquittal in the quote above are considered in the same light as 
the terms organized by the idea of immunity in the later texts; 
they institute a boundary of inviolability, which cuts off the 
bounded from the context within which it is found. In the case 
of both ateleia and the immunis, exemption means exemption 
from the flow of tax or debt. 
However, the idea of exemption does not solely organize the 
way in which Derrida uses the term “stamp.” Indeed, stamping 
also stands for the institution of the debt which produces tra-
dition. For Derrida, the postal is a certain cultural logic char-
acteristic of what we conventionally think of Europe (but not 
contained by our conventional concept of Europe); in “Envois” 
the stamp serves to shore up various ways of the operation of 
the postal logic of this culture. Besides postal stamps, stamp-
ing issues tradition itself in such microscopic and ubiquitous 
ways that we have no choice but be marked by and predisposed 
according to its tendencies. It is in this sense that the postcard 
which The Post Card features as its true protagonist also be-
comes a stamp, the stamp of the metaphysics of presence which 
is so easily associable with Platonism:
Whatever I say, whatever I do, I must paste on myself a stamp 
with the effigy of this diabolical couple, these unforgettable 
comperes, these two patient impostors. A little engraving this 
royal, basilical couple, sterile but infinite in its ideal progeni-
ture. Cynically, without a cent, they have issued a universal 
stamp. A postal and fiscal stamp, by making themselves ap-
pear to advance funds. And on the stamp both are to be seen 
in the course, the one in front of the other, in the course, en 
train, of drawing a stamp and of signing the original. And 
they plaster themselves on the walls. An immense poster. 
This is a stamp. […] This is what tradition is, the heritage 
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that drives you crazy. People have not the slightest idea of 
this, they have no need to know that they are paying (au-
tomatic withdrawal) nor whom they are paying (the name 
or the thing) when they do anything whatsoever, make war 
or love, speculate on the energy crisis, construct socialism, 
write novels, open concentration camps for poets or homo-
sexuals, buy bread or hijack a plane, have themselves elected 
by secret ballot, criticize the media without rhyme or reason, 
say absolutely anything about chador or the ayatollah, dream 
of a great safari, found reviews, teach, or piss against a tree. 
They can even never have heard the name of p. and of S. […] 
And the less one pays, the more one pays, such is the trap of 
this speculation. You will not be able to account for this cur-
rency. Impossible to return it, you pay everything and you 
pay nothing with this Visa or Mastercharge card. It is neither 
true nor false. The issuing of the stamp is seriously immense, 
it imposes and is imposed everywhere, conditions every 
other type, timbre, or tympan in general; and yet, you can 
barely see it, it is minuscule, infinitely divisible, composes it-
self with billions of other obliterating positions, impositions, 
or superimpositions. And we, my angel, we love each other 
posted on this network, […] crushed by taxes, in permanent 
insurrection against the “past,” full of acknowledgements 
however, and virgin from debt, as at the first morning of the 
world. (PC, 100–101)
The post card and the stamp are both forms of sending that 
traverse any possible distinction between public and private: the 
post card is something very private, but becomes accessible to 
anyone who happens upon it7; the stamp is a public institution 
of collecting private fees in advance. Stamping here now denotes 
being always already marked, in advance of one’s arrival, by a 
7 On the public/private distinction and the post, Derrida says the following: 
“This opposition [between public and private] doesn’t work, neither for 
psychoanalysis…, nor for the post…, nor even for the police…, — and the 




heritage that is neither true nor false, because it appears to have 
already “advanced the funds,” issued the terms of the values of 
“doing anything whatsoever.” To stamp and being stamped refer 
both to taxing (“crushed by taxes”), as well as to exemption or 
acquittal (“virgin from debt”). This double nature of the stamp 
is like that of the pharmakon as writing. Indeed, stamping here 
is also writing of the most mechanical kind: type and tympan 
are both terms of printing.8 Love and sexual difference are also 
linked up to the chain of stamping: while “[a]teleia is frank-
ing” (PC, 55) making honest, making virile, it is also a means 
of maintaining inviolability in terms of virginity. Stamping is 
both ateleia, achieving immunity, and being imprinted by the 
chain of indebtedness of heritage — the chain which necessarily 
undermines any acquittal, exemption any codes of guaranteed 
inviolability. In other words, the stamp is autoimmune in the 
sense that Derrida uses this term from “Faith and Knowledge” 
onwards, perhaps most clearly articulated in the quote I shared 
above from Rogues.
I don’t want to suggest that the logic of autoimmunity within 
the Derridean oeuvre as a whole originates in The Post Card 
and thus, in some general, political vocabulary of life. Derrida 
himself connects autoimmunity to “Plato’s Pharmacy,” when he 
referred to the pharmakon as an “old name” for autoimmunitary 
logic.9 Indeed in “Plato’s Pharmacy” we find the current medical 
sense of this logic:
The natural illness of the living is defined in its essence as 
an allergy, a reaction to the aggression of an alien element. 
And it is necessary that the natural life of the body should be 
8 For a discussion of the tympan and related terms in Derrida’s work, see 
Christopher Norris, Derrida (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1987), 
77–80.
9 Jacques Derrida, “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: A Dialogue 
with Jacques Derrida,” in Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Ter-
ror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, trans. Pascale-




allergy, from the moment the natural life of the body ought 
only to follow its own endogenous motions.10
And:
The immortality and perfection of a living being would con-
sist in its having no relation at all with any outside. That is the 
case with God […]. God has no allergies.11
Although allergies are not autoimmune in the strict medical 
sense, they are, in the medical sense, exemplary for under-
standing the concept of the immune in general and therefore 
help us to better understand Derrida’s term of autoimmunity 
as well. We refer to allergies as problems of immune reaction: 
they emerge when the immune system reacts to external ele-
ments that do not in fact threaten the organism, for example, 
pollen or certain nuts. An allergic reaction is an unnecessarily 
triggered reaction. It may be dangerous because the severity of 
the immune reaction can harm and even kill the organism it 
ought to protect. This happens in the case of disease brought 
on by pathogens as well, but it is in the case of allergic reaction 
the harmful potential of the immune reactions appears excep-
tionally clear. This is the reason that Derrida identifies allergy as 
the essence of the disease: the essence of disease is the immune 
reaction that threatens both the organism and the pathogen. In 
other words, the organism as well as whatever labeled “foreign” 
by immune processes has to endure the immune reaction for 
survival. When we come down with the flu, we need to survive 
the flu with the help of our immune system, but we also need 
to survive the immune activity (high fever, inflammation, etc.) 
itself. While external pathogens and their threatening interven-
tion are most often part of disease, immune activity (either too 
little or too much) is always at the heart of disease. To the extent 
10 Jacques Derrida. “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara John-




that immune activity is necessary for maintaining health, health 
always includes the risk of threat. What Derrida identifies in al-
lergy corresponds to his term of autoimmunity in the sense of 
the threat brought on by the immune, the exempt, the heilig, the 
inviolable.
Accounts of the Derridean use of autoimmunity often re-
fer to it as his choice to select a medical term. These accounts 
usually don’t concern themselves with questions of biology or 
the question of the relationship between the concept of life and 
the terms conventionally considered as referring to biological 
phenomena. Our conventional sense of designating medicine as 
the origin of the term autoimmunity yields easily to a general 
implicit sense of positing the origin of the idea of life in what 
is now accepted as what Derrida calls the “domain of biology. 
However, it is crucial for a general understanding of Derrida’s 
project (from deconstruction to autoimmunity) and for under-
standing the political significance of his reading of seemingly 
different lexicons (of biological and political) life to pay atten-
tion to his treatment of “life” or “life in general.”
In a footnote to “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides,” 
Derrida assesses the footnote on autoimmunity in “Faith and 
Knowledge” as an intervention “to extend to life in general the 
figure of autoimmunity whose meaning or origin first seemed 
to be limited to so-called natural life or to life pure and simple, 
to what is believed to be the purely ‘zoological,’ ‘biological,’ or 
‘genetic.’”12
We can sketch, then, the arch of the development of autoim-
munity from the lexicon of biology from at least “Plato’s Phar-
macy” to “Faith and Knowledge” and “Autoimmunity.” Link-
ing ateleia onto this line illustrates Derrida’s insistence in the 
footnote in “Autoimmunity” that the organic is not the source 
of life, an insistence that he expressed very clearly elsewhere as 
well, for instance in “Biodegradables”: “[T]he organic is not the 
12 Derrida, “Autoimmunity,” 15.
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living; natural life is not the whole of life.”13 “Life in general” is 
more than natural life, because there is constant traffic between 
the vocabulary of “nature” and other lexicons: the link between 
ateleia and immunity insists that we contest any claims or com-
pulsions to posit the vocabulary of “nature” as the anchoring 
repository, the place of organic origin of the political vocabulary 
of life, death, health, and protection. The reason that immunity 
could be picked up by “the lexicon of biology” is that this sense 
of inviolability animates the different legal meanings of the 
word. But as the etymology of immunis suggests, inviolability 
does not concern only bodies conventionally considered organ-
ic. Inviolability is also always a political concept of privilege. As 
such, it is necessarily violent; marking privilege by inviolability 
necessitates violence even in contexts conventionally considered 
non-violent. No principle of inviolability can function without 
allowing, facilitating, and managing violence. If indeed autoim-
munity is an especially apt term for deconstruction, it stresses 
that deconstruction concerns the cloud of terms around the no-
tion of immunity and its political significance. The immune, the 
exempt, the heilig, the inviolable are all terms of ipseity. It is the 
critique of this inherent link between ipseity and violence that 
motivates deconstruction and which, in part, attracts Derrida to 
the image on the postcard depicting a the scandalous reversal of 
S. and p. making public the perverse implication that the young-
er one, the pupil, might insert his manifest virility between his 
master’s thighs.
13 Jacques Derrida, “Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments,” trans. Peggy 




Philately on the Telephone: 
Reading, Touching, Loving the “Envois”1
For D.A.
In this essay, I read a phone conversation that Jacques Der-
rida alludes to in the “Envois,” but never directly transcribes. 
The content of the phone call remains secret. However, I want 
to retrace the significance of the conversation and its organiz-
ing figure, “philately,” but even before I begin, I acknowledge 
that the aims of this essay are paradoxically at odds: I am both 
on the phone and in a text, writing about love, but always at a 
distance from explicit emotional content. The entanglements of 
telephone and post, of emotion and its suppression, necessarily 
entail some detours that also perform philately on the telephone 
with Jacques Derrida. What is essential, then, is not the content 
of the phone conversation between Derrida and his lover, or my 
conversation with Derrida’s text. Rather, this essay foregrounds 
the relays of telephone, postcard, voice, and emotion in effort 
to think through love itself as an envois. That is, I foreground 
the ways that Derrida’s text recasts love as always already in the 
post. 
1 This essay was revised and prepared with the support of the Bill and Carol 




In a letter from the “Envois” dated 4 September 1977 Derrida 
reveals that he “would really like to call this book philately in 
order to commemorate secretly our somewhat nutty phone call” 
(PC, 56). However, this book is not the book we are reading, The 
Post Card. The book, named in the phone conversation, perhaps 
even before the thought of publishing the “Envois” as part of 
The Post Card, is a book never yet written, a phantom text that 
is definitively not the “Envois.” The desire to name the phantom 
book philately emerges at the end of a telephone conversation, 
and the letter begins with the phone conversation’s end: “Hang-
ing up just now” (PC, 55). Subsequently, the addressor recounts 
the moment of “hanging up” in a parenthetical volley: “(as al-
ways, ‘hang up,’ — “No, you hang up,’ — ‘No, you,’ — ‘Hang, up 
you,’ — ‘Hang up, you,’ — ‘I’m hanging up,’ etc), I was in seventh 
heaven, I was laughing softly over the sage conversation con-
cerning the word ‘philately’” (PC, 55). Philately emerges from the 
volley of hanging up, an event that only takes place insofar as it 
has been transcribed, recounted, and repeated in a letter. Philat-
ely on the telephone. Just as Derrida situates the “Envois” “as a 
preface to a book I have not written” (PC, 3), the phone prefaces 
philately, the phantom text that is never explicitly written. The 
phone conversation, like the phantom book that the “Envois” 
nonetheless commemorates, is lost or “incinerated” at the mo-
ment Derrida writes “Hanging up just now.” All that remains is 
the letter that records the phone call at the moment it is always 
about to be hung up. 
However, if “hanging up just now” begins the letter, to what 
moment does the “just now” refer? “4 September 1977” marks a 
singular date, locating us an apparently specific moment: “Just 
now.” But, hang on — or rather let’s not hang up just yet by as-
suming we have identified the moment that Derrida hangs up. 
There are four consecutive letters dated “4 September 1977,” 
each of which traffics in its own language, performing Derrida’s 
“Postal Principle”: “the Postal Principle [works] as [a] differan-
tial relay, that regularly prevents, delays, endispatches the de-
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positing of the thesis, forbidding rest and ceaselessly causing to 
run, deposing or deporting the movement of speculation” (PC, 
54). Even if the date promises singularity, it also “prevents, de-
lays, endispatches” the “just now” it sets out to mark. These four 
letters, written on the same day “4 September 1977,” mark the 
internal division of dates and the “just now” of “hanging up.” 
Derrida writes in “Shibboleth” that the date must “divide it-
self in repeating itself, and in the same stroke encipher or en-
crypt itself.”2 While “4 September 1977” marks the “just now” 
of Derrida having hung up, it also obscures the very moment it 
sets out to record. The date marks time without distinguishing 
the moments, repeating itself four times, not unlike the volley 
on the telephone. So, the “just now” that marks the end-begin-
ning-repetition of the “nutty phone conversation” — the philat-
ely — is also an unrepeatable instant that divides itself. After all, 
what would this lost “nutty” and wayward phone call be, if not, 
unrepeatable? The phone call is always already incinerated and 
burned away, made the ghost of a text that seems to record it.
Indeed, the only transcriptions that Derrida provides of the 
phone conversation are the interminable seconds that lead to 
“hanging up.” The first iteration — “hanging up just now” — oc-
curs in the present, marking an on going process that is never 
quite arrested by the “just now” that punctuates it. The pro-
cess of never quite hanging up asserts itself in the parentheti-
cal reiterations: “(as always, ‘hang up,’ — no, you hang up — No, 
you — Hang up, you — Hang up, you — hanging up,’ etc).” 
Hanging up never ends. Instead, it remains suspended by “et-
cetera” — and so forth, ad infinitum, as if we could never fin-
ish “hanging up.” Indeed, hanging up “always” happens; it is 
inscribed in the exchange, dividing the singularity of the phone 
call insofar as its singularity is only in the letter recorded as a 
repetition of the ritual of always “hanging up.” The philately of 
telephony is marked through the repetition of the hanging up 
2 Jacques Derrida, “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan,” in Sovereignties in Question: 
The Poetics of Paul Celan, eds. Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen, 1–64 (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 15. 
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that encrypts and obscures the secret of the phone conversa-
tion. The nutty telephone conversation is not only nutty by vir-
tue of the encryption that makes its idiom impossible to read, 
but also nutty because the conversation cannot be reproduced 
in the text. 
However, the hanging up ritual also makes telephony legible 
in the text. Hanging up is written into the transcription, as the 
“no’s,” the “you’s” and the “hang ups” shuffle back and forth, ex-
changing places, and leap-frogging one another. Each “no, you 
hang up” strikes the ear differently. This is not simply a phone 
call we have overheard-read or a counterfeit we have been fol-
lowing; this is the postal principle on the telephone.3 That is, 
the hanging up ritual is “the differantial relay, that regularly pre-
vents, delays, endispatches” the account of what transpired on 
the telephone. Derrida writes the telephonic principle qua post-
al principle through “hanging up” because it is also the phrase 
through which we recognize the duration of a telephone con-
versation. No question my thesis has been delayed by “hanging 
up,” caught up in this relay and the impossibility of locating the 
moment of the “just now,” the moment at which Derrida hung 
up the phone and began to write of philately on the telephone. 
2. Love-Stamp
Philately, the love of stamps or the activity of collecting them, 
not only precipitates out of the phantom phone call but allows 
us to uncover the ways in which the text and the phone conver-
sation are subject to the same postal principle. As the whispered 
subtitle to the phantom book and the phantom phone call, phi-
lately is a secret word that touches the lost moment of “just now.” 
Derrida writes:
3 In “Ulysses Gramophone,” Derrida writes of a “telephonic interiority,” relat-
ing telephonic effects to the effects of phonetic enunciation and the voice: 
“…before any appliance bearing the name ‘telephone’ in modern times, the 
telephonic techne is at work within the voice” (“Ulysses Gramophone: Hear 
Say Yes in Joyce,” in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, 253–309 [New 
York: Routledge, 1992], 273).
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No, philately does not mean love of distance, of the term, of 
the telos or of the tele-, nor the love of letters, no, […] it is a 
very recent word, it is only as old as stamps, […] and it treats 
of ateleia […]. Ateleia is franking, the exemption from taxes, 
whence the stamp. It is true that it maintains therefore a re-
lation with one of the senses of telos: acquittal, exemption, 
payment, cost, expenditure, fee. From acquittal one could go 
to gift, offering, and even […] marriage ceremony! Phila-tely 
then is love without, with/without marriage, and the col-
lection of all stamps, the love of the stamp with or without 
stamped love. (PC, 55–56) 
Philately, then, names a principle “without,” love “without,” 
which is “the love of the stamp with or without stamped love.” 
Love of the stamp cannot be read as a commentary on postage 
stamps because Derrida’s are not material stamps in the ways 
we might want to conceive of the materiality of the “post card” 
or the letter. Rather, the figure of the stamp suggests that there 
is a form of love that precedes and exceeds the profession of 
romantic love. Love in this sense does not necessarily emerge 
in language as much as it names the possibility of language and 
the envois.
While letters, postcards, dates, and telephones make para-
doxical bedfellows, the love-stamp reveals the ways in which 
these modes of transmission, despite differences of technology 
and medium, exist by virtue of an amorous condition of possi-
bility. In another envois, dated “31 August 1977,” Derrida returns 
to the stamp: “No, the stamp is not metaphor, on the contrary, 
metaphor is a stamp: the tax, the duty to be paid on natural lan-
guage and the voice. And so on the metaphoric catastrophe. No 
more is post a metaphor” (PC, 46). This letter, which, we might 
add, is the only one written on “31 August 1977,” singular even as 
it divides itself in the program of dates and letters, returns us to 
the stamp, inverting the figurative line of thought we have been 
following. That is, the stamp is not simply a metaphor for the 
postal principle and it does not merely mark the disruption of 
any definitive arrival. The stamp names metaphor, or the ways 
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that “metaphor is a stamp: the tax, the duty to be paid on natural 
language and the voice.” Metaphor marks a debt that can never 
be paid even though one is always paying it. While “metaphor” 
might signify within traditional rhetorical parameters, here 
“metaphor” signals a more general problematic. Etymologically, 
“metaphor” is derived from the Greek metapherein, which liter-
ally means to transfer or carry over. Meta indicates spatial des-
ignations of “over” or “across,” while pherein means “to carry or 
to bear.”4 “Metaphor” carries over or bears across, operating as 
the figure in general for the movement of the postal system. That 
is, metaphor makes possible, even as it parasitizes, transgresses, 
and delays the “natural language and the voice” and the mes-
sages transmitted by them. 
In this sense, the “just now” of the “nutty telephone conver-
sation” is stamped; it reiterates the impossibility, even as it at-
tempts to mark, the immediacy of the telephone conversation 
and the voice. Indeed, Derrida writes that on the telephone, 
“often I stop paying attention to what you are saying, so that 
the timbre alone resonates, […] I understand nothing” (PC,19). 
The word “timbre” means the sound of a voice. However, the 
French timbre also may be read as “stamp.” The timbre and reso-
nance of a voice without anything having been understood, like 
metaphor operates as a love-stamp. Timbre, designates both 
sound and stamp simultaneously, carrying connotations of both 
written and spoken language, as if written words were always 
wrapped in a voice, baring (and bearing across) the trace of 
enunciated speech. In this sense, the grapheme and phoneme, 
by virtue of the timbre that holds them together, are ghosts of 
one another. Just so, the voice on the telephone is estranged and 
at a distance, only ever heard insofar as one might “read,” in or-
4 In “Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric,” Paul de Man reads meta-
phor similarly remarking that in Francophone cities a “correspondence” 
refers to a Metro transfer and is linked to the “trans” in metaphor (“An-
thropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, 
239–62 [New York: Columbia University Press, 1984], 253). 
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der to hear, the distinctions between phonemes.5 Uncannily, the 
distance on the telephone might be thought as a distance that 
necessitates reading. 
This ghostly principle, in which the grapheme and phoneme 
always bear the trace of one another, collected in the thought of 
timbre as the sound and stamp, situates both written and spoken 
language as always already taxed. Thus, the love-stamp sanc-
tions even as it taxes the “sending”; the stamp makes possible 
the message’s destination only insofar as the message is never 
quite carried to its precise addressee, disrupted by the inevita-
bility that we always might misread or mishear. Perhaps even, 
the love-stamp means that messages, whether spoken or writ-
ten, are never entirely “understood.” Philately: the love of ades-
tination. 
Moreover, the love-stamp makes reading possible even as it 
divides that reading, transforming all letters, all phone calls, all 
envois, all writing, into an “open letter,” which has always been 
intercepted from the very moment of inscription: “of course I 
felt it, at the second that I was writing, that this letter, like all 
others, was intercepted even before any hands could be put on 
it” and for all our ciphers or encryptions “still in advance it is 
intercepted” (PC, 51). The stamp seduces, drawing the reader 
in by the terms used to communicate meaning. Even as Der-
rida describes how writing is always already “interception,” we 
read and intercept his open letter. We read over his shoulder 
as interceptors of a conversation made legible only by virtue of 
the love-stamp, the tax Derrida has paid in advance, in order to 
write anything at all. “At the second that I was writing,” Derrida 
suspects, we have already been reading his postcard. Or, at least, 
insofar as his writing became legible in a second, it became leg-
ible to anyone and “once intercepted — a second suffices — the 
message no longer has any chance of reaching any determinable 
5 I am indebted here to a lecture given by David Wills entitled “Positive Feed-
back: Listening Behind Hearing,” in which he discussed the various me-
diations and “reading” practices at work when we listen. This lecture was 
delivered November 7, 2012, at Emory University.
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person” (PC, 51). Once written the letter is not only intercepted 
and itinerant, it is stamped-love because it has no “chance of 
reaching any determinable person.” 
Writing and interception take place and fall in love “in a sec-
ond,” echoing the “just now.” However, like the “just now” of the 
phone conversation, this second of writing, interception, and 
love might be read not as the primacy of a singular moment, 
but rather, as the very configuration of delay. The “seconds” of 
writing and interception “second” themselves because the delay 
of writing has never come first and is never fully present to au-
thorial intention. Rather, interception is the necessary disrup-
tion through which writing materializes — inscription is inter-
ception and, as Derrida tells us, “the message” just now, at the 
“second” of interception, “no longer has any chance of reaching 
any determinable person.” Put another way, “the letter, at the 
very instant when it takes place […], divides itself, puts itself 
into pieces, falls into a post card” (PC, 81). So no more letters, 
only postcards. This is the love-stamp, the tax paid in advance, 
that is the condition of sending any message and, simultane-
ously, the interminable impossibility of a message ever arriving. 
All communication, writing, telephony, and love are always go-
ing postal. 
Indeed, the possibility of love emerges through the postal 
principle. Derrida, just after consigning every letter to the fate of 
the postcard “in pieces,” affirms that if “this is our tragic lot, […] 
I begin to love you on the basis of this impossibility” (PC, 81). The 
“adestination” of the letter that “falls into a post card” is the pred-
icate for love. Because, even if we “recognize that such a certainty 
[of the postal principle and adestination] is unbearable for any-
one…and most energetically” denied by those “people charged 
with the carrying of the mail, guardians of the letter, archivists, 
the professors as well as the journalists… the philosophers…and 
the literature people,” there remains some residual effect, some 
erotics of “adestination” that gets us closer to philately (PC, 51). 
For, even as Derrida suggests that the postal principle is “un-
bearable,” it is this “unbearable” element that makes possible any 
“bearing across” or “carrying over.” The unbearable bears. The 
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“guardians of the letter,” the writers who wish most vehemently 
to secure the arrival of a thesis are interminably engaged to the 
problem of “carrying the mail” and the taxes that must be paid. 
Moreover, “carrying the mail” like “hanging up,” never finds its 
end — “forbidding rest and ceaselessly causing to run, deposing 
or deporting the movement of speculation” (PC, 54). 
So, “philosophers,” “literature people,” writers in general are 
only ever “carrying the mail” in an effort to bear the unbearable 
thought of love’s possibility. The vertiginous erotics of adestina-
tion, the “love of the stamp with or without stamped love,” com-
pels such a movement. Moreover, the movement of interpreta-
tion, the carrying of the mail, knows no end, producing an eros 
of interception in which, even as we read, we always have been 
delayed, deferred, or endispatched. In a manner, we always, at 
the moment of our readings, have not yet begun to read. The 
“unbearable” work of carrying the mail, of literary interpreta-
tion or theoretical inquiry, also entails an affirmation of love 
that invigorates our efforts.6 A love of letters, can only ever be, 
in the first instance, a love letter. Criticism is written in an amo-
rous rhetoric that, even in the moment of critique, luxuriates in 
the stamp, the timbre, and the resonance that affords the writer 
such an opportunity. Even this opportunity right now of writing 
about “love letters” and their “amorous rhetoric” is invigorated 
by the love-stamp that precedes each and every letter, each and 
every postcard. 
3. Touching
Even as Derrida insists that the work of reading and interpreta-
tion necessarily entails a restless philately that regularly endis-
patches speculation, he elaborates on the erotic elements at 
6 Peggy Kamuf argues in “Deconstruction and Love,” Derrida’s “practice of 
deconstruction proceeds out of love rather than under the sway of a de-
structive impulse;” it cultivates “the force of affirmation to what otherwise 
appears destined to have only the negative force of [a] technical, disman-
tling operation” (“Deconstruction and Love,” in Deconstructions: A User’s 
Guide, ed. Nicholas Royle [London: Palgrave Macmillin, 2000], 153).
104
going postcard
work in the love of letters. “We are monstrous angels,” he writes, 
naming himself among the mail carriers and suggesting that 
carrying the post is perhaps a waste of time:
all this bad economics, this expended energy, this time that 
we will have spent analyzing the tax that we pay in order to 
remain together, the price that it costs, […] the secret debts, 
the charges on the suffering of the others within us, these 
step-by-step discussions, these interminable analyses, all our 
ratiocinations would have been ignoble, the opposite of love 
and the gift, if they had not been made in order to give us 
again the time to touch each other with words. What counts 
and is counted then, is what we do while speaking, what we 
do to each other, how we again touch each other by mixing 
our voices. (PC, 56)
Significantly, the “interminable analysis,” “all our ratiocina-
tions,” our messages on their way to “adestination” would have 
been “the opposite of love and the gift” only “had they not been 
made in order to give us again the time to touch each other with 
words.” Herein resides the corollary to the love-stamp — the 
chance that even if messages never arrive to a fully present per-
son, at a fully present moment, words might allow us to touch. 
The movement of deposed and deported speculation paradoxi-
cally affords the opportunity “to touch each other with words,” 
to “move” one another with language. 
The end of speculation then would be no end at all, but an 
engagement in and through language. Significantly, touching 
must also be thought in terms of feeling, which is not necessar-
ily tactile, but emotive, causing one another to feel with words 
and in language, even if the love letter never fully arrives. In 
On Touching — Jean-Luc Nancy, Derrida elaborates on touching 
as precisely this kind of telephonic, phantasmatic, and affective 
experience: 
Imagine: lovers separated for life. Wherever they may find 
themselves and each other. On the phone, through their 
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voices and their inflection, timbre, and accent, through el-
evations and interruptions in the breathing, across moments 
of silence, they foster all the differences necessary to arouse a 
sight, touch, and even smell — so many caresses, to reach the 
ecstatic climax from which they are forever weaned — but are 
never deprived.7 
Touching is, like the “just now” of the phone conversation, re-
peating and dividing the moment of affecting another person. 
Love takes place in touching not as physical experience, but as 
a force of attraction that traverses the distances put in place by 
phone lines, voices, “elevations and interruptions of breath.” 
Love emerges as the ecstatic climax of telephonic deprivation. 
However, these lovers’ words never touch once, they only ever 
touch again. As voices intermix through words, touch must be 
reconceived as spectral qualia. Put another way, in the context 
of these postcards and the engagement that they imply, “touch-
ing” becomes the process by which the addressee and signatory 
appear and disappear to and for one another through the phan-
tasmatic love-stamp of the letter. What “counts” is not that the 
love letter arrives because the message is always already inter-
cepted and the interception is what makes it a love letter. Rather, 
“What counts is what we do while speaking, what we do to each 
other, how we again touch each other by mixing our voices. […] 
What counts then is that it is still up to us to exhaust language, 
and reason swerves” (PC, 56). What “counts” for Derrida is that 
in “interminable analysis” and the necessary interception of all 
messages there is also a possibility “that again we touch each 
other,” and transform one another with, through, and in lan-
guage. The love-stamp on language becomes the principle and 
possibility of love suggesting that we, all of us, might touch each 
other with words. Touching names a medium through which 
two people (be)hold one another.
7 Jacques Derrida, On Touching — Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizary 




If the love-stamp that intercepts any message whatever is the 
condition of possibility for touching with words, what precise-
ly are the effects of touching? That is, what effects do love and 
touch have for the “Envois”? Derrida asks, 
How could I ask you to burn, which is as much as to say not 
to read, what I was writing you? […] [D]o not read me, this 
statement organizes its own transgression at the very instant 
when, by means of the single event of understood language, 
it assumes command. It compels the violation of its own law. 
(PC, 59)
“Incineration” and “burning” are the products of touching 
one another with words. The injunction to “burn everything” 
suspends legibility and illegibility, because it is a figure that 
demands to be read yet disrupts its own reading; burning ap-
pears only insofar as it haunts and recursively undoes “the single 
event of understood language.” Derrida names the impossibil-
ity of legibility at the moment of any reading or touching with 
words: “But I will arrive, I will arrive at the point where you will 
no longer read me” (PC, 59). We might gloss the arrival as “I will 
touch you at the moment of my incineration.” That is, Derrida 
arrives, becomes legible, only insofar as he resists any reading. 
He touches with the utterance “do not read me.” Derrida does 
not literally suggest that we should stop reading, but rather, that 
we only ever read or touch insofar as we understand reading, in-
terpretation, and touching as the possibility of always not read-
ing, of missing one another entirely. Derrida loves the stamp, 
the timbre or resonance, even at the moment of transgressing 
its law and commanding his addressee, and by extension, all his 
reader-interceptors, to “burn everything.” To burn is to love.
He writes of burning love: “you had understood my order 
[…]: ‘burn everything,’ understood it so well that you told me 
you copied over […], in your writing, and in pencil, the words 
of that first letter” (PC, 59). In this moment, Derrida equates 
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“understanding” to “transcription” or “another way of saying 
that you had reread it [sc. the letter], no?” (PC, 59). Even as 
Derrida acknowledges that his addressee has “understood” 
the injunction insofar as she repeats his words, disassociating 
them from their context by “citing” them in her own writing, 
she has incinerated any possibility that they might mark singu-
larity—burned away from the very injunction that they would 
seem to record. The addressee transgresses whatever might be 
“understood” in the phrase “do not read me” by disrupting the 
singularity of the demand. The injunction “that violates its own 
law” is simultaneously violated and reasserted by its transcrip-
tion; its not being understood performs the touch that Derrida 
formulates as “burn everything.” The addressee has copied “in 
pencil,” transcribed with another writing utensil, the supposed 
singularity of such an injunction. A pencil, after all, is a peculiar 
writing tool that, when stood on its head, unwrites what it “just 
now” records. The spectral pencil mark invigorates the thought 
of this injunction by producing a writing always haunted by the 
possibility of erasure. The appearing-disappearing mark of the 
pencil figures, even as it suspends, the possibility of transcripti-
on and touching. 
I transcribe the transcription that Derrida has, in his fashi-
on, transcribed for his reader-interceptor’s benefit. Derrida tells 
us his addressee has copied his words, which he then copies in 
parentheses for the reader. Subsequently, I retype-recopy this 
reiteration en abyme, in an attempt to trace the moment of tran-
scription, the act that understood and preformed the injuncti-
on “to burn everything” in a gesture of “rereading.” Here, what 
might seem like an endless recirculation of misunderstandings, 
must however be understood not merely as repetition. Rather, 
“burn everything” gestures toward the matter at hand: insofar 
as transcription has been a process of “rereading” (or in the case 
of the telephone, recording to reread) it has modeled “what one 
begins by doing when one reads, even for the first time.” Derrida 
short-circuits the singularity here of at least three “rereadings” 
or “transcriptions”: his addressee’s, his own written into the text 
of this letter in parentheses, and our own cited above. These tran-
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scriptions are neither unique nor singular, consigned as they 
are to “what one begins by doing” when we read anything at all, 
“even for the first time.” Reading only ever occurs through the 
processes of “repetition, memory, etc.” Graphemes are only ever 
understood, made to sound some never-present-voice, by virtue 
of their the repetition — inscribed as the principle of any letter, 
character, document or date — that makes possible our reading. 
And so forth or “etcetera,” the never arrested processes of repe-
tition and memory that allow us to carry the mail.
“I love you by heart,” Derrida announces, “there, between pa-
rentheses or quotation marks, such is the origin of the post card” 
(PC, 60, my emphases). Notably, this declaration of love comes 
on the heels of the “repetition, memory, etc.,” not as a departure 
from the thought of repetition, but rather as dilation. As I des-
cribe above, Derrida transcribes or “recites” in parentheses that 
which his addressee has transcribed, copied, or “cited” to send 
back to him. The proclamation “I love you by heart,” points to a 
“there, between parentheses or quotation marks,” referring to his 
doubly recited injunction: “(‘I am burning, stupid impression 
of being faithful, nevertheless kept several simulacra, etc.’).” The 
profusion here of parentheses and quotation signals something 
about the nature of “love by heart.” Love by heart, it would seem, 
occurs at moments of citationality in which the physics of an al-
ways already reiterating language allow us to touch, repeat, and 
rewrite one another’s words, incinerating (even at the moment 
of our reading “for the first time”) whatever might have been 
the intended meaning. The interminable “hanging up” of the te-
lephone conversation occurs between parentheses and quotation 
marks, secreting even as it performs this “loving by heart,” this 
philately on the telephone. “Such is the origin of the post card,” 
but not just the postcard. The postcard, the envoi, the open let-
ter, the always already intercepted, legible only in and through 
“memory and repetition,” name the act of “loving by heart.” “To 
reread before burning” is impossible because “to reread,” to read 
even for the first time, is already to burn up in love. There is no 
“before” to “burning,” but we burn in an effort “to incorporate 
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the letter […] and to take it in […] by heart. Keep what you 
burn, such is the demand” (PC, 60). 
Again, incineration, transcription, rewriting, or citationality 
are not only figured as the taxes that disable the arrival of the let-
ter that Derrida names in his definition of philately; they are the 
very possibility of love, providing the chance of commingling 
timbres and touching with words. So Derrida offers the subtitle 
philately in order to figure love not only as a condition of pos-
sibility for language, but as an emotion that operates through 
interruption, itineration, and absence. Love, like the letter, never 
quite arrives. The love we have for carrying the mail is the action 
and possibility of love between people: interminable sending, 
missing, and burning, all for the chance of “touching one an-
other with words.” 
4. Myself, Under Your Skin
If one aim of the “Envois” is to read romantic love through the 
postal principle along with writing, the voice, the letter, and the 
telephone, then Derrida also posits a bittersweet theory of emo-
tion. To “love by heart” is to burn a letter such that I might in-
corporate otherwise the words that never fully arrive. At work 
in love then is a restless exchange between self and other where 
the differences between self and other, signatory and addressee 
blur. When Derrida quips “[I] distance myself in order to write 
to you,” (PC, 28) he is not negating “himself ”; rather, he marks 
the difficult operation whereby in order to send a letter, he de-
posits a trace that is always not “himself,” but a remainder. In or-
der to “mix voices,” there is an immediate interception in which 
Derrida the signatory endispatches himself in language, sketch-
ing a “myself ” which is in no way self-possessed. This self-dis-
possession may seem like an existential estrangement from any 
touch at all in language or without. However, the envoi of the 
self, distanced and dispatched from the self-same individual, is 
precisely the postal mechanism that makes love possible. 
Derrida, on the heels of his injunction “to burn everything,” 
to incinerate so as to know “by heart,” elucidates the “self ” that 
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the envoi performs: “Mourn what I send to you, myself, in order 
to have me under your skin. No longer before you, […] but wit-
hin you,  speaking to you and kissing you without interruption 
even before you have the chance to breathe and to turn around” 
(PC, 60). Derrida emphasizes that all this burning and incine-
ration — this “knowing by heart” or “touching” — is not vital or 
present, but only ever occurs as a process of mourning. The let-
ter, which must be in principle operational in the radical absen-
ce or death of its author, predicts and performs the death of its 
author in the process.8 This is not to say that the author is dead 
or that the author must be dead, but rather, that to read is to 
mourn the absence of the signatory and, in so doing, to take the 
signatory within the self. To mourn is the process of loving and 
knowing by heart; the other erupts, touching, appearing-disap-
pearing “under your skin.” Indeed, “touching with words” is a 
form of mourning in which the other is “no longer before you,” 
but “uninterrupted” and “kissing you.” As if mourning allowed 
you to touch the other, kiss the other, and tattoo the other on the 
inside of “myself,” leaving the pronoun and the ipse riven, mad, 
and in love. Touching in this way is no longer a phenomenolo-
gical experience, but bound up in the deconstruction of the self 
by the others that fissure it in mourning and ultimately in love. 
Still, touching with words involves having “the other within 
oneself, right up close but stronger than oneself, and his tongue 
in your ear.” So, as we read, we mourn the absence of the author 
in an effort to take in and revivify the language: to be touched 
by words and commingle our voices, drawing the other “up clo-
se” “stronger than” ourselves, displacing ourselves in order to be 
touched. Derrida’s langue in our ear is both a tongue and lan-
guage. We read in order to have a tongue in ear, kissing us not 
8 Roland Barthes elaborates this principle in “The Death of the Author,” sub-
stituting the reader or interpreter for the “author-God,” as the locus of tex-
tual meaning (“The Death of the Author,” in The Norton Anthology of Theory 
and Criticism, 2nd ed., ed. Vincent Leicht, 1325–28 [New York: Norton & 
Co., 2010], 1325–26). We differ from Barthes on the second point. By virtue 
of the postal principle, the reader would be equally engaged to the vicis-
situdes of adestination and the postcard. 
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necessarily as a physical sensation, but as the erotic principle 
of language that allows another’s words to operate closer than 
whatever we might assume “ourselves” to be. Importantly, this 
“langue in our ears” is both the singular tongue of our signatory 
and, simultaneously, the entire differential relay that makes his 
langue legible and, ultimately, illegible. The process of mourning 
the signatory, of taking in the other “up close,” can occur only 
by virtue of langue having always already been in our ears and 
entirely senseless. 
While Derrida’s langue is in our ears, touches us “before 
being able to say a word,” simultaneously the readers are left 
“looking at [themselves] in the depths of the rearview mirror, 
in an automobile that passes [double] all the others” (PC, 60).9 
Reading, like love, recalls and requires a displacement of self, a 
mourning that makes the other stronger than the self, requiring 
a reconfiguration of everything one might mean when one de-
signates a self. The reading self looks at [itself] “in the depths of 
the rearview mirror,” which is to say that we can only ever con-
figure ourselves as selves through a retro-specular relation. We 
do not see ourselves, but rather, are projected, rear-viewed, even 
as the movement of our “automobile,” the continual movement, 
“running” or “dispatching” of the autos, keeps producing new 
rear-views. The automobile “passes all others,” which would be 
the passing of all others in more than one sense; the automobi-
le passes all “other” versions of its own autos and, in the same 
breath, passes all the “others” who have touched us with their 
words. The verb translated as “passes” is given in the French 
double. For the sake of metaphor, the translator perhaps chooses 
to gloss this as “passes.” However, double might be more literally 
translated as “doubles all the others.” As if the movement of this 
auto-mobile, this self always on the move, only ever constitutes 
9 Derrida describes what Nicholas Royle refers to as a telepathy effect in 
which at the moment of reading we are already “being-two-to-speak” or 
“being-two-to-feel,” perhaps even, being-two-to-touch (“The ‘Telepathy Ef-




its “autos” in terms of a retrospective, rear-viewed doubling of 
each and every other: “Limited Inc”10 in the rearview mirror. 
Derrida sums up the chiasmic displacement of self and other 
as “the most mysterious thing, the most worthy of being thought, 
the least thinkable, my idea of you, the infinite anamnesis of that 
(which) I saw” (PC, 60, my emphasis). Significantly, Derrida’s 
tries to imagine his “idea of you” through the metaphor of this 
“automobile” that figures the movement of a self to which he has 
no access. A challenge no doubt, thinking the “least thinkable.” 
“My idea of you” is only ever an “infinite anamnesis,” the infini-
te process of gathering together under the pronouns “my” and 
“you” all the memories, the retrospecular rear-views that neces-
sarily pass and double (double as they pass) “all the others.” “My 
idea of you” becomes an interminable analysis in and of itself, 
an interminable envoi in which the relations between self and 
other are not only always on the move (autos-mobile), but also 
are only ever constituted in and by the resounding displacement 
of self for other, the mixing of voices, timbres, and love-stamps.
What remains here in the final lines of this envoi is the event 
of such an encounter; the event of my reading-intercepting in 
which all along Derrida has had his langue in my ear without 
ever having intended it. A love from without, a philately, in 
which by virtue of the love-stamp, the tax he paid, the timbre 
which is simultaneously of his voice and not his voice, touches 
me — our voices intermixing and deporting whatever thesis I 
had intended to offer. The love of the stamp sanctions my rea-
ding, touching, burning and citing of the envois never meant 
for me. Yet I have never quite hung up, or will be always just 
hanging up, awaiting the sound of this timbre in my ear, “in a 
10 In “Limited Inc a b c…,” Derrida deploys the phrase “limited inc” not only 
to refer to the explicit influences that an author might name, but also the 
“entire more or less anonymous tradition of a code, a heritage, a reservoir of 
arguments” to which an author has recourse (Limited Inc, ed. Gerald Graff 
[Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988], 36). This “heritage” would 
be radicalized by this figure of the retrospective view, expanding the con-
figuration of the self to a limited, but nonetheless uncountable, company of 
others. 
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language that is all the closer for being foreign, […] [in which] 
I understand nothing” (PC, 19), only ever resounding the amo-
rous rhetoric of this adestined text, carrying the mail, speaking 
with and through Derrida on this telephone, this telephony, this 





I repeat, my love: for you. I write for you and speak only to you [Je 
le répète, mon amour: pour toi. J’écris pour toi et ne parle qu’à toi].1
Love. Has Derrida ever spoken of anything else but love?2
Love is…
Love is the obvious word in the “Envois” to The Post Card and 
maybe the most difficult to say anything about. How can one 
speak intelligibly about it? One falls hopelessly into cliché when 
speaking of love, as Derrida does in the Kirby Dick and Amy 
Ziering Kofman’s film. “I have an empty head on love in gen-
eral,” says Derrida. “And as for the reason philosophy has often 
spoken of love, I either have nothing to say, or I’d just be recit-
ing clichés.”3 And yet, love is certainly the guiding principle, be-
yond pleasure, behind and before Derrida’s corpus, behind and 
before everything he says about adestination, destinerrancy, 
arrival, the gift, the messianic, the secret, others, and also the 
promise; behind and in front of which is a double affirmation, a 
1 PC, 73/81.
2 See also John Protevi’s penetrating essay, “Love,” in Between Deleuze and 
Derrida, eds. Paul Patton and John Protevi, 183–94 (New York: Continuum, 
2003).
3 Jacques Derrida, Screenplay and Essays on the Film Derrida, eds. Kirby 




yes, yes to an unknown future, a oui oui that haunts language as 
the memory of an ad-venture, an other a-venir, each time a new 
beginning. Each time beginning; anew. Every time I open my 
mouth I am promising something, even when I am lying I am 
promising, opening myself up to a possible future, to a future 
anterior about which I can truthfully know nothing for certain.4 
Speaking opens me up to the world, to the love of the world, to 
the promise of an other world. Who could deny that?
How then to trace all those moments of reference to “you,” 
“my love”? How to trace all those addresses to the beloved, the 
one that remains secret, a-b-s-o-l-u-t-e-l-y secret, in the “En-
vois”? Undoubtedly an interminable task. That “my love” re-
mains at the secret heart of everything Derrida says, the wound 
of the text, opening itself to the future, to the to-come of the 
other, exposed to it, naked, entre nous, nude. Indeed, my love, 
my love is exposed to the impossible. Derrida, “having never 
loved anything but the impossible,” is engaged in The Post Card 
to the promise of love, to the reader to come who will fall in love 
again with the letter of the text.5 Even the bad reader, says Der-
rida, solicits his love (PC, 4). 
Without precaution or predilection I will take two entries 
from the same day (3 June 1977) to illustrate why these “Envois” 
are Derrida’s most sustained and important contribution to the 
discourse of love. First entry:         
3 June 1977
and when I call you my love, my love, is it you I am calling or 
my love? You, my love, is it you I thereby name, is it to you 
that I address myself? I don’t know if the question is well put, 
it frightens me. But I am sure that the answer, if it gets to me 
4 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin, 
trans. Patrick Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 67.
5 Jacques Derrida, “Circumfession,” in Geoffrey Bennington, Jacques Derrida 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 3.
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one day, will have come to me from you. You alone, my love, 
you alone will have known it.                                                    
we have asked each other the impossible, as the impossible, 
both of us.                                                    “Ein jeder Engel ist 
schrecklich,” beloved.                                                    when I 
call you my love, is it that I am calling you, yourself, or is it 
that I am telling my love? and when I tell you my love is it 
that I am declaring my love to you or indeed that I am telling 
you, yourself, my love, and that you are my love. I want so 
much to tell you (PC, 8). 
What exactly is frightening about this question? And why does 
Derrida ask if the question is well put? How could the ques-
tion be put otherwise? And if so, how does the phrasing of the 
question effect the response? Why the repetition of the phrase 
“my love”? not only here but throughout the “Envois,” over and 
over again, until the locution becomes intrinsic to the rhythmic 
fabric of the text: “et quand je t’appelle mon amour, mon amour, 
est-ce toi que j’appelle ou mon amour?” (PC, 8/12). 
One answer lies in the discrepancies between use and men-
tion Derrida traces so tenaciously in Limited Inc and elsewhere, 
the ungroundable chasm forged by the great J.L. Austin be-
tween performative and constative utterances, which are always 
leaking uncontrollably into one another, never quite sustain-
able, saturable or definable. When I say “my love” am I stating 
or instigating, declaring a matter of fact or making something 
happen? Calling you to me, I call you out, create you, my love. 
Calling you my love, my love, I am inventing the impossible, in-
venting the event of love; I am promising my love. To you. One 
can never know for sure that love does not appear in the nam-
ing, that the locution “I love you” doesn’t create what it names, 
even if I’m joking or acting on a stage; and by creating what 
it names, it is susceptible to being confused with a declaration 
postcarded to who(m)ever gets in its way.6 Sending it out, I can 
6 See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., eds. J.O. Urmson and 
Marina Sbisà (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 22: “a performative 
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never be sure of its destination, its active sonar, its “tranche-
mission,” seeking out the monstrous contours of some wholly, 
unknowable, beloved other. The performative is therefore al-
ways already a perverformance, provoking the serious and the 
non-serious simultaneously, again, anew each and every time. 
“Perhaps,” says Derrida, “they are going to find this writing too 
adroit, virtuosic in the art of turning away [l’art de détourner], 
perhaps perverse in that it can be approached from everywhere 
and nowhere, certainly abandoned to the other, but given over 
to itself. Why, they ask themselves, incessantly let the destina-
tion divide itself? You too, perhaps, my love, you too question 
yourself, but this perversion, first of all, I treat.” (PC, 223/239).  
To whom or to what does Derrida refer to with “my love,” the 
hidden god of The Post Card? To what other is it abandoned? 
“Quid ergo amo, cum Deum meum amo? Can I do anything 
other than translate this question by SA into my language, into 
the same sentence, totally empty and huge at the same time, the 
change of meaning, or rather reference, defining the only dif-
ference of the ‘meum’: what do I love, whom do I love, that I 
love above all?”7 What do I love when I love my God? Whom 
do I love? Who or what? “the history of love, the heart of love, 
is divided between the who and the what.”8 The question is ter-
rifying. Love, riven from itself, bifurcated in the crucible of the 
idiomatic moment of its enunciation. In saying “I love you” I 
am repeating a cliché, I am bound to a context, to a tradition, to 
the moment of saying, to a language that is not my own; I have 
only one language and it is not my own.9 My tongue is not my 
own tongue, but the other’s tongue in my mouth. And yet I am 
saying something absolutely singular, absolutely new that marks 
an ineluctable alterity at the heart of iterability, the itara, which 
utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by 
an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy” 
(emphasis in the original).
7 Derrida, “Circumfession,” 122.
8 Derrida, Screenplay and Essays on the Film Derrida, 81.
9 Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 1.
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calls to the other in Sanskrit.10 No amount of repetition can ever 
exhaust the novelty of what comes by way of that locution: “I 
love you.”  
But Seriously
The Post Card is indeed a text that makes writing about it a 
peculiar task: “Was there ever such a text as ‘Envois’ for mak-
ing you say strange things? And for making you unable to say 
anything?”11 Undoubtedly. But seriously, can it be taken serious-
ly? Quite a lot hangs on how you interpret that question. That 
one can never know to whom it is addressed lends to it a fictive 
status, a secrecy all its own: “no one will ever know from what 
secret I am writing and the fact that I say so changes nothing.”12 
And yet, it is addressed. To you, my love. Derrida has said quite 
a lot about the phrase “Je t’aime” elsewhere, as J. Hillis Miller 
has pointed out in a chapter on Derrida in his Speech Acts in Lit-
erature (2001).13 In 1992, Derrida presented two seminars on the 
phrase at the École des Hautes Études in Paris and then again in 
an English improvisation at the University of California at Ir-
vine in 1993. One says in French “Je t’aime” in the second person 
singular, which is not something we can say in the English lan-
guage, since “you” is never obstinately singular. One can only do 
this contextually by pointing or directing one’s speech directly 
to a loved one, a loved one who is in some sense, and however 
negatively, “touched” by that speech act, a speech act which is 
not a constative but a felicitous performative event, doing what 
it is saying. Here is what Derrida says of the peculiarity of the 
10 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc, trans. Samuel Weber, ed. Gerald Graff (Evan-
ston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 7.
11 Sarah Wood, “Edit,” Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Lit-
erature 39, no. 3 (2006): 47–58, at 48.
12 Derrida, “Circumfession,” 207.
13 See J. Hillis Miller’s commentaries in Literature as Conduct: Speech Acts in 
Henry James (New York: Fordham, 2005), 204; Black Holes (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1999), 279–311; Speech Acts in Literature (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 134–49; 159–60.
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phrase as it is cited in Miller’s translation of this as yet unpub-
lished seminar:
“Je t’aime” is not a description; it is the production of an event 
by means of which, claiming not to lie, claiming to speak the 
truth (the “Je t’aime” is always true, deemed to be true, im-
mediately true, and […] [it has an] extraordinary allure of 
indubitability […]), I tend to affect the other, to touch the 
other, literally or not, to give the other or to promise the 
other the love that I speak to him or her […]. This performa-
tive declaration creates an event in manifesting, in attesting 
to that of which it speaks, in bearing witness to it; and that to 
which it testifies is not elsewhere, but here and now, nearly 
merging [se confondant] with the act that consists in saying 
it, which has caused more than one to say [ce qui a ou faire 
dire à plus d’un], from Stendhal to Gide or to Proust (I can’t 
remember), that one begins truly to love after or at the earli-
est from the moment when love is declared and not before 
that” [qu’on commence veritablement à aimer après que après 
que ou au plus tôt au moment où l’amour est déclaré et non 
plus tôt].14
Strange to think that love might not come about before it is ex-
pressed concisely and in the singular unanimity of those three 
small monosyllables; that I may not be truly in love until I ex-
press it in some way. Only after I say “I love you” am I really in 
love: “when I tell you my love is it that I am declaring my love to 
you or indeed that I am telling you, yourself, my love, and that 
you are my love” (“quand je te dis mon amour est-ce que je te 
déclare mon amour ou bien est-ce que je te dis, toi, mon amour, 
et que tu es mon amour”) (PC, 8/13). Saying “I love you” almost 
merges with the time of its being said in the here and now, but 
not quite. For when does one know that one is in love, or at what 
moment precisely does one fall in love? It is surely the case that 
one is either already in love or not in love and that the moment 
14 Quoted in Miller, Speech Acts in Literature, 138.
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of its enunciation is deferred, altered, perverted in some sense 
in the crucible of the first fall, a fall that is always already fall-
ing. One is therefore thrown into love; Dasein-like we find our-
selves in love, inventing love, and in loving being already in love, 
within it. At what moment(s), to put this another way, does one 
decide, in all the madness of a decision that is not purely a rea-
soned calculation, that one loves? 
“I love you” is a promise that may or may not be kept, which 
is not to say that one was never in love at all, but that the condi-
tion of being in love is that the promise may not be fulfilled and I 
might say that I am no longer in love. I may have been joking ei-
ther. I may have said “I love you” and not meant it, which doesn’t 
prevent the other being touched by what I have said. I may have 
been writing a poem or, indeed, a novel called “Envois.” But that 
does not prevent the power of what I have said from being taken 
as serious and in that regard as some way felicitous, and there-
fore from affecting or touching the other: “When I speak to you, 
I touch you, and you touch me when I hear you, from however 
far off it comes to me, and even if it is by telephone, the recol-
lection of a voice’s inflection on the phone, or by letter or e-mail 
too.”15 One may be aware that one is reading a fictitious account 
by Jacques Derrida, and that the speaker is one of many per-
sonae, both male and female, a polymorphous polyglot toying 
with conventions of literary-romantic-philosophical discourse, 
but that oddly also brings the text out of itself, breathes life into 
it and challenges the reader to uncover its secrets.  Those secrets 
we are never finished with, those secrets which incite us from 
their place of hiding to account for the unaccountable, to say 
outrageous things to the other, about the other.16 Those secrets 
that leave us naked — nude before the other, nude together.
15 Jacques Derrida, On Touching — Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizarry 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 291.
16 See also Jacques Derrida, A Taste for the Secret, trans. Giacomo Donis, eds. 
Giacomo Donis and David Webb (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 58: “Fun-
damentally, everything I attempt to do, think, teach and write has its raison 
d’être, spur, calling and appeal in this secret, which interminably disquali-




“Without a certain love of the text,” says Derrida elsewhere, “no 
reading would be possible. In every reading there is a corps-à-
corps between reader and text, an incorporation of the reader’s 
desire into the desire of the text.”17 Derrida’s desire is projected 
onto the postcard he picks up in the Bodleian library, just as the 
desire of his readers is projected into his texts, just as my de-
sire is projected, yet again, into the strange body of his writing. 
“Philosophy,” as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, “never arrives at this 
thinking — that thinking is love.”18 Love never arrives. Full stop. 
If it did it would mean death, death to the promise of a future 
to come and a kind of thinking in process, in the process of de-
sire and love. In short — to get to the point — “the destination is 
death” (PC, 33). 
It is the secret that impassions, impossibly. It keeps us locked 
into a contest with the doorkeeper that says thou shalt not, who 
stands before the law in Kafka’s parable, never arriving, prolong-
ing, protracting, and unwinding in an endless différance. “The 
text guards itself, maintains itself — like the law, speaking only 
of itself, that is to say, of its non-identity with itself. It neither ar-
rives nor lets anyone arrive. It is the law, makes the law and leaves 
the reader before the law.”19 Each of those doors is only for us. It 
stands before us in the singular light of an unheard of promise. 
But it is the love of literature, of its absolute secrecy, if it can 
be called that, which keeps us coming back. There is something 
“about” literature, neither wholly intrinsic nor wholly extrinsic; 
there is something, that is, that is not reducible to the aesthetic, 
Given Time and in Passions, we never finish with this secret, we are never 
finished, there is no end.”
17 Jacques Derrida, “Deconstruction and the Other,” in Debates in Continental 
Philosophy: Conversations with Contemporary Thinkers, ed. Richard Kear-
ney (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 156.
18 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (London and Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 86.
19 Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law,” in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, 
181–220 (London: Routledge, 1992), 211.
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something surrounding it, something which cannot, will not, 
be divulged or brought to light which keeps open the possibility 
of saying more about it, something which gives itself to us. The 
love of the text, of the good reading, is each time unique; one 
way or another it keeps us going, searching, beyond hope that 
some other might surprise us. Love of the text is the expectation 
of surprise. Derrida speaks of his beloved in this way too: “the 
uniquely each time that I love: beyond everything that is, you 
are the one — and therefore the other” (“l’uniquement chaque 
fois que j’aime: au-delà de tout ce qui est, tu es l’un — et donc 
l’autre”) (PC, 143/155). 
Rilke’s words from the Duino Elegies, “Ein jeder Engel ist 
schrecklich,” are also fascinating because they too are impas-
sioned responses to the arrival of a letter and its unexpected 
results. There is a beautiful story surrounding Rilke’s writing 
of these poems.20 After finishing his much renowned novel The 
Notebooks of Nolte Laurids Brigge in 1910, Rilke experienced 
a profound spiritual malaise, writing little for a period of two 
years. An invitation from his wealthy friend, Princess Marie von 
Thurn und Taxi-Hohenlohe, to spend some months at her castle 
at Duino on the Adriatic Sea offered Rilke some respite from a 
nomadic lifestyle taken up after 1910: Rilke had also contemplat-
ed giving up poetry at this time and entering the medical profes-
sion. Upon receiving a business letter that he had to attend to 
immediately, Rilke walked out onto the castle’s bastions in howl-
ing winds, along a narrow path separating cliffs that dropped 
off some two hundred feet into the sea. At that moment, out 
of the blue and on the wind, so to speak, came the following 
words: “Wer, wenn ich schriee, hörte mich denn aus der Engel/ 
Ordnungen?” (“Who, if I cried out, would hear me among the 
angels’ hierarchies?”). In the same day Rilke completes the fol-
lowing lines:
20 The following story is recounted in Stephen Mitchell’s preface to Rainer Ma-
ria Rilke, Duino Elegies & The Sonnets to Orpheus, trans. Stephen Mitchell 
(New York: Vintage, 2009), xiii–xv.
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Who, if I cried out, would hear me among the angels’  
     hierarchies?
and even if one of them pressed me suddenly against his 
     heart:
I would be consumed in that overwhelming existence.
For beauty is nothing but the beginning of terror [Denn das 
Schöne ist nichts als des Schrecklichen Anfang], which we are 
    still just able to endure,
and we are so awed because it serenely disdains to  
     annihilate us.
Every angel is terrifying [Ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich].21
The German word “schrecklich” can be multifariously rendered 
as critics of Rilke’s Duino Elegies have testified over the years, 
noting each time just how difficult it is to translate that word 
into English. Locked within it are some of the following mean-
ings: awful, heinous, terrible, appalling, awesome, monstrous, 
dreadful, sublime. It is also nightmarish, ghostly and spectral, 
as in the word “Schreckgespenst.” The word makes translation 
tremble at the crux of a vicious paradox. Rilke’s angel is at once 
both absolutely beautiful and absolutely dreadful. Every other 
angel is unique and arresting, overwhelmingly terrible and 
beautiful. Like Yeats’s, Rilke’s terrible beauty remains secret and 
exposed; it is an oxymoron veiled and unveiled, translatable and 
untranslatable; and it is this secrecy that impassions us to say 
more about it. And when Rilke repeats Derrida’s phrase again at 
the beginning of the “Second Elegy” one is surely no nearer to 
an explication of what that secret is that so impassions. This is 
perhaps the “it” that frightens Derrida when he poses the ques-
tion, is it you I am addressing? It somehow remains impossible 
to say anything about it and yet its call is for an infinite read-




never read before. “And that’s the impossible, that’s the poematic 
experience.”22
Translating, my love
I said there were two entries from the same day that I wanted 
to speak of in this brief accounting for “I love you”. Here is the 
second entry, again from the same day — 3 June 1977:
and you, tell me                                                    I love all my 
appellations for you and then we would have but one lip, one 
alone to say everything                                                    from 
the Hebrew he translates “tongue” [langue], if you can call 
it translating, as lip [lèvre]. They wanted to elevate them-
selves sublimely, in order to impose their lip, the unique lip, 
on the universe. Babel, the father, giving his name of confu-
sion, multiplied the lips, and this is why we are separated and 
that right now I am dying, dying to kiss you with our lip [de 
t’embrasser de notre lèvre] the only one I want to hear (PC, 
9/13).
“Babel” itself names the myth of the origin of translation. Der-
rida has spoken at length of this in his essay “Des tours de Ba-
bel,” and again in “No Apocalypse, Not Now,” “Ulysses Gramo-
phone,” and later on again in The Post Card (PC, 165/240). In 
Genesis the people of Shem, sons of Noah, descend on a plain 
in the land of Shinar after the great flood; all of the earth speak-
ing a single language. In order to “make a name for themselves” 
they build a tower and a city surrounding the tower. This is the 
fabled city and tower of Babel designed to reach up to Heav-
en. God descends from the heavens to scatter the people and 
their language, to sever their tongues and impose translation on 
them and forbid it simultaneously. The word “Babel” is trans-
lated as a proper name and a common noun, an event, and a 
22 Jacques Derrida, Points... Interviews, 1974–1994, trans. Peggy Kamuf et al., 
ed. Elisabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 295.
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confusion of tongues; it is a place and a happening, the name of 
God as confusion and impossible translation. The story of Babel 
is a story then about the (im)possibility of translation and the 
proper name, a name which is the name of God and the name 
of the confusion wrought on the people of Shem by that name, 
the name of their city and their failure to impose their name and 
language on the universe. Various translations of this story ren-
der the Hebrew word for language, through a metonymic shift, 
as “tongue,” whereas others (André Chouraqui) translate it as 
“lip.” Hence the slippage between tongue and lip in the extract 
cited above. 
But what Derrida means by the various multiplications in 
this extract is not all that easy to grasp. To have one lip means in 
this context to have one tongue or language, to speak the same 
language. If, like the people of Shem, Derrida and his love share 
one universal language — “one alone to say everything” — it 
would mean the end of translation. There would be no need to 
interpret what the other said. There is therefore an interesting 
play in this section between the “I,” “you,” “me,” and “we” which 
begins right from the beginning with the double syntax of the 
following phrases: “and you, tell me [et toi, dis moi] […] I love 
all my appellations for you.” Who speaks in this? Who is telling? 
Is the beloved speaking or one of Derrida’s personae? The closer 
you look at the strange phrasing in this segment the stranger 
and more complicated it becomes, until we hit upon the marve-
lous concluding line, “that right now I am dying, dying to kiss 
you with our lip the only one I want to hear.”
In the Derrida film mentioned above Derrida responds to 
Amy Ziering Kofman’s question about love firstly by saying: 
“Why have philosophers always spoken of love? That’s how phi-
losophy started —” And then breaks off. 
Philosophy started with a kiss. At least this is how it start-
ed according to Novalis, who in the final pages of On Touch-
ing — Jean-Luc Nancy Derrida treats in the following manner: 
“this may be where ‘thinking’ begins — when a mouth comes 
in contact with another mouth and when lips, and sometimes 
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tongue and teeth, get mixed up in it.”23 The mixing and the mul-
tiplication of lips is important because it speaks of a certain 
translation of the you into the I, of the multiplication of selves 
that are always breaking into one another, shattering love, shat-
tering the distinction between bodies and thinking, between 
mind and body. 
Can one kiss another in language? Can one caress the other 
in the words, touching oneself touching another in the idiom 
of love? Does speaking in some way kiss the other on the lip? If 
language is by metonymic transfer a lip, it would follow that our 
lips could touch in the language of love. In saying “I love you” I 
kiss you on the lip with my lip. And I want more than anything 
else to hear you say “I love you” and for you to kiss me on my 
lip, with your lip, in your tongue. Yes, “I love you” is, in a man-
ner of speaking, a way of kissing the other’s lips. Difficult then 
not to think of The Post Card as a work of love, as a first kiss, 
first and last. 
For 
when I call you my love, is it that I am calling you, yourself, or is 
it that I am telling my love?
23 Derrida, On Touching, 306. See also J. Hillis Miller’s discussion of the kiss 




Derrida in Correspondances: 
A Telephonic Umbilicus
For Raminta
The chthonic ones are not confined to a vanished past. 
They are a buzzing, stinging, sucking swarm now, and hu-
man beings are not in a separate compost pile.
— Donna Haraway1
At bottom I am only interested in what cannot be 
sent off, cannot be dispatched in any case. 
— Jacques Derrida2
Which side are we on, life or death, reason or madness, in or 
out? The question of my life. What if reason were mad?
— Hélène Cixous3
“6 October 1978.                                                    I am writing you 
in a taxi. I avoid the subway, here too, precisely because I like it 
1 Donna Haraway, “Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, 
Chthulucene,” e-flux journal 75 (2016), http://www.e-flux.com/jour-
nal/75/67125/tentacular-thinking-anthropocene-capitalocene-chthulucene/
2 PC, 14–15/19.
3 Hélène Cixous, Manhattan: Letters from Prehistory, trans. Beverley Bie Bra-
hic (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 32; Manhattan: Lettres de 
la préhistoire (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2002), 48–49; Emphasis in original.
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[parce que je l’aime]. And because I get lost [je m’égare] in the 
correspondances, although the system is much simpler than in 
Paris” (PC, 166/179). This passage from Jacques Derrida’s “En-
vois” in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond in 
which he writes from a New York City taxi seems relatively 
mundane. Perhaps it is. Yet, I’d like to linger within this unex-
ceptionable scene for the paths it might already be leading us 
down. Derrida’s avoidance of the subway precisely because he 
loves it (parce que je l’aime) betrays a logic of pleasure deferral as 
well as something of the postal principle: “relays, delay, antici-
pation, destination, telecommunicating network, and therefore 
the fatal necessity of going astray, etc.” (PC, 66/74). The taxi al-
lows Derrida to minimize the spatio-temporal4 catastrophe of 
destinerrance programmed by the postal principles that might 
lead him astray in the sprawling subway correspondances. There 
is something else, too, that draws me to this passage: something 
to do with dancing underground beneath the city, with sexual 
difference in politics (and the politics of sexual difference), with 
telephones, umbilical cords, and navels. Here it is pirouetting off 
the page: due to an astonishing line break in the English trans-
lation, correspondances becomes correspon-dances.5 I follow (je 
4 For a detailed discussion of destinerrance within Derrida’s corpus see J. 
Hillis Miller, “Derrida’s Destinerrance,” Modern Language Notes 121, no. 
4 (2006): 893–910. There, Miller characterizes destinerrance as that “fatal 
possibility of erring by not reaching a predefined temporal goal in terms 
of wandering away from a predefined spatial goal” (894). Moreover, this 
paper embraces the stylistic destinerrance that performatively manifests in 
Derrida’s writing of which Miller writes that, no matter how “hard he tries 
to stick to the point, he is destined to wander” (900). 
5 Correspondances denotes transportation transfer points in French, close 
proximity or connection in English, and various forms of communica-
tion in both languages such as the similitude of correspondence(s) and 
the distance(s) spanned through correspondence. I read the hyphen in 
correspond-dances as a ciphered telephone line that se-reparates correspon-
dances in between French and English that textually perform its spatial and 
temporal dis-connective function (spatial: between French and English, 
between here, there, and beyond; temporal: between Ancient Greece and 
the contemporary, and its detours). For a discussion on sé-réparation as 
the interval between separation and reparation, separation as reparation, 
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suis…) these correspon-dances that Derrida lovingly avoids in 
dancing a movement through flickering subterranean passage-
ways hidden from the light of day.6 
I’d like to suggest that Derrida’s attempt to avoid this pleas-
urable and fatal destinerrance in the underground subway 
correspondances hooks up with an interred feminine presence 
emanating from the “Greek World” that threatens to derail or 
explode everything, including patriarchy, from within the polis’s 
most intimate and foundational of spaces.7 Following Derrida’s 
Greek preoccupation in “Envois” fomented by Socrates and 
and sexual difference see Jacques Derrida, “Ants,” trans. Eric Prenowitz, The 
Oxford Literary Review 24, no. 1 (2002): 17–42. I thank Michael O’Rourke 
opening this path of thought for me, and for his countless generosities.
6 It is important to highlight here two scenes of dancing in Derrida’s corpus. 
Scene one: Early in “Envois,” Derrida narrates an exchange on an Oxford 
college lawn that occurred after giving a seminar. A student, “très beau” 
and “seductive,” asks Derrida why he doesn’t kill himself since, in the stu-
dent’s eyes, this would be the gesture par excellence of deconstruction given 
the thought of death that imbues its movements. Derrida responds with 
a “pirouette” of deconstruction that demonstrates the interlocutor’s being-
seduced by death at the time of questioning as well asserting that Derri-
da perhaps has committed suicide, otherwise, multiple times (PC, 15/19). 
Scene two: found in Jacques Derrida and Christie V. McDonald, “Choreog-
raphies,” Diacritics 12, no. 2 (1982): 66–76. Beginning with a discussion of 
Emma Goldman’s statement, “If I can’t dance I don’t want to be part of your 
revolution,” Derrida reflects on the need to displace questions of woman 
from a topological matrix that so often assigns place. Rather, Derrida calls 
for a questioning of this place, which would be urge the questioning of the 
“(entire history of the West and of its metaphysics) and that it dance oth-
erwise” (69). Learning to dance otherwise helps to guide the aims of this 
paper that seeks to “invent incalculable choreographies” and “unheard of 
and incalculable sexual differences” through demystifying the surreptitious 
operations of phallogocentrism (68, 76).
7 Derrida’s Of Hospitality inspires this paper as much as The Post Card in its 
interrogation of the inheritances bequeathed to us by the “Greek World” 
that insists on the necessity to “to multiply the two-way journeys, a to-and-
fro between the matters of urgency that assail us at the end-of-millennium, 
and the tradition from which we receive the concepts [la tradition dont nous 
recevons les concepts], the vocabulary, the axioms that are elementary and 
presumed natural or untouchable” (Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality: Anne 
Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to Respond, trans. Rachel Bowlby 
[(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000], 45; De l;’hospitalité: Anne Du-
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Plato’s postal library apocalypse that launches his discussions of 
destiny (Geschick) and destination, sending (schicken), history 
(Geschichte), identity, filiation, the secret, address(ees), tempo-
rality, reproduction, substitution, reversibility, dissemination, 
cinders, and writing, I’d like to pursue a similar line of ancient 
Greek thought that will eventually bring us to two scenes of an 
effaced feminine presence in Aeschylus’s Eumenides, that trium-
phant tragedy that depicts Athens’ juridico-political foundation 
and the ascension of the Olympian gods through the absorp-
tive abjuration of more ancient feminine spaces and deities.8 
Cards on the table: I view the subway correspondances that Der-
rida loves yet avoids as ciphered feminine spaces under a phal-
lic metropolis (mētēr-polis, mother-city) weaving hidden, vital 
communicatory lines in which the Erinyes, Gaia, and the Py-
thon offer their interference.9 As an effect of relay and delay, this 
paper makes a dancing gesture — perhaps a clumsy leap at first 
glance — attended by Derrida’s pirouetting along and away from 
the correspondances’ subterranean shores that bear, from afar, 
an intimacy with an effaced maternal space of the all too quickly 
named “‘Greek World’ (to presuppose provisionally its unity or 
self-identity)” (H, 45/45). 
What ancient investments that continue to compound inter-
est can be discerned in listening to the ciphered calls of these 
correspond-dances, khōraspondances,10 cœurespondances cease-
fourmantelle invite Jacques Derrida à répondre [Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1997], 
45. Henceforth, H).
8 Aeschylus, “Eumenides,” in Aeschylus: Oresteia — Agamemnon, Libation-
Bearers, Eumenides, trans. Alan H. Sommerstein, 353–485. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008). 
9 In order to connect these lines that are often covered over, deadened, and 
disavowed, I take the call from Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other that 
marks the necessity to hyperbolize, exaggerate — “everything that proceeds 
under the name of ‘deconstruction’ arises from it [hyperbolism].” (Jacques 
Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin, trans. 
Patrick Menash [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998], 49; Le monolin-
gualisme de l’autre, ou la prothèse d’origine [Paris: Galilée, 1996], 82 Hence-
forth, M).
10 Texts from Derrida’s whole oeuvre address khōra, a figure appearing in 
Plato’s Timaeus that exists outside of the Platonic intelligible/sensible dyad 
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lessly traveling beneath Derrida’s taxicab? What connections 
and separations can be discerned in these dark correspon-dances 
that Derrida loves but avoids? Crucially, what can be gleaned 
about the anxious motivations of masculine fantasy in its un-
ceasing, almost obsessive production of accounts that denigrate 
the feminine? How do such denigrating assumptions surrepti-
tiously persist in contemporary language, labor, and geopoli-
tics? Specifically in the context of Derrida’s reading of Plato in 
The Post Card, what inheritances, locations, and temporalities 
converge, diverge, and unfold before us in these correspondances 
where Derrida gets lost? 
In order to traverse this admittedly dis-connected jump re-
garding the gendered link between the New York City subway 
and Ancient Tragedy, we’ll navigate through a multitude of dis-
connective subterranean correspondances that seemingly trans-
port us in different directions. This chapter emphasizes the con-
temporaneity of Ancient Greek attitudes toward the intertwined 
various embodiments of (and structural positions assigned ac-
cording to) sexual difference, race, class, ethnicity, ability, and 
citizenship. Moreover, studying the banished and threatening 
yet within the sexual dyad of male/female, which allows Plato to famously 
name khōra as receptacle of all becoming [geneseōs hupodokhēn], wetnurse 
[tithēnēn], and mother [mētri]. Khōra gives rise to and receives the entirety 
of the perceptible world: “[it] receives all things [pandekhes] and shares in 
a most perplexing way in what is intelligible [metalambanon de aporōtata 
pē tou noētou]” (51b). Khōra thus “exists,” Derrida claims in “Faith and 
Knowledge,” “Before and after the logos which was in the beginning,” thus 
requiring us to think its abstraction without any temporal or ousiological 
assurance. Moreover, as Derrida argues in “Khōra,” we can only ever know 
its structure through mise en abyme that will always have preceded and ex-
ceed a philosophical, logocentric search for origins. Plato’s feminizing and 
maternalizing assignations of khōra whisper everywhere throughout this 
paper’s discussion of the postal principle. See Plato, Timaeus, in Complete 
Works, ed. John M. Cooper, 1225–91 (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997); Jacques 
Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of “Religion” At the 
Limits of Reason Alone,” in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar, trans. Samuel 
Weber, 40–101 (New York: Routledge, 2002), 60; Jacques Derrida, “Khōra,” 




feminine elements of the polis necessarily discusses the opera-
tions of masculinity (fragile and threatened, thus all the more 
violent) that sanctions and unceasingly inflicts gendered, sex-
ualized, and racialized violence. I hope to make a small step 
toward transforming these long-standing arrangements. First, 
we’ll look to the interweaving of the postal principle with a tel-
ephonic principle and its relation to a masculine mastery of the 
household in Of Hospitality. Next, we’ll observe the masculine 
State’s ear held up to the telephone receiver in The Ear of the 
Other and Monolingualism of the Other, which both figure the 
telephone as a maddened umbilical cord mediating between 
life and death. Finally, we’ll channel effaced maternal spaces in 
Aeschylus’s Eumenides to argue that the palimpsestic layering 
of masculine over feminine spaces via continued usurpation 
and burial instills an anxiety of the mutinous possibility of the 
banished femininity that lurks under the polis’s political and 
religious spaces. Eventually we will come to the telephonic um-
bilical cord of a disavowed and effaced maternal current flowing 
throughout these umbilical telephonic network correspondances 
of the underground. We are never far from Derrida’s becom-
ing lost in the correspondances, of an originary errancy of these 
underground labyrinths that Derrida’s work performs and trav-
erses. He cannot get over it. He must follow it is as it haunts him. 
In each step, this paper traces a specific operation through 
which the masculine nourishes itself through incorporating the 
feminine — and the anxious desire that propels this process — to 
only then immediately cover its tracks to deny such intermin-
gling. For all attempts are made to make this appear like busi-
ness as usual, as if it was always already this way. If, according to 
Nicole Loraux, Ancient Greek masculinity erects itself through 
“incorporation and encirclement [of the feminine] — in short, 
they pertain to logics of inclusion,” then the feminine is made 
to work in the service of the masculine and threatens the mas-
culine due to its blurry proximity.11 In a similar register, Ann 
11 Nicole Loraux, The Experiences of Tiresias: The Feminine and the Greek Man, 
trans. Paula Wissing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 9; Les 
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Bergren claims that the “appropriation by the male of what he 
attributes to the female persists throughout Greek literature,” 
which, as displayed by the various instances of masculine ap-
propriations of the feminine discussed in this essay, suggests an 
inheritance that persists in the contemporary language, philoso-
phy, and human relationality.12 Damningly, this very process of 
incorporation programs a haunting remainder and anxiety for 
the masculine that possess these repudiated feminine elements. 
I follow Loraux’s counsel to not impose a clear binary between 
the feminine and masculine, in Ancient Greece or otherwise, 
but rather to tarry with thick complexities and avoid merely re-
capitulating “a table of antithetical categories again and again.”13 
Things are not so simple as (Greek) men vs. (Greek) women or 
masculinity vs. femininity, but rather, any relation between the 
sexes implies a certain imbrication and exchange. Still among 
the many others by which the man defines himself, this paper 
wagers that it is the feminine operator par excellence who con-
stitutes the otherness by which masculine identity can erect it-
self.14 Emanuela Bianchi describes the feminine in the Ancient 
Greek imaginary as “always [signifying] the scene of a certain 
adulteration,” thus implying an impurity evading its assigned 
proper place in a system obsessed by the white purity of the 
masculine logos.15 In the course of this chapter, we’ll come to see 
that there is no pure masculine, no pure andreia, left untouched 
by the always-already impure feminine that the masculine must 
incorporate in order to be itself. But the Greek male does not 
know this feminine, kalon kakon (beautiful evil), that consist-
Expériences de Tirésias: Le féminin et l’homme grec (Paris: Éditions Galli-
mard, 1989), 15.
12 Ann Bergren, Weaving Truth: Essays on Language and the Female in Greek 
Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 15.
13 Nicole Loraux, The Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas about Citizenship 
and the Division Between the Sexes, trans. Caroline Levine (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 4; Les enfants d’Athéna: Idées athéniennes 
sur la citoyenneté et la division des sexes (Paris: François Maspero, 1981), 8.
14 Loraux, The Experiences of Tiresias, 4/8.
15 Emanuela Bianchi, The Feminine Symptom: Aleatory Matter in the Aristote-
lian Cosmos (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 11.
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ently evades logos all while occupying the disavowed other at its 
core.16 And this is the maddening threat that never ceases. 
It is important to be clear that I do not wish to assign an on-
tology, essence, or identity through employing the term “femi-
nine” or “masculine” in the following discussion that pursues an 
effaced feminine presence. Ever aware of essentialism’s odious 
deeds, my discussions of “feminine” and “masculine” rupture 
with “female” and “male” in order to highlight how such het-
erosexist understandings of embodiment and experience have 
limited and continue to limit our understanding of what a body 
is, what it can do, what it can feel, and how we talk about them. 
Thus, I employ the term “feminine” catachrestically.17 In this 
sense, the feminine does not have any proper referent within 
phallogocentrism, but rather names something that exceeds, 
interrupts, and jams the logocentric discourse that attempts to 
define it. This understanding emerges from thinkers like Hélène 
Cixous and Luce Irigaray who each, differently, affirm difference 
between sexes, genders, races, nationalities, and class in order to 
displace the overdetermined social, cultural, and political field 
usurped by a “neutral” (i.e., white, western European or North 
American, heterosexist, patriarchal, masculine) subject that has 
historically murdered, exploited, excluded, and/or assimilated 
alterity. Importantly, sexual difference is not reducible or lim-
ited to one’s embodiment, which in normative accounts comes 
down to having- or not-having-a-penis: “sexual difference is 
16 Hesiod, Theogony, 585. 
17 My thought here is grateful to Gabriela Basterra who, in discussing ethical 
subjectivity as unending substitution for the other, defines catachresis as 
something that, “substitutes itself for an absence it names […] something 
that eludes representation.” Moreover, Judith Butler describes Irigaray’s un-
derstanding of the feminine as a “[figure] that function[s] improperly […] 
the use of a proper name to describe that which does not properly belong 
to it, and that return to haunt and coopt the very language from which the 
feminine is excluded” (Gabriela Basterra, The Subject of Freedom: Kant, 
Levinas [New York: Fordham University Press, 2015], 121; Judith Butler, 




not determined simply by the fantasized relation to anatomy.”18 
Through my readings of Irigaray and Cixous, I argue that femi-
nisms of sexual difference work to enact a world that will no 
longer rely on violent polarization and valorization of the self-
same/one but rather generate endless proliferation of embodied 
differences beyond any binarism.19 
Finally, I do not wish to scrawl yet another text in the long 
history of men writing about women. These typing hands — con-
nected with the assemblages of matter, experiences, and envi-
ronments — that I look at with mistrust for their histories of 
violence and privilege quiver with desire to enact otherwise 
histories and futures of experience that can finally ring through 
when, in the words of Hélène Cixous, the “living structures” 
bound to “historicocultural limits” are displaced from an en-
forced masculine primacy.20 As a person who expresses myself 
as a male and who lives a much more wandering gender iden-
tity, this paper acts as an affirmation of the constitutive feminine 
voices that too weave the multiple contradictions that are “me.”
Tele-postal Hospitality: The Home, the State, and the Penetrable 
Masculine
The Post Card interweaves the postal principle with a telephonic 
principle through their shared “differantial relay [relais différan-
tiel]” that immediately pluralizes any being or foundation all 
while structurally necessitating the possibility of going astray, 
becoming lost, and of never arriving (PC, 54/61). Derrida play-
fully grants to the post an originary principle, or rather, “a non-
18 Hélène Cixous, “Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways Out/Forays,” in The 
Newly Born Woman, trans. Betsy Wing, 63–132 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986), 82; “Sorties,” in La jeune née, 114–246 (Paris: Union 
Générale D’éditions, 1975), 151.
19 Irigaray too affirms that both the feminine and masculine are “unfinished 
and open,” which allows for future significations and embodiments that 
would be otherwise than their present conceptions (Luce Irigaray, An Eth-
ics of Sexual Difference, trans. Catherine Porter and Gillian C. Gill [Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993], 112).
20 Cixous, “Sorties,” 83/152.
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origin which is originary”21 that displaces the possibility of any 
teleology or arkhē:
In the beginning [Au commencement], in principle, was the 
post, and I will never get over it [je ne m’en conselerai jamais]. 
But in the end I know it, I become aware of it as our death 
sentence [notre arrêt de mort]: it was composed, according to 
all the possible codes and genres and languages, as a declara-
tion of love. In the beginning the post, John will say, or Shaun 
or Tristan, and it begins with a destination without address, 
the direction cannot be situated in the end… The condition 
for it to arrive is that it ends up and even that it begins by not 
arriving. (PC, 29/34)
This formulaic characterization substitutes the Biblical logos of 
John 1:1, “In the beginning [en arkhēi] was the Word [logos], and 
the Word [logos] was with God [theon], and the Word [logos] 
was God [theos],” with la poste that is always already a télé-post 
presupposing a relation with distance, non-presence, and alter-
ity. Later in “Envois,” Derrida writes that this reformulation is 
merely “for laughs” in that the postal principal precedes, exceeds, 
constitutes, and provides the medium for the very possibility of 
logos, and therefore the possibility of chronology (PC, 66/73). 
The inscribed signs and the postcard itself that materially sup-
ports the postal principle “must bear within itself a force and a 
structure” that enforces the impossibility for it to arrive at its 
destination in that even its very scene of arrival is one of eva-
sion, arriving in multiple registers “elsewhere, several times,” to 
the multitudes within the addressee, composed of the traces, 
spaces, and play of the letters on the card (PC, 123/135). It is this 
force and structure, Derrida explains, that enables the very pos-
sibility not only of language, but being itself: “as soon as there 
is, there is différance [dès qu’il y a, il y a différance] (and this 
does not await language, especially human language, and the 
21 Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” in Writing and Differ-
ence, trans. Alan Bass, 246–91. (London: Routledge, 2005), 255.
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language of Being, only the mark and the divisible trait)” (PC, 
66/74). For any “foundation” of being or origin is constituted by 
différance, that is postal delay, relay, spacing, parasites, and the 
structural possibility of going astray. 
Telephonic logic of differantial spacing flourishes in the Der-
rida’s works that consistently demonstrates how the self is con-
tinually initiated and coming from the elsewheres of others.22 
In other writings, Derrida playfully grafts a telephonic principle 
to this “originary” postal principle that confounds the possibil-
ity of origin — or rather institutes multiple origins forever ex-
isting spatio-temporally elsewhere. In H.C. for Life, That Is to 
Say… Derrida echoes the above scene of logocentrism’s birth: 
“In the beginning, there will have been the invention of the tel-
ephone […], the unique infinity of a telephone line.”23 Similarly, 
“Ulysses Gramophone” asserts that, “Before the act or the word, 
the telephone. In the beginning was the telephone. We can hear 
the telephone constantly ringing, this coup de téléphone […]. In 
the beginning, yes, at the beginning of the telephone call, in the 
beginning, some telephone call [au commencement du coup de 
téléphone].”24 The differences here between was and there will 
have been multiplies the telephonic links of past to future in a 
destinerrant scene thrown askew by such correspondances that 
link the post to the telephone. This postal principle of The Post 
Card, likened to getting lost in the indeterminate spaces of the 
correspondances’ transfer and movement, informs a télé-logic 
that pluralizes, spaces, and interweaves alterity with all language 
and being.25
22 I follow Avital Ronell’s description from The Telephone Book that “telephon-
ic logic means here, as everywhere, that contact with the Other has been 
disrupted; but it also means that the break is never absolute.” (Avital Ronell, 
The Telephone Book: Psychoanalysis, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech [Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989], 20).
23 Jacques Derrida, H.C. for Life, That Is to Say…, trans. Laurent Milesi and 
Stefan Herbrechter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 17.
24 Jacques Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes In Joyce,” in Acts of 
Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, 253–309 (Routledge: New York, 1991), 270.
25 In Of Hospitality, Derrida designates language as the most “mobile of tel-
ephones” that we bear [tragen] with us as “the absolute ground of all dis-
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These ciphered textual correspondances simultaneously bear 
the promise of connection and threat of abyssal severance as it 
bespeaks distance and heterogeneity. Regarding this primary 
role the other plays for the self, Avital Ronell claims that, “Tel-
ephonics imposes the recognition of a certain irreducible pre-
decence of the Other with respect to self. […] [T]his is what 
makes it uncanny, the inside calling from an internal outside.”26 
The telephonic could be spoken of as the literalization of our 
intimacy with distance and alterity via a telephonic mourning 
in which we become receiver for the voice and words of the ani-
mating other(s) within us. In “Envois,” Derrida coins the term 
teleorgasmization [télé-orgasmisation] — the self-shattering, ec-
static, non-boundary dancing between pain and pleasure borne 
by the veils of the “technoteleothingamajig [technotéléomachin-
chouette]” through which Derrida sends off his language from 
a place of no return (PC, 108, 155/119, 168). This telephonics be-
speaks language’s, subjectivity’s, and Being’s abyssal, originary 
trauma of destinerrance that fractures logos’s dream of auto-
foundation. 
Drawing on the télé-postal principle, we must follow an-
other detour that has unfurled beneath us to some of Derrida’s 
writing on the masculinity of hospitality. Of Hospitality parses 
a telephonic connection that transports the Greek world into 
our most private spaces through inheriting its words, concepts, 
assumptions, and truisms presumed to be “natural or untouch-
able” such as hospitality, the foreigner, the home, and the pri-
vate/public distinction (H, 91/85). Such haunting inheritances 
of the Ancient world too concern The Post Card as Derrida 
chides Socrates and Plato: “They are dead, those two dogs, and 
yet they step up to the cashier, they reinvest, they extend their 
empire with an arrogance they will never be pardoned for. […] 
[T]heir phantom comes back [leur fantôme revient] at night to 
do the accounts, in their name” (PC, 98/108). Of these capital 
placements” on which we travel our palintropic path in search for an origin 
that only results in finding a prosthesis” (H, 91/85).
26 Ronell, The Telephone Book, 82.
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returns still circulating between the present and past, in Of Hos-
pitality Derrida discusses Sophocles’ Antigone, which depicts 
that the bounded patriarchal household forms the paradoxical 
ground to offer hospitality. Bringing this ancient scene to the 
present, Derrida leads us to question how the state interrupts 
the phantasmatic distinctions between polis and oikos, public 
and private, and xenos and citizen that subtend the master’s 
ipsocratic household propriety, which provide the paradoxical 
ground from which to offer hospitality. Is there a gendering at 
work — circuitously relayed between past to present — in the 
state’s telephonic incursion into the oikos? (Many pages should 
be devoted to this topic in relation to the current refugee crisis 
and the various state and ideological actors that simultaneously 
foment and ignore this massive humanitarian catastrophe.) 
The image of the home provides Derrida the means to expli-
cate the other’s — more specifically, the foreign other — central-
ity for subjectivity: “We thus enter from the inside: the master of 
the house […] comes to enter his home through the guest — who 
comes from outside” (H, 125/111).27 Telephony links subjectivity 
to (household) mastery through its structure that requires an 
other to call up and create the master’s phantasmatic position of 
self-sufficient propriety. Yet the master’s chez-soi and domestic 
propriety is instituted and deconstituted by the structuring tel-
ephonic principle that transports the other’s (non)presence to 
the very core of subjectivity.
Of Hospitality specifically turns toward the collusion be-
tween the state, the home, and juridical hospitality (all to be 
understood as masculine) to discuss how the sovereign, home-
possessing subject can only be himself (for the master is always a 
he) after he picks up the call of the other through his living room 
telephone that the State might be listening in on: 
27 Moreover, in Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida recalls this strain of 
thought: “We only ever speak one language, […] it exists asymmetrically, 
always for the other […]. Coming from the other, remaining with the other, 




Now if my “home,” in principle inviolable, is also constituted, 
and in a more and more essential, interior way, by my phone 
line, but also by my e-mail, but also by my fax, but also by my 
access to the internet, then the intervention of the State be-
comes a violation of the inviolable [un viol de l’inviolable], in 
the place where inviolable immunity remains the condition 
of hospitality. (H, 51/49–51)
Derrida’s assignation of the telephone’s centrality within the 
home also emphasizes that for the master to accept another, he 
must give up that mastery and lay bare that mastery has struc-
turally always relied on the coming other. There is no ipseity, no 
sovereignty, no internal familial space, and thus no hospitality 
without a pervertability and impurity initiated by the guest who 
can always become parasitic host. 
Rogues further highlights the entrenched masculinism sub-
tending these claims to hospitality, autonomy, or the propre in 
that the “autonomy of the self, of the ipse, namely, of the one-self 
that gives itself its own law,” always presupposes a “father, hus-
band, son, or brother, the proprietory, owner, or seignior, indeed 
the sovereign” as a ground from which to welcome the other.28 
One must position oneself as a masculine proprietor — indis-
sociable from claims of sovereignty — who lays claim to a space 
from which to offer hospitality to the coming other. Moreover, 
hospitality’s masculine, paternal foundations are shaken by the 
threat of a (state) surveillance through the home-constituting 
telephone line by which the other and the surveilling state both 
enter. Here we hear echoes of the “Envois” and the possibility 
of one’s letter to be intercepted and read by prying eyes (multi-
ple addressees without anyone know it), the naked and exposed 
postcard being particularly vulnerable: “With the progress of 
the post the State police has always gained ground” (PC, 37/43).
Derrida — who is always on the phone — wishes to portray 
the impure presence of télé-postal parasites (static is one mean-
28 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault 
and Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 10–11, 12.
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ing of parasites in French) within the foundation of any subjec-
tivity or polity. Rather than being accidental or secondary, Der-
rida displays parasitism as constitutive for the self. Returning to 
the “filtered” purity of the telephone, Derrida writes that,
it is a bit in this element that I imagine the return of rev-
enants [le retour des revenants], by means of the effect or the 
grace of a subtle and sublime, essential, sorting — of parasites 
[entre les parasites], for there is nothing but parasites, as you 
well know […]. Now, parasites, here it is, can love each other 
[peuvent s’aimer]. (PC, 10–11/15) 
Similar to the openness of the postcard’s reversible faces, Der-
rida demonstrates that a network of parasites always populates 
the two-way openness of the telephone line. The telephone line’s 
violability becomes a pressing issue in that it imbues any self 
or home with a radical instability coming from the other. This 
death sentence writ by parasitism for the self-sufficient aspira-
tions of subjectivity, propriety, and hospitality paradoxically 
provides the ground upon which they stand. Such télé-postal 
pervertability, which in other texts of Derrida might be called 
auto-immunity, arises from a structure that maintains “a threat 
within the promise itself,” which structurally maintains an 
opening to alterity that thus harbors the risk of the self ’s de-
struction.29 No ipseity without an open telephonic connection 
to alterity, no chez-soi without a telephone cord to the outside, 
no internal hearth to offer hospitality without an other to fill its 
space. No males without a repressed femininity.
Speaking of such contemporary parasitic hauntings and rev-
enants that telephonically accrue interest from Ancient Greek 
accounts, we must make a stopover in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, to tarry with Hegel, an interlocutor Of Hospitality, and his 
discussions of Ancient Greece’s household incursions. For it is 
in Hegel’s characterization that we slowly approach an interred 
feminine presence keeping threatening watch over both the oikos 
29 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” 82.
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and polis. Keeping in mind Derrida’s writings on the masculine 
propriety that gives rise to a chez-soi, Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit transmits a gendering at work in the State’s relation to 
domestic space within the Greek World.30 Hegel shapes Sopho-
cles’ Antigone into a paradigmatic example for his philosophical 
system in which Antigone (in her familial devotion) embodies 
the Universal while Creon (in his devotion to the polis) embod-
ies the Particular.31 Hegel identifies this feminine, familial, and 
divine law with the lower world or underground [unterirdisches 
Recht] and a masculine, statist, and human law with the upper 
world [oberes Recht]: “divine and human law, or the law of the 
nether and of the upper world — the one the Family, the other 
the State power, the first being the feminine and the second the 
masculine character.”32 This feminine character forms the inner 
feeling [innerliches Gefühl] confined to the household, “which is 
not exposed to the daylight of consciousness,” while the mascu-
line is drawn outwards into the polity’s bright actuality.33 
30 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977); G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970).
31 This distinction is well document by many critics, including many included 
in this paper: see Cixous “Sorties”; Irigaray “Eternal Irony.” Tina Chanter 
cautions that such works “even in their attempts to distance themselves 
from [Hegel’s] legacy, are still beholden to a framework that privileges He-
gel” (Whose Antigone? The Tragic Modernization of Slavery [Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2011], xii). While sympathetic to such work, 
Chanter looks at the colonial aspects of Antigone to reveal the colonial con-
figuration of Antigone’s claim for her brother. Chanter argues that Anit-
gone’s royal position founded upon a slave economy drives many of her 
claims in that her defense of Polynices is largely propelled so as to differenti-
ate Polynice’s body from a slave’s body as mediated through burial rites.
32 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 445/536.
33 Ibid., 274/336–37. Perhaps in reference to the above passage, Cixous writes, 
“she is in the shadow [elle est dans l’ombre]. In the shadow he throws on her; 
the shadow she is.” L’ombre is close to being polyphonous with l’homme, 
thus mimicking the incorporating gesture Cixous identifies of the mascu-
line’s relation to the feminine. She is in the man/ombre which also high-
lights the inversion of human generation that gives the power of creating 
life to the male so rampant in the history of philosophy (“Sorties,” 67/123).
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Hegel’s words portray what Hélène Cixous delineates as the 
empire of the Selfsame [L’Empire du Propre], which describes 
a masculine economy that values return, unity, self-possession, 
and a desire to assimilate (foreign and threatening) otherness 
at the sake of the feminine.34 The empire of the Selfsame in He-
gel’s schematization of a masculine worldview systematically 
suppresses the feminine within the household and elevates the 
masculine out of the household in a movement that goes “out 
into the other in order to come back to itself” through the appro-
priation of alterity.35 Luce Irigaray similarly describes the gen-
dered relations espoused by Hegel’s logic: “The male one copu-
lates the other so as to draw new strength from her, a new form, 
whereas the other sinks further and further into a ground that 
harbors a substance which expends itself without the mark of 
any individuation.”36 Cixous and Irigaray’s contributions signal 
the movements of appropriation, suppression, and burial that 
will preoccupy this paper’s final pages.
Hegel writes that the feminine is bound (geknüpft, implying 
to be tied or knotted) to the household divinities through which 
she receives only partial intuition — or, more perjoratively, inti-
mation — of her universal and individual existence. This intui-
tion of individual existence, that is self-consciousness, will nev-
er arrive but will remain hidden in shadows. Moreover, woman’s 
desire (as for Hegel it performs an individuating effect) must 
never leave the walls of the home or even become recognizable 
to itself: the relation that binds woman to the household does 
not confer individuality as this is not its “is not the natural [rela-
tion] of desire [natürliche Beziehung der Lust].”37 Rather, woman, 
through her “relations of mother and wife,” intuits individuality 
by merely “seeing it disappear [das nur sein Verschwinden darin 
erblickt].”38 For woman, individuality is on the horizon, never to 
see the light of reason’s dawning. This statement and sentiment 
34 Cixous, “Sorties,” 78–83, passim/144–53, passim.
35 Ibid., 78/144. Emphasis in original.
36 Irigaray, “Eternal Irony,” 223.
37 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 274/337.
38 Ibid., 274/337 (translation modified).
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is discussed when Cixous replays the timeless, mythic, and cur-
rent situation that dictates to women: “There is no place for your 
desire in our affairs of State.”39 
Finally, we come to a famous scene that forms a correspon-
dance between Ancient Greece, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 
and Of Hospitality. Here, Hegel nervously discusses — in his het-
erosexist framework — the feminine enemy to the polity [Ge-
meinwesens] paradoxically cultivated by the ipsocratic State’s 
intervention into the home:
Since the community only gets an existence through its inter-
ference with the happiness of the Family, and by dissolving 
[individual] self- consciousness into the universal, it creates 
for itself in what it suppresses [unterdrückt] and what is at the 
same time essential to it an internal enemy-womankind in 
general [Weiblichkeit überhaupt seinen innern Feind]. Wom-
ankind-the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community 
[die ewige Ironie des Gemeinwesens].40 
Interestingly, the polity creates this eternal enemy itself in that, 
“it suppresses [unterdrückt, closely related to unterdrückung, 
meaning repression] […] [that] which is at the same time essen-
tial to it” in a scene marking the feminine as the mere matter that 
gives rise to the masculine form that enters the polity: “for she is 
never anything but the undifferentiated opaqueness of sensible 
matter, the store (of) substance for the sublation [Aufhebung] of 
self.”41 Regarding Hegel’s description of the tenuous space upon 
which the masculine order maintains itself, Cixous writes, “No 
matter how submissive and docile she may be in relation to the 
masculine order, she still remains the threatening possibility 
of savagery, the unknown quantity in the household whole.”42 
The feminine can easily become the excess that can never be 
39 Cixous, “Sorties,” 67/122.
40 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 288/352.
41 Irigaray, “Eternal Irony,” 224.
42 Cixous, “Sorties,” 91/169.
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repressed enough as it is infinitely displaced downward beneath 
the polis. Our task has become more complicated: In addition 
to the pervertability of the self-constituting phone line linking 
the home and alterity, the masculine State’s intervention into the 
home at once suppresses the feminine enemy that it also creates. 
The unterdrückt feminine, literally pressed downward, stifled, 
and withheld in a place of fixity thus forms the necessary and 
reviled oppositional threat folded within the polity’s structure. 
Unbearable and Unburiable Madness: The (Living) Feminine, the 
(Dead) Masculine
In a telephoned interview with Nicholas Royle, Hélène Cixous 
describes the telephone as a life-line: “for me, it’s life itself. It’s 
never death. On the contrary. It’s non-death… And it’s true — It 
interrupts death… It’s like a huge thread of life.”43 Discussing 
her daily telephone calls with Derrida, Cixous explains that she 
could “hear before even the first word was completely uttered, 
I could captivate, I could catch his mood. His state of mind or 
soul.”44 The telephone allows their exchanges to become imme-
diately intimate and deep through the tympanizing — as Michael 
O’Rourke terms it in “Telephantasy” — work of the ear, through 
a “linguistics of breath” and oto-attunement (oto- meaning “of 
the ear”).45 O’Rourke’s reparative and innovative line of inquiry 
reveals Cixous and Derrida’s woven telephonic tongues as a col-
lective and dispossessing loss of self that affirms life through an 
unconditional hospitality, “yes, yes,” over their shared telephone 
lines. We glimpse the telephone’s ability to transgress death in 
that, as O’Rourke claims, “one gets the sense that the telephone 
allows Derrida and Cixous to cross a line, to talk infinitely, with-
out borders, before and beyond death.”46 Perhaps this telephonic 
43 Hélène Cixous and Nicholas Royle, “Hélène Cixous on the Telephone,” 
Interview, 1 hour and 18 minutes, 2011, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/video/
schools/english/HeleneCixousOnTheTelephone.mp3, 5:40.
44 Cixous and Royle, “On the Telephone,” 26:00.




interrelation realizes Derrida’s dream in The Post Card of a ring-
less telephone call in which, “There would be a warning light 
or one could even carry it on oneself, near the heart or in the 
pocket” (PC, 87/96). 
Derrida and Cixous’ life-affirming telephonic coeurespon-
dances disrupt what Derrida names as their différend in H.C. 
for life, That Is to Say…: “This is why I…who always feel turned 
towards death, I am not on her side, while she would like to 
turn everything and make it come round to the side of life.”47 
Elsewhere, Cixous playfully upbraids Derrida’s claim that, “I am 
not ‘against life,’ but neither am I ‘for life’ like [you, Cixous],” 
by stating, “You are against death and fiercely for life. But oth-
erwise. Dis/quietedly.”48 To discern the echoes of telephonically 
mediated feminine life and masculine death, Derrida’s “Otobi-
ographies” further brings out the gendering of such telephony 
through issues of the umbilical cord, the mother tongue, and the 
ear’s role for both.49
“Otobiographies” brings us to issues of sexual difference 
in its parsing of Ecce Homo’s first chapter in which Nietzsche 
identifies with both aspects of his “dual origin”: “I am […] al-
ready dead as my father, while as my mother, I am still living 
and becoming old” (O, 15/62). Derrida reads this claim through 
a sentence from Ecce Homo’s preface: “Hear me! For I am such 
and such [ich bin der und der]. Above all, do not mistake me for 
someone else!” so that ich bin der und der affirms that he is both 
his (dead) father and (living) mother, “the dead (man) the living 
(feminine) [le mort la vivante]” (O, 10,17/50,65). Echoing Cix-
ous, Derrida, and O’Rourke’s characterization of the telephone 
47 Derrida, H.C. for Life, 36.
48 Hélène Cixous and Jacques Derrida, “From the Word to Life: A Dialogue 
Between Jacques Derrida and Hélène Cixous,” New Literary History 37, no. 1 
(2005): 1–13, at 7.
49 Jacques Derrida, “Otobiographies: The Teaching of Nietzsche and the 
Politics of the Proper Name,” trans. Avital Ronell, in The Ear of the Other, 
1–38 (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1988); Otobiographies : 
L’enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre (Paris: Editions 
Galilée, 1984). Henceforth, O.
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line, le mort la vivante, the dead father and the living mother, 
carries Nietzsche “one foot beyond [au-delà] life” to surpass any 
duality of life and death, feminine and masculine (O, 19/69). Im-
portantly, this discussion of the masculine and feminine devel-
ops through issues of the paternal state telephoning through a 
maternal umbilical cord.
Following this discussion of le mort la vivante, Derrida turns 
to “On the Future of our Academic Institutions,” Nietzsche’s 
abandoned and auto-redacted early lecture series, in which he 
calls for a renewed German education system that privileges the 
mother tongue beyond statist thinking that nevertheless was 
later used to corroborate and buttress Nazism. Indeed, central 
to Nietzsche’s concern in “On the Future…” is the German lan-
guage’s disfiguration by contemporary pedagogic institutions 
that treat the mother tongue as dead with no future ahead of it. 
Thus, this treatment of the German language as dead operates in 
the name of the (dead) father. In order to reanimate this mother 
tongue and thus Bildung, Nietzsche affirms, according to Derri-
da, some pact of, “the language of the living feminine [la langue 
de la vivante] against death, against the dead [contre la mort, 
contre le mort]” language through which the law is stated (O, 
21/78). A maternal signature thus directs the always-masculine 
teacher to respect and protect the feminine language through 
which the stultifying state must speak.50 Importantly, Nietzsche 
elevates the importance of the German language’s vivacity and 
radically separates it from any notion of the state, which he calls 
the “coldest of all the cold monsters” where “the slow suicide of 
all [se donnent eux-mêmes la mort] is called ‘life’” (O, 34/105–6). 
The State, for Nietzsche, is on the side of death, to which the liv-
ing mother tongue can never be absolutely usurped by. 
50 Towards the end of “Otobiographies,” Derrida remarks on the profound ab-
sence of woman in the educational institution both envisioned by Nietzsche 
and the contemporary academic institution: “Yet, even if we were all to give 
in to the temptation of recognizing ourselves, and even if we could pursue 
the demonstration as far as possible, it would still be, a century later, all of 
us men — not all of us women — whom we recognize [nous tous que nous 
reconnaîtrions. Je n’ai pas dit toutes]” (O, 38/117–18).
150
going postcard
Derrida’s explication suggests the pervertable doubleness of 
Nietzsche’s text — as well as all language and meaning — that 
admonishes the state while also being amenable to a political 
project beholden to the most violent of nationalisms, Nazism. 
Derrida takes seriously the fact that the only “teaching institu-
tion that ever succeeded in taking as its model the teachings of 
Nietzsche on teaching will have been a Nazi one” (O, 24/84). 
Following Derrida’s observation that both Nietzsche’s insistence 
on the life of the mother tongue and Nazism’s deforming of this 
language for the purpose of death, “draw their points of origin 
and their resources” from something resembling a maternal 
tongue, I heed the fascistic dangers that maternal idealization 
can produce (O, 29/95). Indeed the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century German preoccupation with Ancient Greece is well 
documented, and the Athenian ideology of autochthony must 
be read in Nazi Germany’s ideology of Blut und Boden, blood 
and soil. This is the maddening pervertability and/of substitu-
tion inscribed in Nietzsche’s text: language’s infinite parasitic 
pervertability perhaps arises from its errant destination and 
source whose assurances have become buried in interred cor-
respondances. 
In Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche, the dead, paternal state 
“wants to pass itself off for the mother — that is, for life [la mère, 
autrement dit la vie], the people, the womb of things them-
selves” (O, 34/106). This stultifying simulation performed by the 
professor connects the student’s ear with the dead state through 
appropriating the living maternal tongue. This pervertability of 
the mother tongue brings us back to the uncanny ear. Nietzsche 
describes the dead paternal state’s transmission through the 
professor’s words that travel through the student’s ear to then 
be recorded in their notebooks, “very often the student writes as 
he listens; and it is only at these moments that he hangs by the 
umbilical cord of the university [an der Nabelschnur der Uni-
versität hängt, literally meaning hanging on the line]”; Derrida 
follows up: “Dream this umbilicus [Rêvez cet ombilic]: It has you 
by the ear” (O, 35/109). The paternal belly of the state appro-
priates a maternal role that speaks through a living umbilical 
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cord hooked up to the student’s uncanny ear. An oto-umbical 
cord strings all this along, yet this is an umbilicus that disavows 
any feminine presence as the masculine state usurps this huge 
thread of life, as Cixous might say, for death’s purposes. Indeed, 
a woman “never appears at any point along the umbilical cord, 
either to study or teach” (O, 38/118).
In Nietzsche’s figuration, the disembodied trace of the appro-
priated mother’s umbilical cord that Derrida describes as om-
phalos — the Greek navel stone marking the center of the world 
that we will soon discuss at length — strings together the state, 
professor, and student. In the text’s final paragraph, Derrida as-
serts this oto-umbilical cord operates only on through the ef-
facement of the living feminine mother tongue: 
No woman or trace of woman [pas de femme], if I have read 
correctly — save the mother [fors la mere, fors both meaning 
“except for” as well as “deep inside”] […]. She gives rise [Elle 
donne lieu] to all the figures by losing herself in the back-
ground of the scene like an anonymous persona. Everything 
comes back to her, beginning with life; everything addresses 
and destines itself to her [tout s’addresse à elle et s’y destine]. 
She survives on the condition of remaining at bottom [au 
fond]. (O, 38/118)
We must attempt to follow this usurped telephonic maternal 
umbilical cord that addresses and destines every correspon-
dance from its subterranean realm from which the masculine 
law gathers its energy. We’re trying here to no longer allow this 
maternal imprint to remain on bottom, in the subway’s corre-
spondances due to this paternal appropriation. And we’re still 
on the call with the home, whose state law infiltrates this living 
life-line with its dead decrees.
Madness haunts this interminable telephonic relation that 
mediates the line between life and death. This connected-sev-
erance, this se-reparative break marked by the omphalos’s um-
bilical traces arrogated by the masculine calls forth Derrida’s 
discussions in Monolingualism of the Other, or, The Prosthesis 
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of Origin of the inseparability of the mother tongue — “some-
thing like the law or the origin of meaning” — with the always 
possible becoming-mad that lurks within it (M, 88/106). This 
mother tongue rests on an abyss that provides meaning with a 
spectral and non-localizable foundation, remaining always to 
come, postal, as an arrivant. Responding to Hannah Arendt’s 
statement that it was Nazism and not the German language 
that went mad, Derrida asserts a founding madness saturat-
ing all language and logos: “the mother as the mother tongue, 
the very experience of absolute uniqueness that can only be re-
placed because it is irreplaceable, […] is madness” (M, 89/107).51 
This madness of the maternal language marks a structure that 
always differs from itself in that it inscribes the possibility of 
madness — the “amnesic, aphasic, delirious” — due to its very 
inappropriability (M, 87/105).52 Moreover, (one manifestation of 
the) madness imbuing and emanating from and of the mother 
tongue wreaks its havoc precisely when it becomes petrified and 
locked into meaning — that is the totalitarianism enacted by 
Nazism and warned of by Nietzsche. 
Possibly hinting at the Classical Athenian obsession with pa-
ternity and legitimate children that assigned the strictest laws to 
“safeguard the virginity of unmarried woman and the fidelity of 
those who were married,” Derrida assumes the masculine posi-
tion that that mother’s fidelity can never be certainly known, the 
moment of conception will never become present.53 Moreover, 
in order to become legible, the absolute uniqueness of the moth-
er as mother tongue must be susceptible to the maddening logic 
of iterability and substitution that divests its uniqueness. The 
mother as mother tongue at once engenders the spacing and dif-
ference necessary for legibility while also exceeding those very 
constructs. Via language’s legibility and repeatability, in the as-
51 Emphasis in the original.
52 For further explication of this point on maternal madness see Jennifer 
Gafney, “Can a Language Go Mad? Arendt, Derrida, and the Political Sig-
nificance of the Mother Tongue,” Philosophy Today 59, no. 3 (2015): 523–39.
53 Eva Keuls, The Reign of the Phallus: Sexual Politics in Ancient Athens (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1985), 100.
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signation of proper names, of producing the illusion of proprie-
ty in general, the mother tongue itself is not one: “monolingual-
ism is not at one with itself [ne fait pas un avec lui-même]” (M, 
65/123). The mother, whose absolutely unique language one tries 
to (and must) translate, veils and veils itself of any assured self-
presence of meaning. This maddened law of the mother tongue 
is at the same time the law and the undoing of law. This mother 
as mother tongue generates the very bodies that later enter into 
language and is thus the experience and space that prefigures, 
bears, and exceeds any sign system. She is unique in that she 
engenders from a space at once representable and exterior to 
representation. The mother as the mother tongue arrives, works, 
and produces in excess of the masculine logos that attempts to 
speak through it.54 
Like the telephonic logic that welcomes the other into the 
subject as the site of its very constitution, this law of language 
speaks through the dead paternal’s belly as a ciphered mater-
nal presence that threatens an always possible becoming-mad 
at the very core of masculine logos. The state speaks through a 
prosthetic umbilicus of its own origin — a usurped and incorpo-
rated maternal tongue that instills the menacing prospect that it 
might not comply. Madness haunts paternal logos, the madness 
of the living feminine mother who provides its matter but only 
on loan. No one can predict when she will rise again to collect 
her debt. Dream this umbilicus, it is calling into our ears. 
54 I am tempted here to summon khōra that follows an analogous logic (al-
though a “bastard logic” or a/logic). Khōra can only be thought of or ap-
proached asymptotically and does not carry the assurances of a paternalistic 
genealogy. Thus, it is immediately impure, illegitimate, does not carry a cer-
tain authorizing patronym to guarantee its logos. In “Khōra,” Derrida asks, 
“how is one to think the necessity of that which, while giving place to that 
opposition [of logos and mythos] as to so many others, seems sometimes 
to be itself no longer subject to the law of the very thing which it situates? 
What of this place? It is nameable? And wouldn’t it have some impossible 
relation to the possibility of naming?” (90–91).
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Transmissions from the Omphalos
We have never left the subterranean correspondances whose 
transfers and relays have errantly led us through bugged tele-
phone lines interrupting and constituting masculine mastery, an 
appropriated umbilical cord, a buried mother, and thus the al-
ways possible becoming mad of logos. We are torsionally trave-
ling these correspondances of history, imagination, and anxiety 
to (never) arrive at a maddened and maddening interred place 
upon which ancient accounts circulate their influence through 
present day language, embodiment, economy, relationality, and 
geopolitics. And hardly discernible in the waning light of these 
abyssal correspondances, just before being immersed into sub-
terranean darkness, we perceive the outline of a small stone.
The correspondances that we are following lead us to Aeschy-
lus’s Eumenides. In this play we find a double movement of 1) 
Apollo expropriating the Delphic temple — the navel, omphalos, 
of the world — founded by Gaia and successively watched over 
by her two daughters Themis and Phoebe, and 2) the chthonic 
Erinyes becoming interred under Athens by Apollo and Athena, 
those children of Zeus. Forgotten yet preserved, the eternal iro-
ny of the community are locked away and ciphered in the om-
phalos (the material vestige of the earth’s umbilical cord), buried 
beneath the earth, and enshrouded in murky prehistory all in 
the blink of an eye. 
Eumenides opens at the already Apollonian Delphic Temple 
where we find that Orestes has just arrived while being madden-
ingly pursued by the Erinyes for the matricide of Clytemnestra. 
The Erinyes, or Furies, are chthonic goddesses (ancient dei-
ties associated with the earth) of retribution who punish those 
who break natural law such as committing filial bloodshed. 55 
55 The Chorus of Erinyes described their vocation as “For I have chosen for 
my own the overturning / of houses: When Violence / turns domestic and 
destroys a kinsman, / we chase him — oh! —” (ll. 354–57). Aeschylus identi-
fies the Furies as daughters of Night — Who give mortals at birth good and 
evil to have, /And prosecute transgressions of mortals and gods. / These 
goddesses never let up their dread anger / Until the sinner has paid a severe 
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Through reading Aeschylus’s description of the Erinyes, one can 
almost discern the characteristics of the Others so necessary yet 
excluded by Classical Athens: barbarian, black, earth-bound, 
elderly virgins, etc. The Erinyes are racially other: “black [mela-
nai] and utterly nauseating”; they are non-reproductive and 
thus undesirable women: “abominable old maidens, these aged 
virgins [kataptustoi korai, graiai palaiai paides], with whom no 
god holds any intercourse, nor man nor beast either”; they are of 
subterranean darkness and hate the Olympian gods (thus con-
structing a temporal and spatial binary between chthonic and 
Olympian gods): “born for evil, for [epei, implying causality] 
they dwell in the evil darkness, in Tartarus beneath the earth 
[chthontos], and are hateful to men and to the Olympian gods”; 
they are likened to barbarians (a Greek word denoting other-
ness in general, Ancient Greek slaves were almost all of “bar-
barian” descent) through their “un-Greek” actions: “you belong 
where there are head-chopping, eye-gouging judgements and 
slaughters, where eunuchs are punished by the destruction of 
their children’s seed.”56 
The history of the Temple at Delphi is one of maternal begin-
nings — Delphi bears a hazy etymology with the cognates del-
phos and delphis, respectively meaning womb and dolphin (the 
-adelph- of philadelphia means “of the same womb”). In Eume-
nides’ opening lines, the Pythian priestess evokes these maternal 
currents: “First among gods, in this my prayer, I give pride of 
place to the first of prophets, Earth [Gaia, implying a prophet-
mother].”57 The prayer depicts a peaceful history of the succes-
sive gods that have occupied the Temple, moving from chthonic 
female lineage later taken over by Apollo, son of Zeus: Gaia, 
Themis, Phoebe, and finally Phoebus Apollo (also known as 
penalty” (Aeschylus, Eumenides, ll. 219–222). Hesiod’s Theogony describes 
the Furies as being born from Earth’s generation with the blood from Oura-
nos’ pruned genitals (lines 175–185). In this way, the Furies are spawned 
from a paternal castration. See Hesiod, Theogony, in Works and Days, and 
Theogony, trans. Stanley Lombardo, 61–90. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).
56 Aeschylus, Eumenides, l. 51; ll. 67–70; ll. 71–73; ll. 186–88.
57 Ibid., ll. 1–2.
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Loxias), who is the “spokesman of his father Zeus.”58 Nicole Lo-
raux acerbically writes how this teleological story enacts an as-
similation and displacement of these feminine deities by Apollo 
that relegate them to the primordial past: in “his magnanimity 
Apollo exalted the powers of ancient Gaia at the very instant 
he absorbed them. Without any violence. Utterly naturally.”59 
However, the Homeric Hymn to Apollo sharply contrasts with 
Aeschylus’s description of Apollo’s felicitous genealogical ascen-
sion. According to this hymn, the area where Phoebus Apollo 
built his temple was guarded by the Python and her double Ty-
phaon, elsewhere described by Hesiod as, “a plague to men.”60 
The Hymn describes Apollo killing the Python with an arrow 
and boasting as the Python becomes one (again) with the nour-
ishing Earth:
“Now rot [putheu, imperative form] on the soil that feeds 
man […].” Thus said Phoebus, exulting over her: and dark-
ness covered her eyes. And the holy strength of Helios made 
her rot away there; wherefore the place is now called Pytho, 
and men call the lord Apollo by another name, Pythian; be-
cause on that spot the power of piercing Helios made the 
monster rot away.61
When we take into account the etymology for Python (puthein 
meaning to rot) and the belief that the Temple at Delphi houses 
the world’s navel, then this rotting serpent begins to look very 
much like a feminine, chthonic umbilical chord shriveling in 
the masculine, light of heavenly Helios. The whole of Eume-
nides could be described as choreographing this gen(d)erational 
dispute between the chthonic and Olympian gods and the si-
multaneous assimilation and repudiation of the by which the 
58 Ibid., l. 19.
59 Loraux, The Experiences of Tiresias, 185/221.
60 “Homeric Hymn to Apollo,” in Hesiod, Homeric Hymns, Epic Cycle, Homer-
ica, trans. Hugh Evelyn-White, 324–61 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1914), l. 352.
61 “Homeric Hymn to Apollo,” ll. 362–74.
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Olympians silenced (or naturalized) of this violent overtaking 
of the chthonic. Or as the Erinyes explain the situation: Apollo 
is “a thief, a youth riding roughshod over ancient divinities.”62
Following the play’s opening prayer, the Pythian priestess-
es describes her entrance to the temple where she encounters 
sleeping Erinyes and the suppliant Orestes: “I am on my way to 
the inner shrine richly hung with wreaths, and there I see a man 
sitting at the navel stone [omphalos] […], a man polluted in the 
eyes of the gods.”63 The omphalos, the navel of the earth, which 
once connected the earth to the womb of Chaos can be read as 
the traumatic split between earth and sky, mother and child, the 
forever lost plenitude of the One. Next, Orestes flees the temple 
towards Athens at Apollo’s suggestion and the freshly woken Er-
inyes lament, “the navel of the earth has acquired for its own a 
horrible blood-pollution.”64 Irigaray alludes to this scene with, 
“the phallus becomes the very organizer of the world through 
the man-father at the very place where the umbilical cord, that 
primal link to the mother, once gave birth to man and woman.”65 
Thus, we have a scene in which the cursed matricide Orestes 
asks for supplication at the omphalos, the Earth’s navel, within 
Gaia’s ancient temple named after the rotting umbilical-cord-
like Python. Orestes thus continues his stain of maternal defile-
ment by a perverse inversion of birth: The blood soaking the 
umbilical cord is no longer the blood spilled in childbirth from 
the once nourishing cord that connected Orestes to his mother, 
but the blood is that of the murdered mother dripping from the 
hands of her murderous offspring. Orestes dripping his mother’s 
blood on the omphalos is a rehearsal and retelling of the femi-
nine’s violent usurpation within these maternal-laden spaces 
whose etymologies and histories mediate maternal connection, 
sustenance, and beginnings. Just as le mort state’s decrees that 
62 Aeschylus, Eumenides, ll. 149–50.
63 Ibid., ll. 40–41.
64 Ibid., ll. 166–67.
65 Luce Irigaray. “Body Against Body: In Relation to the Mother,” in Sexes and 




speak through la vivante in Nietzsche, the once connective om-
phalos has been severed to rot in the sun of the masculine expro-
priation that eclipses a maternal lineage.
Following this scene at Delphi, Aeschylus brings us to Ath-
ens for a trial between Orestes (legally represented by Apollo 
on behalf of Zeus) and the Erinyes presided over by Athena and 
ten jurors. The tense courtroom proceedings again construct 
gen(d)erational oppositions that juxtapose the chthonic with 
the Olympian: “Orestes: O Phoebus Apollo, how will the ver-
dict turn out? / Chorus: O black Mother [melaina mēter] Night, 
do you see this?”66 After hearing Apollo’s and the Erinyes’ tes-
timonies, the jury’s votes result in a tie that will be resolved by 
Athena. Athena decides: “This man [Orestes] stands acquitted 
of the charge of bloodshed.”67 With two children of Zeus holding 
important courtroom roles, one might have been able to foresee 
this verdict. Anyways, Athena had already confided her affilia-
tions: “There is no mother that gave birth to me, and I commend 
the male in all respects.”68 And in the words of Donna Haraway: 
“we expect no better from motherless mind children.”69
Having lost the trial, the Erinyes threaten to “fill the land with 
miasmas fatal to humans” due to their “unbearable treatment at 
the hands of the citizens [politais].”70 After thrice repeating their 
threat, Athena suddenly succeeds in appeasing the Erinyes (this 
begins their transformation to the Eumenides, meaning “Gra-
cious Ones”) by promising that they will hold an esteemed posi-
tion for all Athenians to which they bashfully respond, “You will 
bring that about, so as to give me such great power?”71 Athena’s 
charming and flattering of the Eumenides portrays them in a 
feminine light of impressionability subject to adulation. Athena 
leads the newly-named Eumenides underground to, “show you 
your chambers [thalamous, inner room generally defined as 
66 Aeschylus, Eumenides, ll. 744–45.
67 Ibid., l. 752.
68 Ibid., ll. 736–37.
69 Haraway, “Tentacular Thinking,” n.p.
70 Aeschylus, Eumenides, ll. 787–90.
71 Ibid., l. 896.
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women’s quarters], […] and when you have passed under the 
earth [kata gēs] […], keep down below [katekhein] what would 
be ruinous to my country, and send up what will benefit my city 
and give it victory.”72 Eumenides’ final lines speak of the ensu-
ing peace that Zeus has brokered through the reconciliation be-
tween Athens’ citizens and the new resident aliens [metoikōn]. 
Buried in the feminized and buttressing darkness underneath 
Athens, the chthonic Erinyes are sealed up, closed off, encircled. 
But there is a remainder. 
We’ve traversed télé-postal correspondances of maternal 
presences usurped by ipsocratic masculine authority through a 
sampling of Derrida’s texts back to Aeschylus’s haunting scenes 
of buried feminine power. The Eumenides apparently rest ap-
peased below Athens and Apollo presides over the Omphalos: 
“the original and secondary origins constitute two defeats (for 
the feminine in the form of Themis and Gaia), as opposed to 
two victories for the Olympian order (for Apollo and Zeus). The 
daughter is defeated, as is the mother, while the son’s victory 
reinforces his father’s power. Once again, everything is there.”73 
Yet the compost of the rotting Python and the memory of the 
Eumenides’ rage beneath Athens insist as an unsettling debt 
lurking in reason’s shade. What correspondances do the Eume-
nides, now interred in their subterranean thalamos and who 
once pursued Orestes for matricide, maintain with the subway 
correspondances avoided by Derrida? In what ways does the om-
phalos, once presided over by Gaia and overtaken by Apollo, still 
call out to us? What gendered and sexed relations and econo-
mies might proliferate within a different history and language 
not subject to such masculine appropriation of the feminine?
In the beginning was the post. In the beginning was the in-
vention of the telephone. Such originary traces, echoes, screen 
memories, substitutions, supplements, and parasites perhaps 
suggest an effaced maternal principle that informs both the tel-
ephonic and the postal as inscribed in, by, and through the navel 
72 Ibid., ll. 1004–9.
73 Loraux. The Experiences of Tiresias, 186/222.
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scar. Traveling this umbilical telephone line would read a tele-
phonic structure of subjectivity and propriety through the navel 
scar through which a hospitality emerges beyond life and death. 
Herein lies the importance of disinterrance and destinerrance 
that injects breath, through the telephone’s static, to these buried 
maternal traces which have been jammed to the bottom. Derrida 
performs an abyssal maternal language by compelling to “make 
something happen to this language [faire arriver quelque chose, 
à cette langue],” which erupts in a maternal madness that no 
longer remains on bottom (M, 51/83). Derrida welcomes the Eu-
menides’ return all while recognizing their threat to become the 
Erinyes they really are, which the Olympian gods and the polity 
already know them to be. He keeps his space as he loses himself 
in innumerable textual and archival correspondances while ap-
parently avoiding the subterranean correspondances. But I just 
don’t believe him. He feels the mad choreography always lying 
in wait in the shadowy correspondances underfoot — it is calling 
in to his ear hooked up to his pen. And we can faintly discern 
the Erinyes’ voices accompanied by dance in the hazy distance 
as they sing a song from a time before their courtroom defeat 
and subsequent interment, before the Olympian gods swooped 
down to assimilate and usurp their powers while locking away 
their bodies. Performed in a moment in which the future’s infi-
nite paths remain suspended and brimming, the Erinyes’ song 
transports the living possibility of another history within the 
very foundations of our most familiar structures and stories. 
Feel their encircling song: 
Men’s conceit of themselves, however proud while under the 
     bright sky,
dwindles and melts away into worthlessness when beneath   
     the earth,
thanks to our black-garbed assaults
and the angry dancing of our feet.74 
74 Aeschylus, Eumenides, ll. 368–71.
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Glossing Errors:  
Notes on Reading the “Envois” Noisily1
This is why more and more I believe in the necessity of burning every-
thing, of keeping nothing of what has passed (been given) between us: 
our only chance.                                                    no longer spermit.2
“No longer spermit,” Derrida(-Bass) writes (PC, 195), violat-
ing grammar and spelling rules, abusing “language itself ” as he 
promises on the back cover of The Post Card. This slip is one 
of many studded throughout the “Envois,” rupturing the sense 
of sentences and recoding the delicate mechanisms of meaning 
embedded within linguistic coils. The strange new grammar 
within this section of The Post Card spreads like a trap to net the 
impatient reader, the analytical thinker, and the careful glossa-
tor all at once. This fine gauze of error invites complicity while 
refusing participation and twists us towards a reading of mix-
tures and of multiple, contrary truths.
Amongst the intimacies of Derrida’s missives, silent and 
glossily impenetrable to a first reading, the pencil meanders and 
underscores aimlessly, deferring hidden currents of the text. 
A second, more concerted reading (specifically for this issue), 
1 The author would like to thank Michael O’Rourke for the invaluable dis-
cussion he has shared on this topic and Karin Sellberg for her sometimes 




transforms each earlier palliative underline into an excruciat-
ing return. The pencil threatens to perform a biblioautopsy and 
turn the textual body’s insides out (invertus); the previous scrib-
bles are revisited by the kind of parser that Derrida indicts — the 
“bad reader,” tortured rather than pleasured by “retracing one’s 
steps” over the uneven terrain of previous readings (PC, 4).
In other terms: the words of the “Envois” resist. They intimate 
a multitude of perforations and non-closures — a landscape of 
gappages in sentence structure; lines of text deferred, promised 
but never given; and endless, interminable wanderings — while, 
frustratingly and simultaneously, they refuse entry for this glos-
sator’s markings. The text seems strangely pre-emptive: its in-
timacy stakes a high, albeit silent, value of possible meanings 
against less familiar bidders; it feels bought and owned before 
we have even entered into bargaining  — and perhaps it was so 
even when the book was at in its infancy, or further back, at the 
limits of its very incipience.
Yet, perhaps strangely or maybe with utter reasonableness, it 
becomes apparent that what Derrida owns is nothing. His envois 
witness the beginning of empty space; they execute a quite mas-
terful feint of reading and writing. This is a trick which reveals 
itself at the very first instance, upon the book’s title and cover: 
The Post Card. There are, of course, no postcards in the envois 
(nor in any other part of this text), just text about postcards, 
explaining postcards, reproducing postcards. The postcard has 
always been the void around which Derrida spins a chrysalis of 
words. Is it this vacant space which beckons or necessitates the 
gloss?
Derrida is, of course, already glossing postcards, just as he 
glosses the Plato–Socrates relation and he glosses his own gloss-
es by leading us into (that is, in his introduction, intro-ducere) 
his own envoi-gloss apparatuses through a strategy of what he 
characterizes as burning. The idiosyncratic smelting of these 
postcards denies their very penetrability: “As for the ‘Envois’ 
themselves,” he writes, “I do not know if their reading is bear-
able” (PC, 3). If, as Jean-Luc Nancy supposes, reading is always 
a “melee,” a skirmish of reader and text meeting each other with 
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undeniable, potentially violent traction,3 Derrida’s cauterized 
envois have offered no openings in which to engage in this fight.
“Save [fors] a chance” (PC, 3). (Is there ever a text which is 
not always-already permeated by chances either to enter, as he 
speaks of here, or to abandon, as he notes later on page 195?) 
An abrupt grammatical fracture, a spelling foible — “no longer 
spermit” — snags this glossator’s eye, even as it skids without 
discrimination over other passages of text. The very possibil-
ity of mistake permits the gloss; it opens the page to an almost 
involuntary multitude of preliminary questions of intentional-
ity (a pun, wordplay, a displaced s before a p?) and authority 
(Derrida, Bass, the mark of a silent, overlooked typographer?). 
Circled, interrogated, speculated upon, this gloss’s entry point 
into The Post Card begins with the possibility of error. 
Reading is here ensnared in the folds of language not by the 
exigencies of content, not by words or meanings, but by faults: 
typographical hiccups and apparent slips within the printed page 
appear like chinks within a previously impenetrable defense. In 
such places intervenes the gloss, which slides explanatory ad-
denda within the white spaces of leaves, seeking to rescue as-
pects of textual and linguistic obscurity from “between the lines 
or in the margins” (OED, “gloss, n.1”). Simultaneously, it calls at-
tention to fractures of meaning in the narrative landscape and 
levels them out; it veils the text with explanation (OED, “gloss, 
n.1”). The gloss bestows an un-parsable (and unpassable) protec-
tive coating, converting fragments of text into the unitary page 
and laying words under a paper sheen; and like glossy varnish, 
as Steven Connor notes, “it magnifies every dot and dimple in 
the surface to which it has been applied; but it also repels, re-
maining impermeable.”4 Thus the addition of glosses allows us 
exactly not to stop, filling in gaps with black ink piles towards the 
3 Jean-Luc Nancy, On the Commerce of Thinking: Of Books and Bookstores, 
trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009).
4 Steven Connor, “Intact,” talk delivered for the John E. Sawyer Seminar Se-
ries at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (IASH), Univer-
sity of Edinburgh, May 20, 2011.
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smooth reading of unimpeded comprehension. It gifts us with a 
contrary, impenetrable glaze of understanding.5
So the slip of “no longer spermit” permits a certain entry into 
the “Envois,” one which allows the insertion of a secondary text 
that seeks to negate the very slip that it parasites. It legitimiz-
es this labor of the gloss for extending our reading efficiency 
within an economy of understanding. Indeed, a thorough glos-
sator may note that while the slip permits the gloss, the envoi’s 
“spermit” also permits the slip. The text of La carte postale reads, 
“ne plus s’permettre” (PC, 195/210) — no longer s’permit — and 
furnishes proof of Derrida’s intention. An undated forewarning 
in a previous missive, “almost all my slips are calculated” (PC, 
135), anticipates this as a willing work of a playful linguist. It is 
another feint — that of the mistake which is not one.
Reconstructing this scene of accident, we have evidence 
enough to establish a single narrative of origin, of intent and 
of a causal chain of events through which this error has been 
fabricated. Like a confession of violence, his statement to the 
reader on the back jacket contains an admission of guilt: “I […] 
abuse dates, signatures, titles or references, language itself,” 
signed, “J.D.” We know who is responsible. The slip of spermit, 
transmogrified now into s’permit, no longer permits its own 
spreading. Already these three words have been glazed, em-
balmed by the activity of the gloss — we can see this inanimate 
textual corpus there complete, but we cannot touch or interact 
with it. Now, however, its new signification denies even the var-
iegation of possible readings and the dissemination of meaning 
in multiple; rather than being unpicked, this tapestry of poten-
tial multiplicity is burned to cinders, with “nothing out of the 
5 And, of course, a gathering of glosses forms the back or front matter of so 
many books as a “Glossary,” as it has between pages xii and xxx of The Post 
Card. The compiled Glossary allows readers to refer to its explanatory notes 
without “losing place” (or pace) in their reading. Indeed, the glossary is 
most appropriately labelled a reference tool as, like the plasterer’s toolbox, 
it enables the reader to carry back (referre) explanations to fill in the holes 




reach of what I like to call the tongue of fire, not even the cin-
ders if cinders there are” (PC, 3). Thus this sentence is left with 
only one recognisable account of the past. “No longer s’permit”: 
s[ocrates] slips in before p[lato] and the order of history is reas-
sured. After the funeral, cremation.
As criminal mastermind, Derrida pre-empts the glossator’s 
maneuver of glazing by entering his own name as instigator of 
this arson — “I believe in the necessity of burning everything,” he 
professes (PC, 195). Yet cast to the tribunal, he is equally quick at 
rejecting culpability as he is at presenting himself: “I have forgot-
ten the rule as well as the elements” (PC, 5); “It doesn’t touch me, 
doesn’t concern me myself ” (PC, 76); “I am not involved” (PC, 
178), he denies, all the while carefully and meticulously shred-
ding to pieces the wads of historico-philosophical currency that 
has amassed in the account of Plato-cum-Socrates, stuffing the 
valueless fragments under the robes, the hats, and the impotent 
inkpot of this other perverse plato and this turned-around So-
crates. Derrida’s arson effaces his presence from the crime; it 
turns even him to cinders, that which “erases itself totally, radi-
cally, while presenting itself.”6 
We sacrifice these “other” texts of Derrida in order to recon-
stitute him as author of this sentence and this crime of gram-
matical abuse, by excising this passage from the other envois. 
Skilled at incorporation rather than dissection, the glossator is a 
poor surgeon; perhaps a bad reader is a better murderer (and ar-
sonist) for the sake of history. The “spermit” invites commentary 
to enter it but once inside, this new text turns violent against its 
host. Hostes hospites, Michel Serres writes — the guest–enemy 
creates the originary moment of this slip by surviving off its 
donor’s death, as a flame eating the matter it lives on until it 
is reduced to ash.7 The glossator’s complicity carries us to the 
6 Jacques Derrida, “On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the 
Essex Colloquium,” Research in Phenomenology 17, no. 1 (1987): 171–85, at 
177.
7 Michel Serres, Rome: The Book of Foundations (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1991), 148, 155.
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contradiction of this error’s origin: to impose it, the text which 
it identifies must be destroyed.
We take Derrida as the excluded third in this game of re-
lations — envoi, glossator, and author. He is our corpse upon 
which the corpus can be founded. Analytical addenda are ac-
cumulated as if organically, branching arboreally from a solid 
trunk of text, yet all the while we must ignore that as parasite, 
as fire-starter, as dissector, we desiccate the text upon which we 
build. “Criticism,” Serres writes, “is indeed a science of limits. It 
is the science of death.”8 The Post Card’s contradictions shrivel 
and disappear on this inscrutable stage of murder. “This will 
kill that, the book will kill the edifice, the poem requires that 
Moscow burn”9: socrates writing at a desk in Matthew Paris’s 
manuscript irrumates and asphyxiates the bodiless, scriptless 
Socrates; Derrida’s The Post Card cremates the postcard artifact 
upon which his envois are written. This gloss right now varnish-
es the word spermit until it too is rigid and lifeless behind the 
sheen. The process is done in three concurrent steps: we must 
kill Derrida, the founder of the text; we must present his seam-
less body in a glass coffin over which the eye can swiftly skim 
without obstacle; and we must burn the ligaments of all his oth-
er possible meanings until nothing is left. The (textual) body is 
killed; it is shown to the crowd; it is disposed of.
How does one gloss a text without participating in its mur-
der? These envois retrace one another, tracking again and again 
over earlier assessments. This is a killing field for the frontis-
piece to Paris’s Prognostica Socratis basilei and for the two de-
picted upon it, even for plato who “did not want to die” (PC, 
109). Derrida enacts so many murders — plato and Socrates in 
this postcard, at once laughable mistake, then Socrates turns his 
back, and plato is jealous, is caught in flagrante delicto in the 
moment of frottage, is tyrannically ordering Socrates to bend 
over the desk, telling him to write. Yet, somehow, each progres-
8 Michel Serres, “Exact and Human.” trans. Winnie Woodhull and John 




sive death, palimpsestically interweaving with the others, seems 
here quite contrarily to bring a little un-death: a little fusion in-
stead of inertness; some movement rather than cold dissection.
Perhaps the trick is not to follow a principle of growth but 
of spread, like vermin or parasites that will happily hollow out 
a tree from the ground, circumventing the hierarchical order 
of its limbs in growth. Mixture presides over the process of 
spreading — by multiplying meaning, instead of cruel distribu-
tion, Derrida’s Socrates, his plato and his spermit insist upon 
invagination.
Contrary texts thus also map this word “spermit.” The gloss 
enters the text, cued by the gappage opened by the mistake. It 
settles there, seeking (and failing) to smooth over a part of the 
void at the center of the “Envois” — this place where the actual 
postcard has never really resided — by suggesting the slip was 
intentional. But it flounders, attempts to gloss over the text 
again and again (a pun on dissemination, a historical reversion 
of Socrates before Plato, a devious trick to turn us into autho-
rial killers), and gradually losing its purpose, it strays to other 
texts, to accusations and to murders. These narratives amass like 
layers on letters (s’s on p’s); finally we have submerged the soli-
tary voice of the envois; one becomes many talking around one 
another. Derrida wants to burn, but he will have to settle on 
drowning instead.
The undifferentiated noise of these glosses sinks the concrete 
confession that had been given to us in the past — the French 
ne plus s’permettre that recalls Derrida back to his mistake and 
transforms the misplaced “s” into a sign of intentionality. These 
alternative, glossy investments of “s” and “p” simultaneously 
di-vest the error of its singularity of meaning and deny the 
possibility of origination. In failing to identify an origin, the 
gloss loses the ability to make reading smooth. The explanatory 
order of the gloss breaks down. The “s” that has crept onto page 
195 and undermined the meaning of “permit” in grammar has 
also changed the licence of my supplement. In these conditions, 
the permit of meaning converts to the open access principles of 
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deregulated invagination and dissemination. The “s” abolishes 
the “permit” to which it has so tentatively latched. 
Is it possible to write a gloss that is no longer legitimated by 
textual permittance? No, the gloss sustains itself via parasitic as-
sociation: it cannot live on its own; it requires the relation of 
another. We must bring Derrida, once the excluded third party, 
to this dependent glossing, included back again into this patch-
work coat of narratives. Of course, this is not hard. Already, we 
have called him mastermind and feinter, but in truth he is a co-
median, equipped with gags and puns. Following this master of 
paronomasia, we have obsessively tracked the entendre of his “s” 
and “p” as a single, then a double and a triple, getting drunk with 
laughter off the fumes of his possibility. He parasites glosses 
such as this one — and indeed, even his own — to play his jokes; 
he becomes the third-included in this game of meanings.
As mastermind, we have seen him deny culpability, but as a 
joker he has already readied his text for a facetious paradox by 
assuming “without detour the responsibility for these envois, for 
what remains, or no longer remains, of them.” This in his very 
first envoi, the prefatory envoi (what belongs at the end placed 
at the beginning, already a contradiction), of which he writes: 
“I am signing them here in my proper name” (PC, 6). He marks 
the text with the legitimacy and ceremony of his full proper 
name (not merely his initials) just this once in the text, “Jacques 
Derrida,” followed by the date “7 September 1979” like an autho-
rial fixative — indeed, like its baptism. The pages of the “Envois” 
are claimed with the writer’s appellation, as the intimate remains 
of a mysterious lover’s friendship and correspondences with the 
caress of diary entries. How is it ever possible for him to deny 
part in the production of his slips and puns?
Of course, as soon as Derrida should appear on paper, he 
evaporates, trailed by laughter at the ridiculousness of the 
event. His mirth takes the form of a dagger-like “7,” his own 
supplementary gloss cutting through the meaning of the name. 
We would expect the addition of a footnote, even his own, in 
some small way to cause his own death. Yet instead of arson 
and the clean dissection of analytical murder, his joker’s knife 
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dehisces. In this footnote to his name, he writes: “doubtless we 
are several, and I am not alone as I sometimes say I am” (PC, 
6). His remark (this re-marking of his mark) reverberates 
against the singularity of his proper name and cuts down his 
very identifiability — but from the wound explodes a clowning 
circus of Derridas. Refusing to close the valences of meanings, 
it has instead rendered him indiscernible. The once-inscrutable 
stage thus lightens to reveal a tragi-comic scene of murder and 
revivification — Derrida has been killed and yet is here again 
quite literally in multiple, inundating us his glossators with his 
different guises, inhabiting the “Envois,” cramming into the gaps 
of his spelling error.
This is his second (or third, or fourth, or fifth?) punch line: 
Derrida (singular, recognizable) disappeared from the text long 
ago; we think we kill him, imprison him, cremate him as we 
gloss, but he always escapes us. His laughter is one of distor-
tions, drowning the certitude of meaning which resides within 
the inscription. It is only ever joke. Similarly, laughter dogs the 
slip of “no longer spermit”, chasing the “s” which precedes the 
“p”: it becomes all meanings and none, diffusing the destructive-
ness of this gloss. In fact, the text parasitically perverts this gloss 
itself — it has escaped me; I no longer know where it goes, where 
it has gone, what it has taken into it. These deviations force a re-
linquishment of control. I thought that this gloss had made me 
complicit in a murder through the slip of “s” before “p.” In fact, 
the murder I participated in was my own; I have glossed myself. 
Exhausted and tracked over again and again by a straying pen, I 
find finally that the joke is well and truly upon me.





“It may be that no work has ever been better fore-
armed  against commentary than Derrida’s Envois.”
 — David Wills
A commentary? On “Envois”? No, really, you’re joking, right? 
Or else you just want to see what might result from the collision: 
commentary + “Envois.” In which case, you no doubt already 
expect there will be accidents at the scene. I won’t say you pro-
grammed it, since it will indeed have to have been an accident 
and therefore unforeseen, if not altogether unforeseeable. You 
don’t know what to expect, exactly; perhaps you harbor a small 
hope of seeing commentary derailed, ruined in advance in its 
very possibility.
In advance: commentary supposes, at a minimum, an ad-
vance order, an order of the pre-position of the text to be com-
mented on. It, the proposed preposed work, is already there, in 
advance and in front of the commentary, before it. But “Envois” 
demonstrates, and this is also its performance, that things in 
this regard are never really certain and thus a matter of certain 
knowledge. Rather, there is only belief to go on once it can be 
admitted — but can it? must it? — that what we call knowledge, 
the knowledge of some truth, is a phantasm and it is inherited, 
indeed, it is the phantasm of inheritance. The tradition of com-
mentary is shaped by the supposed truth of inheritance: that the 
heir — the commentator? — comes after that which or that from 
which it inherits or claims to inherit. 
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I suppose you saw the catastrophe awaiting all these suppo-
sitions across the pages of “Envois.” But perhaps you also saw 
the chance there for acts of displacement, or even destruction of 
this “thing” — concept, act, experience, practice, law, institution, 
discipline, what you will — that is called inheritance. “Envois” 
takes up the question of inheritance at the end of the postal ep-
och. It marks the end of the epoch of destinality by invoking the 
condition of possibility that is also a condition of impossibility 
(forgive me, I know you know all of this), which it calls, then, 
adestinality. Adestinality is something like the infinite suspen-
sion of the support of the whole postal era and system. It over-
sees the logic according to which it is correct to say: because 
a letter can never arrive at destination, it never simply arrives; 
or else, the addresser comes only after an addressee’s act of re-
ception, who thereby cannot have been the addressee intended 
(“receive everything you give, there is only that, you just have to 
receive” [PC, 231]). These are some of the seemingly perverse ef-
fects of “Envois” as argument, performance, novel, demonstra-
tion, autobiography, epistolary fiction, but above all as acts of 
sending without address, without destination readable by the 
technologies of the postal era. 
By address, however, “Envois” wants to hear (entendre) the 
singular timbre that calls: come, you, you over there. This is an 
impossible address to comprehend without already repeating it 
and beginning to destine it to oneself. The timbre of a voice is 
stamped from the outset in this repeatability, the repeatability of 
a name, for example. Nevertheless, the writer of “Envois” wants 
to discern between name and address so as to write these letters 
into their gapping difference as gestures of pure address or pure 
apostrophe. Address without address, a-destined, carried only 
on the force of some reception or other, mine or yours, hers, his, 
theirs, ours: all the possibilities are open.
Before there can be commentary, then, there will have been 
reception at (of) one’s own address. The writer of “Envois” for-
mulates the rule as follows: “Moreover, the expert can be objec-
tive only to the degree (what degree) his [or her — PK] place is 
designated, assigned on the card-map, in the picture and not 
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facing it” (PC, 187). The remark is prompted upon reading the 
report of the art historical expert solicited to comment on the 
Matthew Paris image of Socrates and Plato (or plato and So-
crates). The writer of “Envois” receives the expert testimony 
reluctantly, for it puts an end to “history, our history,” and to 
“my delirium around S and p,” that is, around the post card 
image that the art historian has no trouble deciphering (“Your 
question can be answered quite simply,” he replies [PC, 172]). 
For eighteen months or so, the writer has indeed made deliri-
ous associations on the subjects of the image as depicted. This 
délire — a madness of reading — has fit countless stories into its 
frame, often setting it up as a mirror for the couple(s) he forms 
with one or more women and to whom, according to the fiction, 
he is writing. So, into this scene of now desperate, now hilari-
ous narcissistic phantasmatic projection comes the expert com-
mentator, who has to fail to see himself “in the picture” in order 
to take up the objective position facing an image that bears no 
trace of him or of his desire. He has to do this, if we follow the 
writer of “Envois,” by order of “a moment of the desire for ob-
jectivity, a stirring of the epistēmē the origin of which is looking 
at you here in two persons” (PC, 173). Objectivity: who cannot 
desire it? And desire to know how to look, objectively, at the 
origin of knowledge itself, even if it must be divided, parceled 
out, distanced from itself by the more-than-one of every pos-
sible copula (S is p)? 
***
I think we should start over, at another allure, another pace. Or, 
better yet, at another distance. But precisely the question is at 
what distance to receive these “Envois.” Consider how this cor-
pus can address itself to any and all readers:
this is my body, at work, love me, analyze the corpus that I 
tender, that I stretch out on this bed of paper, sort out the 
quotation marks from the body hairs, from head to toe, and 
if you love me enough, you’ll tell me about it. Then you’ll 
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bury me in order to sleep peacefully. You’ll forget me, me and 
my name. (PC, 99)
The body, the corpus is this language seeming to address a most 
compelling imperative: “love me.” It is the “materiality” (where? 
there) of a corpus stretched out on a bed, a bed that may also be 
a lap cradling the book’s body on its knees so as to read it.1 The 
corpus thus includes the reader in its bed, or rather calls her 
into the bed where it is stretched out head to toe (or from toe 
to head, de pied en cap, if one is speaking the writer’s first lan-
guage). It invites analysis (commentary?) of its finest traits, the 
closest examination of its intimate parts, its body hairs.2 “Ana-
lyze me,” it says. These imperatives — love me, analyze me, sort 
me — are all addressed in the plural second-person: vous. This 
is not polite address in the singular, but a plural, disseminat-
ing one, which opens up the space for one to hear her-/him-/
themselves addressed: you, any of you. You respond one way or 
another, from a distance that you cannot fully calculate. In this 
way, you are like the writer of the “Envois” who imagines how 
people will respond to the book once published: “Certain people 
will take it into their mouths, in order to recognize the taste, oc-
casionally in order to reject it immediately with a grimace, or in 
order to bite, or to swallow, in order to conceive, even, I mean a 
child” (PC, 177). Taste and distaste set the distance, or rather try 
to abolish it by either ingestion or rejection, fort/da. Meanwhile, 
the corpus will have been tendered toward you from the mo-
ment you respond to it. 
This is my body, au travail, Derrida writes. The syntax here 
bears an irreducibly double sense at least. It depends on whether 
or not you hear the phrase “au travail” as an elliptical impera-
1 See the letter dated 10 June 1977: “I am writing (to) you between Oxford and 
London, near Reading. I am holding you stretched out on my knees” (PC, 
32).
2 I follow here David Wills who modifies the translation of “poils” to read 
“body hairs” and not just “hairs” in his very fine reading of “Envois,” in 
Matchbook (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 59; for this passage 
in French, see La carte postale, 109.
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tive address: “allez au travail,” “get to work,” which is how Alan 
Bass translates it. Yet, it is syntactically and grammatically just 
as possible to read the phrase as predicating “my body”: this is 
my body at work “au travail,” which is then not at all imperative 
in force, but predicative, descriptive. The two-word phrase thus 
makes sense vacillate between, on the one hand, a constative 
description, a kind of caption for an invisible photograph (this 
is my body at work), and, on the other hand, a performative 
speech act, a command or order given (you, get to work). On 
this split surface of sense, two bodies of and at work are placed 
one before the other, that is, one after the other, one in front of 
and/or behind the other, etc., etc. Relation is posed at an unde-
cidable distance, in an unfigurable difference. In a split second, 
one work begins to provoke or evoke or convoke another that, 
bending over the finest hairs of the corpus, learns to sort out 
from among them all the quotation marks that only resemble 
hairy extensions of the corpus itself. There is thus a division 
or a distance marked between the work of the one and of the 
other, which is the distance from out of which to respond to the 
vocative address. Take your time to take your distance, it says, 
before switching from the imperative mode to the future indica-
tive so as to predict: “you’ll tell me about it.” In French, “vous 
m’enverrez des nouvelles,” “you’ll send me news.” Something 
new, a figuration for the work that is yet to come, perhaps, “if 
you love me enough.” 
Let’s pursue this “commentary” to the end of the quotation. 
Two more sentences, still in the future: “if you love me enough, 
you’ll tell me about it, you’ll send me news. Then you’ll bury me 
in order to sleep peacefully. You’ll forget me, me and my name.” 
As marked by “Then,” this sequence is also a consequence: for 
having sent me news — your work of analysis, in whatever form, 
for example and why not, “nouvelles” or short stories (the short 
story as commentary?) — you will (be able to) bury me and 
sleep peacefully. You’re in bed once again, but the corpus is no 
longer beside you. Sending the response of an adestined work 
(of analysis or poetry) buries the ghostly phantasm of whatever, 
whoever it is to which, to whom one has responded. Or rather 
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it will bury it, you will bury it. And then you will forget me and 
my name. 
You try to imagine that future. Foreseeing it, you begin work-
ing to avoid it and prevent the forgetting. Meanwhile, there is 
the ghostly remains of a disseminal, adestinal address that must 
be buried, “laid to rest,” within you. The promise of peaceful 
sleep is for the both of you: yes, yes, it says, forget me and my 
name, keep only what was received at the secret address. 
***
— Where is that? I forget.
— Really? 
— Unless it is jotted down somewhere in the margins of La 
carte postale, in the copy of it I first read in 1980. You can see that 
it’s been opened many times, indeed too many times judging by 
the state of its binding. The book is barely a book any longer; 
now it is a thing unbound, untied, and unglued from its spine 
and cover. There remain just so many loose folded sections of 
sixteen recto and verso pages, spilling their slippery leaves and 
sheets out on the table. By the looks of it, there will have been 
some untying of ties, loosening of links, breaking down into ele-
ments. Some analysis, in other words.
— 5800 State Road, Hamilton, Ohio. Sound familiar?
— Yes, in 1980 it was the most familiar address, where I first 
read “Envois.” I need no reminder for that. 
— Perhaps, but there is one thing you regularly forget about 
the “Envois” delivered to that address. You only remember it 
once you fold back the now detached front cover and see again, 
on the very first leaf, a name (not yours, and not the author’s, 
another’s)…
— It’s true, yes. A name is inscribed there — autograph or sig-
nature. It seals the signatory’s act of claiming and proclaiming 
that this book belongs to him, the one who names and signs 
himself here (think of those printed plates you can still find in 
old books, pasted on the inside front cover: “From the library 
of ____________,” with a name written in the blank). Here the 
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one-time owner’s name is still very visible, readable: large and 
in bright red marker. Each time I uncover it, it’s as if I am dis-
covered to be guilty of a theft. This is true even though I have 
no memory of the circumstances whereby the book or what re-
mains of it ended up in my hands. Did I steal it or was it given 
to me? Did I ask the self-proclaimed original owner to give it 
to me and did he consent? Or did I take it anyway, despite his 
prior claim? Or maybe it was this claim itself that was the theft, 
which was canceled once the book returned to me? It doesn’t 
matter and, moreover, I will always prefer forgetting the details 
of whatever happened, if anything at all. But the fact remains 
that each time I have entered into some analysis of or with La 
carte postale — dare I say my carte postale? — the possibility of a 
diverted, intercepted, or stolen address hangs over or trembles 
beneath everything I read there. At every second.
— But notice how those singular circumstances — which 
are no doubt best forgotten — cannot finally be discerned from 
the general condition under which anyone may read and try to 
analyze the same text, another copy of the same text. Well, “the 
same,” so to speak, except that no one will ever be able to prove 
that we — you and I, for example — respond to the same text. 
For if there is only response and if address is always divisible 
once it has to repeat, then we…
— …are a wager, a guess, a leap, a belief, an act of faith. Of 
course we are and we do all that in order to say “we.” The limit of 





(but when I say that I run, I’m not talking about jogging, although… 
but even though they cannot bear that I run, or that I write, they 
infinitely prefer that I practise jogging or writing for publica-
tion: it never goes very far, it comes back in a closed circuit, like 
a child in its playpen. What they cannot bear is what you know: 
that jogging and writing for publication are for me only a train-
ing with you in mind, in order to seduce you, to have some wind, 
for some is necessary, the strength to live what I risk with you).1 
The exact difference between running and jogging is not estab-
lished in the Oxford English Dictionary, which merely defines 
jogging as “to run at a gentle pace (esp. as part of a ‘keep-fit’ 
schedule).” When someone is referred to as a jogger the re-
sponse will often be to correct this, to assert that they are, in 
fact, a runner, the activities treated as distinct despite one being 
a form of the other. The narrator of the “Envois” is aware of this 
distinction, saying that they “cannot bear that I run,” preferring 
him to jog. Running is privileged over jogging.
It’s not speed that separates running from jogging. There is 
something awkward about the motion of a jogger, expressed 
through its homonymic associations, jogging someone’s pen for 
example. Jogging is more restrained than running, often part of 
a schedule, something programmed and therefore predictable. 
Certain people prefer the narrator to jog because it “never goes 
1 PC, 247/264. 
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very far” — a runner’s reach is greater than a jogger’s. Indeed, 
jogging is “only a training,” not an activity in itself, preparation 
to provide some wind, “the strength to live what I risk with you.”
According to J. Hillis Miller, Derrida “briefly took up run-
ning at Yale in the campus cemetery […] under the tutelage of 
James Hulbert,” with Hulbert stopping Derrida every few hun-
dred yards to check his pulse which, Miller writes, “must have 
been a funny scene.”2 Hulbert was a graduate student in com-
parative literature, one of the team that translated Le facteur de 
la vérité for Yale French Studies. Hulbert ran with Derrida in the 
Grove Street Cemetery and, according to Hulbert, Derrida took 
to the activity “like a duck to water,” although some were con-
cerned that he not be allowed to over-exert himself.3 These runs 
are described by the narrator in the “Envois,” who exercises in 
the same cemetery and writes of how “from time to time I stop, 
panting, next to a tomb” (PC, 157).
According to Derrida “La Carte Postale is haunted by Joyce, 
whose funerary statue stands at the centre of the Envois,”4 and of 
whom the addresser asks, at one point, “what made him run [ce 
qui l’a fait courir]” (PC, 240/257). Murray McArthur has writ-
ten about the interplay between Derrida and Joyce and how this 
works through pairings such as the two cemetery scenes, one 
in Zurich, where the narrator visits Joyce’s memorial, the other 
when he runs in Yale. 
Derrida has written about how the “Envois” have “a whole 
family of James, Jacques, Giacomo,”5 and McArthur places “Jim” 
(“who sounds awfully like this Jim or James or Jacques”6) in the 
role of Joyce, the reverse of the Joyce portrayed by the statue, 
2 J. Hillis Miller, The Medium is the Maker: Browning, Freud, Derrida, and the 
New Telepathic Ecotechnologies (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 
50.
3 Personal communication.
4 Jacques Derrida, “Two Words for Joyce.” in Post-structuralist Joyce: Essays 
from the French, eds. Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer, 145–59 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 150.
5 Ibid., 151.
6 Murray McArthur, “The Example of Joyce: Derrida Reading Joyce,” James 
Joyce Quarterly 32 (Winter): 227–41, at 235.
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“the languid European with his sedentary position, his aerobi-
cally unsound cigarette, his cane.”7 The shifting of the relation-
ship between the figures of Joyce and the narrator provide fur-
ther examples of the strange baton passings that fill the Envois. 
For McArthur, the scene of Hillis and the narrator in the Swiss 
cemetery contrasts with the one in Yale: “the master in this cem-
etery who knows everything is Jim, a metaleptic troping of the 
European scenes, this running of jogging buddies running side 
by side.”8 
According to the narrator of the “Envois,” Jim was “crazy with 
his jogging [il est un peu fou avec son jogging]” (PC, 157/170). 
This mention of jogging rather than running seems significant, 
particularly when Derrida is obviously alert to the difference 
between the terms. Indeed, as a runner, Hulbert asserts that he 
was not a jogger, stating that “I was perhaps more crazy ‘about 
running’ than ‘with jogging.’”9 Other than these brief mentions 
in the “Envois,” jogging disappears from Derrida’s work, as if 
running were a fad that he took up briefly in the 1970s. 
I took up running and my study of Derrida at the same time, 
in my early thirties. In both activities, being a late starter does 
not devalue my participation — knowing that I will never win 
a race doesn’t limit my enjoyment of such events. One can run 
with other people while still racing against oneself. Indeed, it is 
good to have someone to keep pace with, to force you to strive a 
little harder — to prove that one is running, not jogging. 
Derrida’s writing paces me. I enjoy his work because he is not 
simply “writing for publication,” but seems driven by something 
more important. His prose sometimes feels like hard work, the 
epic sentences that are hard to read aloud, the breathless hitch 
of the ellipsis in the passage above (“I’m not talking about jog-
ging, although… but even though”). A work like the “Envois” 
is exhausting, pursuing the proliferation of pronouns: I, they, 






And then there is the confusion — can the narrator be directly 
identified as Derrida, am I chasing him or a literary phantom? 
While Miller is prepared to “testify under oath, moreover, that 
what the speaker says happened the three or four times I am 
mentioned by name in “Envois” really did happen as ‘historical 
events,’” the “Envois” always disturb my footing and I am not 
sure whose trail I’m following. Does the narrator describe the 
runs Derrida took with Hulbert or not? Every word of Derrida’s 
seem limitless, language coming alive. His work defies simple 
programs and schedules. Even a concept as peripheral as run-
ning explodes with puns and plays: the couriers and relays of the 
“Envois,” the confused baton-handover between Plato and So-
crates, the step in pas-sages, the jambes of the chimney in Poe’s 
Purloined Letter. McArthur points out the “perpetual movement 
that the addresser engages in, an Odyssean voyaging, but also 
the theme of legacy or legs, the walking, running, pedalling, 
limping that the accident-prone addresser does throughout.”10 
Derrida claimed in 1982 that “I haven’t even begun to read 
Joyce”11 and I have the same feeling when I read Derrida. But 
from my experience of running I know that it is not what one 
achieves that is important but the feeling of striving, to be able 
to say that I am a runner, not a jogger. Even if I never “mas-
ter” Derrida’s work, the experience of reading it is still a positive 
one. It is about more than training. This experience of reading 
Derrida recalls something Haruki Murakami wrote in his book 
about writing and running:
Most runners run not because they want to live longer, but 
because they want to live life to the fullest. If you’re going 
to while away the years, it’s far better to live them with clear 
goals and fully alive than in a fog, and I believe running helps 
you do that. Exerting yourself to the fullest within your indi-
10 McArthur, “The Example of Joyce,” 236.
11 Derrida, “Two Words for Joyce,” 148.
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vidual limits: that’s the essence of running, and a metaphor 
for life — and for me, for writing as well.12
This brief response can only be a prelude to a work that I will 
never have enough breath to write. I could never exhaust all 
meaning in Derrida’s work, never reach a finish line. I will al-
ways be run ragged by the “Envois,” its couriers always ahead of 
me, but when I run, my life feels fuller.
12 Haruki Murakami, What I Talk About When I Talk About Running (London: 






It’s always about the name. Everything comes down to this. 
Everything is due to the difficulty of properly naming the 
thing itself. Actually this difficulty is an impossibility, a diffi-
culty whose limits can only be indefinitely pushed back. (PC, 
382)
Leave this, the limits being “indefinitely” pushed at, moved 
backwards, further and further, to recede, the harder one tries. 
This involves a question of perception.
Perceive: apperceive. 
Always there: perception.
On the one hand: perception of another.
On the other hand: an other perception; perception of the other.
There is always another perception in perception: there remains, 
in secret, hidden away, just below the surface, underneath the 
tongue, sublingually, as if the two were entwined, one tongue 
insinuating itself with the other’s tongue; or, say this the other 
way around so as to gain perspective if not to perceive correctly, 
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the other’s tongue always already having insinuated itself un-
der, in the mouth of the one. So it is with the action of per-
ception. So it is with perception of apperception, and what it 
means to perceive. Traveling across tongues, leaving, as it were, 
can you perceive this, the trace of another’s perception in your 
own, Latin to French to English. To perceive: seize, understand, 
take entirely. The other’s tongue, in its being carried over into 
my mouth, knows me. I believe I take it on, make it conform to 
my will, to the power of my language — as if there were such a 
thing — when, and here is the other perception, perception that 
will never be mine, in imagining the other’s perception, percep-
tion of the other, I perceive indirectly, I apperceive, that there, 
there is the other perception, perception of, on perception. In 
taking the other, seizing its tongue, making it conform, I take on 
a perception that perceives without being perceived necessarily, 
and which, in so doing, apprehends me. I am taken entirely by 
the other.
A question of the trans-, of the Über, this matter of percep-
tion, of perception’s perception, as if, imagine it, from some oth-
er place. One is taken unawares. I am translated. In “To Specu-
late — on ‘Freud,’” the very title of which insinuates perception 
in its play on what is given to be seen, Derrida engages in a sus-
tained reflection, meditation perhaps, on perception. Without 
stating it though, his passage, his discourse on the discourse 
situated by Freud “at the very heart of perception” (PC, 383) 
opens for the reader to perceive the questions of the narrator 
and framing (PC, 114–15) and also those perceptions that plague 
the post cards on memory, love, the self and other, which, for 
now, I will limit to one small exchange (PC, 432–33).
Where though, in this small weave I wish to ravel, might we 
begin? Pulling a thread, I find myself moving backwards. With 
perception, someone might say to you, seeing things from an-
other side as it were, “[e]verything is due to the difficulty of 
properly naming the thing itself.” But then, this is hardly new; 
for, “[a]ctually this difficulty is an impossibility, a difficulty 
whose limits can only be indefinitely pushed back” (PC, 382). 
“At this point,” so to speak, I already have the sense that one per-
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ception entails within it the possibility of another, and another; 
from this perception, perception of the perception of percep-
tion (of perception ad infinitum, the scene of perception being 
one en abyme), we perceive, do we not, that there is that which 
“distances us from intuition, and legitimately provokes distrust” 
(PC, 382). Such distancing, such an opening that takes place 
from within the more or less reflective, and, it has to be said, be-
lated, perception on perception’s perception of perception’s per-
ception… (I could go on), the realization dawns that this is not 
simply a matter of seeing, of how one sees and so understands, 
seizes, takes hold of, takes entirely. 
Do you see what I mean? Can you see? Is the meaning avail-
able to perception?
No, it is not simply, if ever, a matter of sight as apprehension. 
In the moment of seeing, in the naked experience of the oth-
er that touches me, from over there, from where, I realize, the 
other perceives me, I pass, too quickly doubtless, in the blink of 
an eye, to intuition. I have this feeling of being apprehended, of 
being taken. As if possessed, as if in a photograph. I am taken by 
the other, I perceive before perceiving, I intuit my being taken. 
Placed under arrest by, under the arrest of the other’s percep-
tion, I come to realize at this point. That is to say, I realize at this 
point, or to put this differently, from the point where my per-
ception takes place belatedly, that there is, there takes place the 
displacement, the translation — from experience, to intuition, to 
perception (and ultimately from there to memory, re-presenta-
tion, the difference of perception’s perception) — ; or, following 
Derrida once more, the transposition, in fact “[a]ll the move-
ments in ‘trans-,’ the ones that involve repetitions, displace-
ments, and speculations […] [which] inhabit this origin [sc. the 
origin of perception, and therefore perception of the origin of 
perception] on its very threshold” (PC, 383; second emphasis 
mine). It is, to repeat, at this point, that the realization occurs 
that what takes place on the threshold, inhabiting the origin, is, 
in being what distances us from intuition, “the figurative nature 
of language and the necessity of borrowing these figures,” bor-
rowing, in Freud’s case, (which is not our immediate concern 
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here), according to Derrida from “already constituted sciences, 
[…] psychology, and more precisely the psychology said to be of 
the depths” (PC,  382). Where there is language, there is percep-
tion, separating me through the hinge it effects, which it causes 
to operate and which it is itself, on the very threshold of the 
origin of perception, by which “I” is distanced, I am constituted 
in my perception as always already at a remove, at a loss. The “I” 
is constituted, is given to oneself through the gift of perception, 
perception of the other, the other’s perception, by this arche-
originary loss. I am therefore I am at a loss for words, wherever 
perception takes place, and everywhere it takes place. 
“I” comes into being in this originary perception of origi-
nary loss, perception as loss, and precisely through transference, 
translation, transposition, all that which hinges on trans-. Be-
ing, becoming in the perception of Being as being-at-a-loss, if I 
can put it like this, takes place as perception of the self through 
the “metaphoric transposition within language […], [through, 
in turn, that of which] the word transference reminds [us, its] 
metaphoric network, which is precisely metaphor and transfer-
ence (Übertragung), a network of correspondences, connec-
tions, switch points, and a semantic, postal railway sorting with-
out which no transferential destination would be possible” (PC, 
383). Hence, from “the first intuition [as if there ever were a first, 
as if one could perceive such a possibility, imagine it if you will], 
from its threshold”; or to shift within language, transposing one 
metaphor for another, slipping from one tongue to another, in 
another register, on the tongue of the other, giving ground to an-
other perception, from a “first step,” all motion, all displacement 
is always already in play “as the very condition of what is called a 
perception or a description at the edge of perception” (PC, 383).
Therefore, if I comes into being in this originary perception (of 
perception’s originary transposition, transference, etc.) it does 
so not as guarantor of presence, identity, Being’s fixed point, its 
constant, pole star… (choose your own metaphor, whichever 
best suits your perception of a stable ontology); rather it comes 
into being, if I can put it like this, as the condition of percep-
tion’s endless disorientation and reorientation. If, in reading 
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this, you find yourself at a loss, disoriented, so to speak, this 
has to do with the challenge that recognizing, or speculating on 
the perception of perception as the perception of the other, of 
différance at, on the one hand, the heart, and on the other hand, 
the threshold, entails. For “[a]ll these trajectories — transitional, 
transcriptive, transpositional and transgressive, transferential 
trajectories — open the very field of speculation. It is there that 
speculation finds its possibility and its interest. There that is, in 
the trans” (PC, 382). Everything comes down to being opened to 
another perception, another way of seeing, of speculating on an-
other perception, perception as always other, as always already 
an alterity informed and transposed in its speculation by dif-
férance, the singular manifestation of différance that is called, 
simply, perception. 
But, “on the other hand” (PC, 383)… There is always another 
perception, we are back with this dislocating opening of the 
transgressive, transferential trajectory (open your eyes!). Trans-
ference (Übertragung) opens, causing the opening onto percep-
tion, but is too the condition of perception’s possibility, the pos-
sibility of the “on the other hand.” On the other hand, to look at 
this differently, it is not just, never merely a matter of what one 
is given to see. In understanding, in perceiving that the figure 
of sight is not simply the name for vision but also part of the 
metaphorical transference that names indirectly understand-
ing — you see what I mean — there is always the apprehension 
that it is “discourse at the very heart of perception, from its first 
step as its condition” (PC, 383). Thus, as that which mobilizes 
perception discourse — that which has always already disrupted 
the one — erases, this is Derrida’s word, the “oppositional limit 
between perception and its other” (PC, 383). In that visual “re-
fraction” by which perception is understood to operate, as if from 
a first place, there in that return misunderstood as the inaugural 
opening of a perception, wherein there is traced the ‘specula-
tive transference orients, destines, calculates the most original 
and most passive “first step” on the very threshold of perception. 
And this perception, the desire for it or its concept, belongs to 
the destiny of this calculation. As does every discourse on this 
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subject’ (PC, 384). Within perception, at its heart, unseen, in-
visible, there is discourse, opening and destining. Transference 
has always already taken place, at least this is the speculation, 
in the act of perceiving, and I perceive this as the possibility of 
that perception. In the arrival of that “first” perception, before 
I am given the opportunity to reflect, to speculate, to look back 
on what in the “first” look has caused it to take place, the other 
has given the place, the threshold of perception, discoursing on, 
and, perhaps, framing, constructing the frame of perception in 
the deconstruction of the undifferentiated metaphor of the ori-
gin, the first, the one.
II
“But that is the fiction. There is an invisible, but structurally 
irreducible, frame around the narration. Where does it be-
gin?” (PC, 431)
Framing: if I am narrating here, in this reflective speculation 
on the speculative transference, then, it has to be admitted that 
standing in the position of a narrator, I find the figure of the 
narrator — and of course there is no “narrator” as such; mere 
“metaphor” there is only that insistent play of différance, the be-
coming-space of time and the becoming-time of space, deferral 
and differentiation, transferential trajectory, within the mobile 
network of trope and perceptual shift, elision, erasure, and rein-
scription — to be double, doubled, reiterated, and divided, in the 
act, any act of narration: “[t]he narrator (himself doubled into a 
narrating narrator and a narrated narrator, not limiting himself 
to reporting the two dialogues)” (PC, 431). It will, it should, be 
noticed that, at this introduction of the narration on the dou-
bled, doubling narrator, there is a framing of the double. Paren-
theses frame. Arriving — but from where? — they enframe that 
division, an iteration potentially endless. Who gives the frame? 
Who frames? The narrating narrator? Or the narrated narra-
tor? Neither, there is a performative at work here inasmuch as, 
without presence, without voice, writing enacts the opening we 
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name framing, the opening onto, as a reinscription of, the mise 
en abyme. In this, the erasure or that oppositional limit between 
perception and its other, is implied, even as, in this gesture, the 
doubling doubles itself, marking as it erases, and leaving behind 
merely the ghostly, voiceless trait of framing-opening, the dou-
bling play of narrators — narrated and narrating — in the narra-
tion of their division. Hence, the “invisible, but structurally irre-
ducible frame” of which only the question of the beginning can 
be asked, without solution. Just one more — one in an endless 
sequence — speculative transference. Perception perceives; per-
ception, of the other. Perception, of the other: on the one hand I 
perceive — the other. But then, the other perceives me, even, es-
pecially, when I am not aware; when, for example, I write. There 
is the other’s perception all the time. Perception of perception 
then, more than one, and no one perception; despite the best 
efforts of narration to frame, and so control, to elide perception 
within the guiding frame of a reality presented as perspective, 
the phenomenological confused by, occluded by, the empirical. 
I is a frame by which I name myself, believing in a unity that 
cannot, does not hold. A mere fiction, convenience itself, by 
which, believing, entertaining the narrative of an autonomous 
and unitary, stable self, always present to itself, I frame and am 
framed. I, frame of the other, this perception I mistakenly call, 
and believe to be, mine. Thus, the frame is never single, there 
is always a doubling of the frame, and the impossibility is in 
knowing what the proper perspective might be. Impossible to 
tell one frame from another, where one ends or the other begins, 
whether one is on the inside or the outside of the other, and so 
on, ad infinitum. While the image of the frame brings with it the 
notion of closure, and, with that, that which is framed, there-
fore closed off and opened onto, as a portal, giving access, and, 
therefore, to remind ourselves, place a threshold for the stag-
ing or reflection on perception — as if we were looking into the 
abyss; having a perspective on the abyss, from the safety of this 
“position” beyond the frame, outside it; to pursue the counter-
intuitive thought, the abyss is not simply that onto which we 
look as I would look at a stage, a photograph, an image, still or 
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moving on a screen (computer, television, cinema), whilst re-
maining comfortable in and assured of my perspectival position 
and perception. No, mine is not the central location, the point 
to which the vision returns, the abyss presented, or from which 
the gaze emanates. 
Mine is merely a locus, one perception, and perspective, 
amongst others, within others. I, in being framed, am not out-
side, above the abyss. Rather I is a moving point in an abyss 
that is “all around”; though of course this phrase is inadequate, 
inasmuch as it still suggests an implied or representable spatial 
dimension, with limits, ends — in short, its own frame. I is a 
small point, cursor if you will, for the convenience of reflection, 
within the abyssal, available to each and every other perception. 
“Not to take into account this complication,” to move from Der-
rida’s starting point, that of the embedded framing devices that 
function in relation to the idea of the (narrating and narrated) 
narrator in The Purloined Letter), is a failure of comprehend-
ing — a case of not gaining access to the nature of perception it-
self — of that which is always “twice-framed” in being “framed” 
in any “represented content” (PC, 433).
I realize of course that I am extrapolating, perhaps a little too 
hastily, from a specific example and narrative scenario, moving 
from the ontology of the literary, or the problematic of defining 
that through the limits of any analysis that does not take into ac-
count fully and comprehensively the nature of that which fram-
ing is, or what takes place through the gesture of “the frame, the 
signature, and the parergon” (PC, 432). In this move, opening 
onto, or reflecting on the possibility of a phenomenological ap-
prehension of the self, irreducible to a subject, as provisional, 
informed not by any plenitude or auto-completion (a self-fram-
ing) but instead by the other’s perception, I am seeking to show 
how, as soon as one shifts one’s perception on the self, one has 
already entered into a mode of analysis that requires the begin-
nings at least of an acknowledgement of the extent to which I 
names itself only at the cost of loss. 
Every time I say I, I reinscribe violently a limit, which will 
not hold for very long, and which, therefore, is untenable, for it 
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admits or confesses to a limit that is exclusive and provisional. I 
am this rather than that. But at the same time, in saying I, which 
is always, also, I am (ontology is the framing limit of articula-
tion, which by its discursive as well as epistemological nature 
must operate according to some framing or limiting gesture), I 
place myself at the threshold of an opening, in which the I loses 
its force in the moment of its utterance. Framing through nar-
rative, producing the perspective, offering phenomenal percep-
tion as empirical detail, fact or “reality,” I put myself forward “as 
a very singular character within the narrated narration, within 
the enframed,” thereby constituting an “agency, a ‘position’” (PC, 
433). That there is agency at all indicates both how play, motion, 
is intrinsic to the assumption of the self; that this is a position 
at all indicates that, far from being free, absolute, sovereign, the 
self, the I, is only ever given, a “giving” given en-framed, framed, 
and framing, subject to the perception of another or perception 
of, on the part of the other.
III
“As you come to me from the only place in which I do not feel 
myself loved, I also have the feeling that you are alone in lov-
ing me, alone in being able not to love me.” (PC, 115)
Love comes, if it comes at all, as the singular expression, of the 
other; this is my perception, in the perception of the other: that 
love is given. Not a thing, irreducible to any ontology and there-
fore unavailable to deconstruction, it is the giving of perception 
to that place I name as myself, wherein I perceive myself loved 
or not loved in what is given, not given, or withdrawn, as the 
touching experience of the other. In this I apprehend analogi-
cally, indirectly, apophatically, the perception of the other; the 
other’s regard, for me, of me. In this realization, I am seized, I 
understand myself to be taken, entirely, taken, captured, as in a 
photograph. This being-seized, being-taken, it marks not only a 
space, but also a time, however slight. There is a gap, a lag. This 
is doubled in my perception of being perceived. If this reflection 
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illustrates or illuminates anything, it illustrates how love is never 
mine to give; it is not a gift in any conventional sense; I find 
myself having given love, giving love, without my consciousness 
taking part in that decision. I can of course decide that I believe 
I am withdrawing my love, but that is simply to frame my per-
ception of the other in a particular manner, so as to save face, to 
turn my face away. But the truth of love is far from this; and, it 
might be, I come to realize that the love given was never mine 
to give all along.
Thus, without love being given, without the giving of love, 
there is no being in the perception of the other, for the other, 
“the one to the other” (PC, 114). I ‘have to hang on to you […]. 
For I do write you […] even if I don’t send everything” (PC, 114). 
No perception, no one without the other, the other always send-
ing, giving, without acknowledgement of receipt, this is the hy-
pothesis. I am taken in love, apprehended; framed, even as I ask, 
I demand that you “tell me, my love, give me the truth,” a truth 
which — possibility of the impossible — would arrive only on 
condition that I could “erase all the traits of language, coming 
back to the most simple […] in order to send you ‘words’ that 
are ‘true’ enough for me not to recognize them” (PC, 114). So, 
here then, in this the perception of the frame having been riven 
arrives in the desire for that erasure of all the traits of language, 
save for the apprehension that “when I say ‘je suis,’ with you, 
[…] I am (following) you the way one follows a raise, and tak-
ing a step, betting on your faith (PC, 117). At least here is what I 
suspect, believe, perceive in the most indirect manner. I am with 
you, I am you, but I am never on time, I am always in your wake, 
following you, in the wake of the other, from when love seems 
to give itself most indirectly, invisibly. And all I can hope for is 
that other perception, the one that breaks through the frame in 
which I seem to see myself as myself, alone. Only “[y]ou who 
know, [can] tell me the truth, tell me your secret” (PC, 117). You 
remain though, you are “untranslatable” even when “you are 
there to haunt me” (PC, 113); especially then, for though I ap-
prehend in the touching instant of the as if, in the analogical 
apprehension, the apperception of the other (conjuring all the 
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doubleness that phrase can muster without at all framing the 
other in the phrase), then, there, in what I believe to have been 
given, what I am calling, naming impossibly love, without at all 
giving to that which is given a frame by which love comes to 
be represented, encapsulated, defined, perceived directly once 
and for ever; in this, you haunt me, you remain to haunt me 
as I am (found) (following) you, at a loss, because “you never 
sign” (PC, 163). Love never signs, the other never signs at the 
bottom of the card as if authorizing the frame of perception for 
the self. So, “I await you, there where we are not yet, neither the 
one, nor the other” (PC, 163). There is a difficulty here, clearly. 
I have to break off. Actually, as someone said, scribbled across 
the back of a postcard, this difficulty is an impossibility, a dif-
ficulty whose limits can only be indefinitely pushed back. Thus 
framed, and framing the reply, the response, we find ourselves 
opened, and opening, to one another, abyssally. Mise en scène 
transformed from within, translated by what remains, becom-
ing what it always already is, a mise en demeure, which opens 
in the moments of its framing, its presentation, representation, 





That the relationship between J. Hillis Miller and Jacques Der-
rida occupies a unique place in the landscape of contemporary 
criticism is no secret. They have played as well a significant role 
in my intellectual building, having encountered them some 
thirty years ago. I have written about that in my “Journey With 
J on the Jour J,” an introduction to Derrida’s essay “Justices” on 
J. Hillis Miller, and Miller’s “Isabelle’s Kiss” published in Criti-
cal Inquiry in 2005. There, I have likened these two essays to 
letters on the way “to further destinations of as yet uncharted 
parts. Like letters, sealed with a kiss.”1 Derrida’s essay “‘Justices’” 
includes a description of the scene in which he receives a let-
ter from Miller (“Hillis” when referring to the film character, “J. 
Hillis Miller” or “Miller” when referring to Miller as author in 
further text), regarding the real name behind the “J” which has 
received extensive treatment in my film The First Sail: J. Hillis 
Miller.2 
In The First Sail, the first thing Hillis comments upon when 
discussing the scene at the lecture when Derrida shows the let-
ter, is Derrida’s death, already presaged by his not looking too 
healthy to Hillis’s eye in the filmed footage screened by Hillis 
in the film. This the first bout de souffle, breath turn, the pneu-
1 Dragan Kujundžić, “Journey With J on the Jour J,” Critical Inquiry 31, no. 3 
(2005): 684–88, at 688.
2 Dragan Kujundžić (dir.), The First Sail: J. Hillis Miller, DVD, all regions, 81 
min. (Deer Isle Productions, USA, 2011). 
198
going postcard
matic turn of the soul, that fills the sails (voiles) of the film and 
the book and sends it on to its destinerrance, thus the envoiles. 
The counter-time of mourning Derrida is inscribed in my own 
desire to film J. Hillis Miller. Derrida’s specter haunts me and it 
haunts the film, as much as it haunts J. Hillis Miller. But not nec-
essarily in ways that are visible or re-presentable. The ways the 
spectral divides the frame of the cinematic representation, what 
I call the effects of division and devision (a destinerrance of the 
cinematic image, in fact), pose interesting and urgent questions 
about the modes and ethics (prostethics) of representation. They 
go from the phenomenological to the political in a heartbeat. 
Thus, the question of the frame or the letter (be it a single letter, 
the initial of the first name, “J.”), the letter which does or does 
not arrive, to the cinematic which does or does nor “represent” 
the Other, imposes itself as the burning issue pertaining to the 
very core of what is a tradition, history, and what our response 
and responsibility to it are or should be. Who writes what and 
who writes whom, how or whether we allow the Other to leave 
an imprint, what or who arrives: those are the issues which 
haunt the text below, from the film on J. Hillis Miller, Derrida’s 
“Justices” episode reproduced in the film, to the burning politi-
cal turbulences that have left their imprint on the body of Eu-
rope, Bosnia, and now, most recently, Greece. Joyce’s Ulysses and 
Theo Angelopoulos’s (1935–2012) Ulysses’ Gaze serve at the end 
as exemplary sites calling for a destinerrant Europe, the Other 
Europe and the Other of Europe to be invented, in the face of a 
looming catastrophe. 
The reflections below are also marked, truly haunted, by a 
telepathic encounter with the Other, marked in this text in ital-
ics. Someone else, Julian Wolfreys, dictated these italicized in-
terventions to me on May 19, 2012. Having come to me after I 
almost finished writing, they have, I realize, from an infinitely 
distant telepathic proximity, taught me, unbeknownst to me, 
how to write my own essay even before it had been written, as 
well as taught me how to watch my film. What is really uncanny, 
is that at the same time I initially proposed to the editors to write 
on the scene from the film where Jacques Derrida discusses the 
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letters he mis-addressed, in relation to The Post Card, Julian 
Wolfreys wrote about the same scene in The First Sail, starting 
with the description of his visit, on the day of his lecture, to the 
Bodleian library at Oxford University, in search for, as he says, 
“that” postcard which is on the cover of The Post Card (Plato 
teaches Socrates how to write, shown initially to Jacques Der-
rida by Cynthia Chase and Jonathan Culler). And thus Wolfreys 
relating the whole analysis of the letters sent to Miller with an 
erroneous appellation (John for Joseph), and Miller’s response 
that Derrida quotes in the film, to the analysis of destinerrance 
in The Post Card. This was the same thing that I proposed! But 
the uncanny ghosts haunting these essays proliferate, with Julian 
Wolfreys’s conclusion of his conference presentation (delivered 
at Oxford University on April 13, 2012 as one of the keynotes at 
the conference on “Giving up the Ghost: the Haunting of Mod-
ern Culture”) with a reference and analysis of Ulysses’ Gaze by 
Angelopoulos, which is exactly the ending of the essay which I 
had already initially proposed to relate to sailing in all senses of 
the term in Ulysses and Ulysses’ Gaze, the destinerrant sailing of 
the tradition itself. In advance, I have followed Wolfreys’s text 
blow by blow, my writing from the very start already sealed by 
this distant proximity and affinity that taught me how to write, 
in a scene of writing where I can no longer tell who or what 
came first. On occasion, our analyses reverberate with a gen-
tle dissonance, like a contrapunctual musical motif, thus all the 
more underscoring the mutual affinity. I quote them here in 
indented italics with an infinite gratitude and without further 
explanation. “It is impossible not to believe that each of us has 
an internal television screen by means of which we have visions 
of what distant friends and relations are thinking, or not to be-
lieve that whatever we think is broadcast to the internal televi-
sion screen of others,” says Miller in The Medium Is the Maker.3 
This essay is exactly a product of such televised encounter with 
3 J. Hillis Miller, The Medium Is the Maker: Browning, Freud, Derrida and the 




Julian Wolfreys (whom I never met in person, except online, 
even though we overlapped for a while in the same University 
of Florida where we had arranged but missed encounters, tor-
mented, like letters, with an “internal drifting”). 
Having arrived earlier this morning, and thinking about ghosts, 
the ghosts of Oxford, and, in particular, one shade, whose dis-
turbing motions here I like to call to mind, I took a walk to the 
Bodleian, its gift shop at least. I was in search of a post card. 
I was less interested in what it represented or who was repre-
sented than the memory of another who had, in purchasing 
an untold number of these cards, had made it visible to the 
academic world in a rather provocative way. 
Derrida’s death has also entailed the darkening of register of 
some of Miller’s recent writing, the dark Derrida, a darkening 
in Miller of a wound that does not heal. I tried to exemplify this 
relationship in the scene where Hillis watches Derrida read a 
letter he had received from Miller. Relating the scene in the film 
about the destinerrance of the postal regarding J. Hillis Miller 
and Derrida with Joyce is justified on many levels, not least of 
all because of the entry in The Post Card on “20 June 1978. I 
had not come back to Zurich since spring 1972. You accom-
pany: CHECK me everywhere. Hillis, who was waiting for me 
at the airport (the De Mans arrive only this afternoon,) drove 
me to the cemetery, near to Joyce’s tomb, I should say funerary 
monument” (PC, 148). In his The Medium Is the Maker Miller 
(just after his description of how he took Derrida sailing on his 
boat, The Frippery, featured extensively in The First Sail, on a day 
when there was a “small craft warnings” and “look what hap-
pened to Shelley when he went sailing on a day when there was 
too much wind!”4), claims that he has no memory of that ever 
happening, not “having a car in Zurich.” However, “Derrida and 
I did go together, as the ‘Envois’ report, on another occasion, to 




mal cries from that zoo appear in Finnegans Wake. We did stand 
laughing before the tomb of Egon Zoller, ‘Erfinder des Telepho-
nographe,’ with its engraved ticker tape machine and its carved 
Alpha and Omega. Derrida, as we stood looking at the tomb, 
connected it to his then current project about telecommunica-
tion networks, that is, the ‘Envois.’”5 From this scene I’d just like 
to retain the inscription of The Post Card in the neighborhood 
of the telegraph, tele-technology, the uncanny repetitions of un-
certain memories, the sailing on Miller’s boat (“6 October 1978. 
[…] Tomorrow, return to Yale, day after tomorrow excursion in 
Hillis’s sailboat” [PC, 166]) and Joyce, in the cemetery, thus the 
relation of the letter with death. 
In The First Sail, Derrida describes in the episode how he 
had once (or many times in the past) written to J. Hillis Miller 
addressing him, erroneously, as “John Hillis Miller.” To which 
Miller responded in a letter, and that is the film scene, “My 
name is ‘Joseph,’ not ‘John.’ Not that it matters in the least, since 
I’ve never used that name in any case.” 
The First Sail: J. Hillis Miller. [CLIP] What have we seen? Let 
me break this down a little schematically: (1) we see J. Hillis 
Miller, watching something, someone, we cannot see. The who 
and the what do not exclude one another, there is not a choice 
here. We hear a voice, a recording within a recording, first 
French, then translating itself to English, the idiom resistant 
to direct transport. To this Miller responds with laughter. (2) 
From this, there is a cross fade, from Miller to Derrida, Der-
rida “after” Miller, the image “after” the voice, apparently. Der-
rida “arrives” without arriving, appearing, much as Plato ap-
pears after Socrates in that Post Card.
In the film, Hillis minimizes the video tape of Derrida, as not 
“really the return of Jacques Derrida,” something that I sense is 
also at work in Hillis’s description of Derrida’s book on touch-




ingly difficult,”6 as he said in an interview to Eamonn Dunne 
in Dunne’s J. Hillis Miller and the Possibilities of Reading, and I 
wonder if it also means difficult to touch, to behold? 
This subtle tone of positioning vis-à-vis Derrida comes 
across, at least to me, as an attempt to ward off Derrida’s return, 
precisely as the return of the ghost. If he came back as a ghost, 
it would mean that Derrida had died. That is, as J. Hillis Miller 
says in The Medium Is the Maker, he cannot listen to Derrida’s 
lectures on tape, because that would mean that he is really dead. 
But Miller knows better! We always return as ghosts, even in 
real life. As soon as there is a return, there is a ghost, I learned 
that form The Medium Is the Maker. And from Miller’s analysis 
of On Touching. And from his writing about “Absolute Mourn-
ing.” And from all those other writings on zero, on the empty 
core of literature, on living on, etc. 
Miller continues, after reference to the recordings of Glenn 
Gould playing Bach; he considers how the filmmaker can fast 
forward, rewind, slow down, pause, play over and over again. 
The spectro-tele-technological archive gives one the illusion of 
power over the living and the dead, although I have to say it 
does not appear to occur to Miller that even were he hearing 
Gould play live, Gould, or whichever pianist you prefer for 
your Bach, Schubert, or whoever, is, even in live performance, 
nevertheless acting as a medium, a conduit for the trace of the 
other. 
What I sense in these subtle strategies of evasion to see Der-
rida as a ghost is a certain tenderness for Derrida which Hillis 
is trying to protect from opening or precisely from bringing 
into present or presence, like a wound which refuses to heal and 
which cannot or should not be touched. But not just because 
Hillis is protecting himself from the exposure to the death of 
the other, which would be understandable, anxiety-ridden, an 
6 Éamonn Dunne, J. Hillis Miller and the Possibilities of Reading: Literature 
after Deconstruction (New York: Continuum, 2010), 134.
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anxiety quite human and easy to explain. In this way, I would 
claim, Hillis is protecting Derrida’s passing away to be worked 
through, obliterated, diminished, “properly mourned,” and thus 
done away with. Geoffrey Bennington recently wrote about this 
as “militant melancholia,” which I think describes Hillis in the 
film scene: 
Who or what, in these still dark days of an ongoing melan-
cholia I began by declaring “militant,” militantly melanchol-
ic, something that wanted to affirm, with Jacques himself, 
a certain refusal of the “normal” work of mourning and its 
“normal” dealings with the death of the other—a proudly 
militant melancholia that soon however settled into some-
thing much less glorious, much less proud, much more mel-
ancholic, in fact—who or what, then, might come to open 
something again that might lay some claim, however modest, 
to the sometimes very minimal dignity of what often bears 
the probably misleading name of ‘thought’?”7 
The music in the film, composed and performed by Natalia 
Pschenichnikova, to whom I left complete discretion as to the 
placement of chords, punctuates this countertemporality of a 
loss splitting the scene but refusing representation, as explicitly 
avowed by Hillis, and so subtending the whole set of representa-
tional, framing divisions and devisions. 
There is even an instant when the ghost of Alexander’s father 
[in Bergman’s Fanny and Alexander] is seen sitting disconso-
lately at the piano, playing notes my memory wants to tell me 
are very close to those used in the documentary by Miller. 
Hillis is protecting, in a sense, the wound or the loss from heal-
ing, by not allowing it to be touched, exposed, revealed, talked 
7 Geoffrey Bennington, “For Better or for Worse (There Again…),” Discourse 
30, nos. 1–2, special issue “Who or What” — Jacques Derrida, ed. Dragan 
Kujundžić (2008): 191–207, at 191–92.
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about, worked through, by not allowing Derrida to come back 
as a visible ghost in short…. To do that would probably be ad-
mitting to the visibility of appropriation, an apparatic appro-
priation of an apparition, which I sense Hillis wants to avoid 
or ward off. In a sense, this subtle refusal of the programmed 
mediatic return is precisely the work of mourning which does 
not appropriate, which refuses a “revealed” and visualized ghost 
tele-programmed by manipulation, controlled videographic 
and prosthetic repetition. And thus is more faithful to Derrida 
and his “return,” predicated on the possibility of a missed en-
counter and a non-return, thus allowing a return not only of an 
Other, but of every other, wholly other as well.
I am, therefore I am haunted; to say “I am” is to confess to the 
experience, perception and recollection, re-presentation of the 
singularity of every instant of an authentic spectrality, authen-
tic because, violently anachronistic, resistant to all historical or 
temporal containment, the gift of haunting remains other than, 
and resistant to any mode of conventional, certainly visual, or 
let me qualify this, directly visual, visibly direct representation 
or mode of mimesis.
What does it mean to be “really dead,” which listening to Der-
rida’s tapes would reveal or bring? 
Coming from what I call with too much ease a “past,” my own 
past, an historical past, memory is what remains, it is the re-
mains, so to speak, but wildly anachronistic, it also remains 
this unpredictable future revenant, remaining to come. 
Seeing the “real” visible return of Derrida in the video clip 
would be nothing but the possibility of such an appropriation, of 
a completely controlled and programmed prosthetic substitute. 
In order to keep Derrida alive as much as possible, alive in mem-
ory, at least, one must not touch the dead or let the dead return 
in the exact, programmed form. Thus allowing it in this scene to 
return them or him more vividly in invisible forms of displace-
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ments configuring the singular scaping and escaping (“the queer 
inscape,”8 or where more generally, “[t]o be is to be queer”9), of 
the experience of being J. Hillis Miller/Hillis. In any case, that 
is what I tried to edit “into” this film and the sequence (often 
very much blind to its effects), but the sequence operates here 
the displaced a- and ana-chronistic temporality whereby what 
comes before or after is scrambled, non-linear, in-visible, and 
di-visible. In a word, the scene is constructed or deconstructed 
as a counter-time in which one waits for or comes in the wake 
(the trace, the mourning) of the death of the non-appropriated 
other. “Each is already in mourning for the other. […] It takes 
place every time I love.”10 
We cannot be prepared for what can always come, always 
haunt us, or hit us with the force of a dead man’s hand. That 
unprogrammable future, distinguished by Derrida as l’avenir, 
the to-come, as opposed to la future, the certain future of the 
sun’s rising, the 14th of April following the 13th, is where we 
cannot be prepared to let-go. The ghost makes us let go.
These scenes are strewn throughout Miller’s recent responses 
about Derrida. In the film, Hillis also speaks about the “dark 
side” of Derrida, the nocturnal Derrida, with which Hillis wants 
to “maybe disagree” but which I cannot but interpret as the 
nocturnal Derrida in Hillis, a counter-time of mourning which 
Hillis preserves as he keeps it at a distance, “The sun for sorrow 
will not show his head.” The conclusion of his For Derrida which 
was quoted in the film as an intertitle states as much: “That is 
my last word, at least for now. […] If these essays are works of 
mourning, they have not worked.” A certain absent core seems 
to open in Miller’s work of late (and it is a question of coming 
8 Nicholas Royle, In Memory of Jacques Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, 2009), 126.
9 Jacques Derrida, “‘Justices,’” trans. Peggy Kamuf, Critical Inquiry 31, no. 3 
(2005): 689–721, at 703. Henceforth, “J.”
10 Jacques Derrida, “Aphorism Countertime,” trans. Nicholas Royle, in Acts of 
Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, 414–35 (New York: Routledge, 1992), 422.
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too late, as we shall see), or seems to be the work of his writing 
itself, something like a touch that cannot be touched, a vacant 
center opened by Derrida’s demise. 
So, returning to the video of Miller and Derrida, to conclude 
with the video clip, even if it proves not to have done with us: 
The limit of Miller’s reading is the limit of representation it-
self and the distinction that remains to be thought through be-
tween representation, a mode of human intervention or control 
(whether more or less technological), and that which is beyond 
all representation, within but inexpressibly other than repre-
sentation: the trace…
This has left inscriptions or inscryptions, encrypted, sometimes 
unconscious marks in J. Hillis Miller’s The Medium Is the Maker, 
for example, when he discusses Derrida on telepathy. Referring 
to Derrida, Miller describes something that “turned up again, 
close at hand, at a time when it was too late…,” a description of 
a ghost if there is any, creeping in this seemingly innocuous ana-
lytic formula. And then goes on: “This present fake lecture [note 
the apotropaic, ‘fake’ protective irony here], already far too long 
to be read in one séance [note again the protective irony, but 
also the scene of writing as a conjuring up of the ghost] ought to 
have been part of my For Derrida, but has been written too late 
for inclusion there.” 
Though I can rewind, fast forward, pause, and so on, I cannot 
control that return, that which can always arrive from within 
and overflowing the technological, the revenance in the trace 
of the voice. 
In a word, such experience comes too late, to use Miller’s words, 
there is a decalage, or a counter-temporality at work there, my 
words For Derrida come too late for Derrida. And right after this 
sentence, “my For Derrida,” “too late for inclusion there,” Hillis 
writes: “The Fort/Da sequence of his losing and then refinding 
‘Telepathy,’ says Derrida, ‘remains inexplicable for me even to 
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this day.’”11 Just after For Derrida, seconds later, a heartbeat later, 
a Fort/Da, for Derrida, an F–D, an inscription of Todestrieb, 
of a death drive, Derrida Fort but not Da, not anymore, left 
to haunt Miller’s work like a vacant center, a touch he cannot 
touch. An impossible touch of Derrida (a dubious genitive here, 
je me touche toi) which comes too late, written too late, always 
already too late for Derrida, but also for Miller. We will not have 
mourned the ghost, the spectral, in the living, never enough. 
And by missing the other so much he comes to the truth. 
[R]e-presentation that can always return to haunt from the 
future, and additionally serve to exceed and so erase or de-
construct the premise of a separation on which binaries such 
as “recorded/live” “dead/live,” fort / da, here / there, presence 
/ absence, and so forth are all predicated. As soon as we ac-
knowledge the trace, there is the ghost in the machine.
Hillis is here far from “Hillis le Mal,” the rugged Virginian, the 
almost demonic force with an untouchable, so to speak, imper-
turbable serenity, which Tom Cohen justly or unjustly but hu-
morously discerns in him, “Hillis le Mal,” so not Hillis le Mal, 
but Hillis l’Animal, the animal looking for the lines of escape, the 
evading animal frightened by the death of the other, “l’animal 
que J. suit.” “I am, he is,” you will notice, a confusion engulfs the 
writing here in a difference which cannot be heard, or touched, 
but which animates the scene of writing but also of filming, like 
an animal que je suis/t. L’animal, also, qui est mal, the wounded, 
hurting animal which I follow, in me, in the other, there where 
we wait for each other at the limit of each other’s finitude and 
death, at the limit of truth, there where I is the other, Je (J) est 
un autre. 
There is, in this, no absolute sequence. Speaking of a “before” or 
an “after” is to assume a logic that is both temporal and spatial, 




when what takes place is a constant interchange. Derrida is 
talking about wondering what it must be like to be, to feel like, 
to taste oneself as, to have the taste of, for J. Hillis Miller, of 
Miller’s taste of, for himself. In this too there is an edit whereby 
the laptop, the technological substrate disappears, giving us in 
the illusion, through the medium by which film is filmed, that 
we are no longer watching a film on a laptop, projection within 
a film, the subject of which is no longer visible but watching 
from elsewhere, like the ghost of himself that the film would 
make of him, regardless of whether he is alive (as is Miller) 
or dead (as is Derrida). One subject, always already absent, 
assumes a supplementarity for the other subject. These are all 
provisional positions and can always change. 
This countertemporality and spectrality which cannot be seen 
is precisely what I tried to convey or to allow to appear with-
out appearing (not visible to me either), then, in editing with 
the cascading frames, but can we see how many? I am the one 
who is probably the most blind. Let’s try to enumerate some 
of them. The scene of Derrida on the computer is preceded by 
the cut on Hillis’s eye made by the glass frame. And where? In 
Irvine (which will appear shortly in Derrida’s explicit mention 
of “the Archive”) after the fall on the stairs leading to the Hu-
manities Hall where Derrida held his seminars! The eye itself as 
frame; Hillis’s eye held by the metonymy of the prosthetic cam-
era eye, thus the viewer’s eye, seeing the wound and the cut as 
frame, from which the scene flows (the water stream, the video 
stream…); thus, the framed, wounded, lachrymose eye (seen 
in the slow motion, the eye/I wading anamorphically through 
the ocular water), the eye wounded by the loss larger than the 
camera, the frame and the scene, beholding the viewer, includ-
ing the “director,” the “I-eye” filming it in the grip of intermi-
nable blinding melancholia. In the film, I told Hillis, jokingly: 
“what about that scar, what did you do to the other guy?” to 
which Hillis responded: “Yes, you should see the other guy.” 
And then I proceeded to edit the entire sequence about Der-
rida and mourning, yes, go and see the other guy who wounded 
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Hillis’s eye, go and see the mourning as the other that wounds 
the eye/I. But I only myself saw it in the end, on a big screen 
at the first public screening, blinded by my own wounded and 
lachrymose gaze and refusal to see the demise of Derrida. And 
Barbara Cohen’s picture afterwards, framing a friendship, with J 
and J touching each other, the haptic in the cinematic, the ulti-
mate ghost, and there they are both… touching each other and 
by that touch creating a counter-time “at the heart of the syn-
cope, between touching and untouchable,” and thus also already 
a prosthetic mourning, “the ageless intrusion of technics, which 
is to say the transplantation of the prosthesis.”12 With the voiceo-
ver and the punctuation of the piano chord: “For nothing in the 
world would I have passed up the chance to recall, publicly, that 
it has been given to me, like a benediction, to know Joseph Hillis 
Miller for more than thirty five years, to have had the honor of 
teaching at his side, […] the honor also of having shared with 
him more than with any other, through I don’t know how many 
countries, colloquia, meetings of all sorts, the intellectual ad-
venture that signs and seals our lives” (“J,” 712). And then, Hillis, 
“Am I on camera?” walking alone (Derrida’s I Will Now Have to 
Walk Alone, Deleuze’s obituary, another mournful frame, was 
my reference here) after posting a letter, creating the counter 
time of mourning, they miss each other, do they miss each oth-
er, how they miss each other! Like Romeo and Juliet, the coun-
ter time of mourning as the impossibility of being with is put 
on display or on replay here — Derrida in Hillis’s solitude (the 
crunching of the gravel also a sound frame, the Mittagsgespenst 
of the archive fever leaving the traces in stone), more “visible” 
and “in picture” than ever. Where? There. 
The scene of Hillis walking back to “us,” to the camera (“Am 
I on camera?”), when he sends the letter, comes right after the 
analysis of the letter sent from that very same mail box on Deer 
Isle, the address clearly visible in the corner of the letter which 
12 Jacques Derrida, On Touching — Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizarry 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 112.
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Derrida reproduced moments earlier. The letter Hillis sent in 
that scene of posting the letter went to Derrida…. When? Then!
From Derrida, to a letter. From Derrida on the screen, to a let-
ter, on the screen, by virtue of another screen, one screen on the 
screen inside a screen, reproduced for the screen, yet another. 
The “original” letter, transferred to a transparency and thus re-
iterated, placed on a projector, becomes yet one more in a tissue 
of traces, the thinnest of leaves overlaying one another, so thin, 
so seemingly transparent as to have no weight, no depth.
When is this letter, where is this letter? The letter sent by Hillis 
(the scene of Hillis sending the letter) in the film from Deer Isle 
arrived in time to follow Derrida’s lecture eight years before 
the scene of sending; only to announce that Derrida’s letter to 
Miller were not arriving to the right addressee. The letter de-
scribed by Derrida seemed, in turn, “to forecast today’s lecture 
and keynote, from more than thirty years distance” (“J,” 706). 
Thus, the missive announces the miss and the missing, always 
already, from the time immemorial. I missed you, says Derrida 
in his lecture and in his letter, but when, where? Am I missing 
something here? This destinerrance of the letter, however, which 
is displayed in the film as coming after (after the long history of 
friendship), also comes before the film, as the traumatic space of 
memory of this lecture at which both Hillis and I were present. 
And in which scene in the film Hillis sees Derrida’s demise, “he 
already looked old and not that well.” 
In conclusion: so, perhaps, and I do not say this lightly, perhaps 
Miller is, if not wrong exactly in his response to the tele-techno-
logical ghost, then not quite right either. For as the recording, 
that which can be played back is only ever a trace, it is differ-
ent only in degree, rather than as one might at first believe, 
in kind. A prosthetized archive, memory denatured, made 
available through an othering, a nonhuman externalisation, 
the recording can always come back, but only on the condi-
tion that we understand it not as a representation, though it is 
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this of course. Instead, we must see past the merely visible, the 
mimicry, the mimetic tendency of tele-technology to be, in its 
apprehension of the trace, simply representation.
The memory of a loss, to which Miller’s writing, his postings, 
have subsequently tried to respond, like in the scene of mail-
ing the letter, but also in For Derrida, are profoundly informed 
or imprinted by this spectral but non-representable division, of 
“the lack which does not have a place in dissemination” (PC, 
441). The letter is thus fully (un)accounted for, both before and 
after, here and there, but never in the right place: “The letter 
might not be found, or could always possibly not be found” (PC, 
442) dividing the scene of representation as the infinitely divis-
ible specter haunting the frame of “representation,” but also, I 
would claim, informing the very scene of writing in works like 
The Medium Is the Maker. 
I have introduced a distinction to do with representation and 
what cannot be represented, and which distinction therefore 
admits the possibility of speaking about haunting beyond rep-
resentation, where the visible fails, and haunting takes place all 
the more forcefully through memory and that which counter-
signs memory, always, already: loss.
In The Medium Is the Maker Miller has an innovative analysis 
pertaining to the question of finitude in Heidegger and Der-
rida. For Heidegger, the finitude of being (da-sein) partakes in 
the movement of general Being, it “holds,” Hillis says, “all the 
horizons of time with one mobile unit. […] Heidegger’s time 
is grounded in Sein, Being with a capital B. Derrida’s time is 
created out of performative media, the media as makers […]. 
On each occasion a given medium is used that creates its own 
ground and its own differance.”13 What this means is that each 
time we use a technical apparatus, flip a cell phone, type on a 
computer, make a film, watch a TV, we are opening a new tem-
13 Miller, For Derrida, 25.
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poral ground in which our finitude is both confirmed and tra-
versed and overcome. By using technical apparatuses, we par-
take in our own survival. And that happens every time I speak, 
teach or touch someone. “As if the word ‘I’ were inaugurating, in 
the first person, the very grammar of all spectrality, like a mask, 
‘I’ of a revenant” (“J,” 714). But it is most discernible in the usage 
of the technical apparatuses like recording live or life. Just like 
Derrida’s notion of the letter in The Post Card, which from “the 
first stroke divides itself, and must indeed support partition in 
order to identify itself.” Thus, “there are nothing but post cards, 
anonymous morsels without fixed domicile, without legitimate 
addressee, letters opened, but like crypts” (PC, 53). And, just like 
in the scene with the letter, Derrida displays, posts a post it for 
all to see, a piece of an open letter but also a crypt. An inscryp-
tion, the pieces (morceaux) of which are little bites (morsures) of 
death (mort). “Soon everyone will be there, and me, I will have 
to leave” (PC, 61). 
“This too will be in the archive”: the film as epitaph, ceno-
taph, and cinetaph. 
The archive, its very idea, the phantom eidolon following in the 
wake but also presaging the material possibility of the archive, 
is always already haunted by the play of the trace on which the 
archive relies for its somewhat uncanny existence. 
The letter sent many years ago never quite arrives, it arrives er-
roneously, too late, it misses its addressee. The division of the ad-
dress that Derrida tried to discern in the “J” of “J. Hillis Miller” 
is divided between “John” and “Joseph,” thus between the Old 
and the New Testaments. “And one of the sins that I must have 
committed at the origin, by substituting John for Joseph, will 
have been to risk evangelizing and Christianizing a name that 
hovered between the Old and the New Testaments” (“J,” 718). 
It is not hard to see in the film how bemused Derrida is by 
this originary confusion, and his mistake. Precisely, by a mistake 
of “revealing” the secret name, the name of the “secret God,” 
and thus giving visibility to what must remain hidden. But by 
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this mistaking Joseph for John, Derrida in fact enacts what he in 
Ulysses Gramophone, the Yes Saying of Joyce sees as an affirma-
tive yet disruptive force of alterity in the messianic without the 
Messiah. Without this possibility of the non-arrival of the letter, 
of the wrong arrival of the letter already divided by this errant 
“sailing, sealing, signing,” without this intrusion of the Jewish 
other in the Greek tradition, everything would be just the rep-
etition of the same, it would lead to the non-arrival of Greek 
onto-theology to itself, and Ulysses (but not the novel, Ulysses), 
thus returning to himself/itself/themselves as the arrival of a 
dead letter. (The danger of such “Greek” return to itself is made 
evident in Heidegger’s Danube, Der Ister, flowing rückwertz, 
from Greece, towards Schwarzwald, as to its proper destination, 
the origin flowing to itself, as he writes in 1942; and just like 
Greece itself, in a Europe programmed by the exclusion of the 
Greek other, by the exclusion of economic justice, which is com-
ing back to haunt Germany, in 2012, returns to Germany as the 
origin coming back and imploding Europe and Germany like 
the return of the repressed. The danger against which Miller’s 
Topographies is one of the most emphatic warnings ever writ-
ten, particularly regarding Heidegger, in “Slipping, Vaulting, 
Crossing”14).
Could we hear in Derrida’s bemused laughter the “eschato-
logical tone of the yes-laughter” which is “traversed by the vow-
els of a completely different song,” that broke out in Dublin in 
Joyce’s Ulysses, in the body of Molly Bloom, “necessary in order 
to contrive the breach necessary for the coming of the other,” 
whom “one can always call an Elijah, if Elijah is the name of the 
unforeseeable other for whom a place must be kept: […] Eli-
jah, the Other.”15 The amused, contagious laughter which broke 
out in the lecture hall with Derrida upon the revelation of this 
confusion, announced, in this erroneous attribution of the letter 
14 J. Hillis Miller, Topographies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
15 Jacques Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce,” trans. Tina 
Kendall and Shari Benstock, in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, 253–
310 (New York: Routledge, 1992), 294–95.
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address and the name (Christian for Jewish), a laughing recog-
nition and affirmation, yes, yes, that the non-arrival of the other 
is the very condition of something happening, taking place, as a 
difference or differance. The possibility of this destinerrance is 
the very condition of the arrival of the Other. This is the lesson 
that the “protestant” J. teaches the “Jewish” J., in a chiasmatic re-
versal, in the letter in which Miller teaches Derrida how to write. 
Keep the place at the table for J, the Other, “the uncanniest 
of guests.”16 
A Coda: Ulysses, a Destinerrance of the Other
Within, other than the visible, the visual, beyond mere repre-
sentation, the trace of the other is there, the trace in my relation 
to that trace remains singular. It can always arrive to touch me, 
because for me, if for no one else, it has about it that singular-
ity phenomenally, by which the trace bears in it the ghost of a 
chance. This is most eloquently illustrated, I think, in the final 
scene of another film that treats of ghosts, personal and those 
of history, Theo Angelopoulos’s Ulysses’ Gaze. 
Theo Angelopoulos’s Ulysses’ Gaze (1996) narrates how a mod-
ern-day Ulysses (Harvey Keitel) seeks to find three undevel-
oped reels by the Manakis brothers whose first movie, which 
does exist, and is one of the first ever, depicts women weaving, 
somewhere in the Balkans. (That movie is actually shown at the 
beginning of Ulysses’ Gaze). The quest for knowledge leads Ul-
ysses through many scenes repeating the violence of history that 
constitutes the space known as the Balkans: in Greece, Albania, 
Macedonia, Romania, then Belgrade and Sarajevo. (A scene in 
the movie shows an insignificant village, Janina, filmed by the 
Manakis brothers, as the voice over narrates: “All European ar-
mies have marched through it.”) It is to the Sarajevo of the last 
war that the teleology of his will to know takes him, and finding 
16 J. Hillis Miller, “The Critic as Host,” in Deconstruction & Criticism (New 
York: Continuum, 1979), 253.
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the reels, it finds its destination, its end. The undeveloped reels 
are kept by a Jewish curator, to be killed with his entire family 
soon after he hands the movie over to Keitel. The last scenes de-
pict Sarajevo in the fog, the only time when the city is at peace. 
And in that moment of peace is the time to bury the dead. And 
it is in this moment of suspended shared danger that the youth 
orchestra (“the young Serbs, Croats, Muslims, playing together,” 
the Jewish curator explains to Keitel) can perform in the open. 
A sheltered gathering appears in the face of a catastrophe, dur-
ing the fog, which re-orients Ulysses’ heading, to the possibility 
of another Bosnia, another Europe. 
Ulysses’ Gaze subverts the entire Greek, and therefore ex-
emplary European notion of the onto-teleology of gazing and 
spacing, starting at least with Plato’s cave, and proposes another 
“dislocation of the Greek logos,” a certain Greco-Jewish contam-
ination, as Jacques Derrida has it in “Violence and Metaphysics”: 
“a dislocation of our identity, and perhaps of identity in general; 
it summons us to depart from the Greek site and perhaps from 
the very site in general.”17 These are Derrida’s words about anoth-
er patient Jew, Emmanuel Levinas (“Jewgreek, greekjew” is how 
Joyce calls his Ulysses, and how Derrida calls Levinas18). This 
different site and sight will be motivated not by the will to know, 
see, or name, which can only testify to the already programmed 
catastrophe of history. (This “will to know” is in itself complicit 
in many ways with the violence taking place, as exemplified by 
a cynical anecdote spun in Sarajevo during the siege; one neigh-
bor to another, as a curse, says a Serb to a Muslim: “May your 
house appear tonight on CNN!” CNN is therefore not where war 
and destruction are, war and destruction are where there is CNN. 
The citizens of Sarajevo understood that better than the “liberal 
West” or “Europe”). Rather, this alternative sight will be moti-
vated, or imagined, by an utmost passivity: weaving, keeping the 
patient commemoration of danger which wards off exactly that 
17 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” in Writing and Difference, 




kind of ophtalmo-phallocratic gaze of war under which the Eu-
ropean history unravels or ruins itself. It is in weaving and keep-
ing, in danger, that, as Levinas says, “the face of the other, in this 
nudity, exposed unto death […] reminds one of the very mor-
tality of the other person.”19The responsibility to the other will 
always have preceded the certainty of the name, sight, or gaze. 
In one of the last scenes of the movie, the blank frames flicker 
in front of Ulysses’ gaze. 
A Greek-American filmmaker, having returned to Greece, 
journeys through the Balkans in search of three missing reels 
of film, thought to be the first film, the first “gaze.” Finally, in 
Sarajevo, he finds the film. We witness the filmmaker watching 
the film, but we never see what he sees, by which he is moved 
to tears, to which he responds with words promising return, 
the narrative of an other, to which he gives voice. We can never 
witness the ghost directly.
In the blank screen he sees, maybe, the catastrophe of history: 
the face of every person who died in the Bosnian war; the end of 
a site and of a sight, a sight/site of Europe. But in the blank flick-
ering of the frames, an opening: the blank, undeveloped film, an 
unseen memory of the unprogrammed other, patience, passiv-
ity, a promise, a future. For example, an example. An example? 
In the meantime, Sarajevo is in fog. The world is blind.
19 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 107.
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Postface
This collection of essays is an example par excellence of the post-
card effect so extensively treated in Jacques Derrida’s The Post 
Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. None of these essays 
was ever meant to end up in my hands, being now the presumed 
“editor” of this volume. As if in an actual enactment of, or per-
haps, better, faithfulness to the project of this publication, its 
original addressee returned the mail, which, poste restante on 
the west coast of the United States, in a locale not far away from 
the Jacques Derrida Papers housed at the Special Collections 
and Archives of UC Irvine, was forwarded to my inbox.
My own encounter with Derrida’s work started with a simi-
lar form of destinerrance, when I stumbled across Of Gramma-
tology in the philosophy of language section of the W.E.B. Du 
Bois library at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst. A 
graduate student in linguistics, I was convinced that the book 
was addressing me. It spoke of the origins of language, took on 
Saussure, and developed the notion of “trace.” Freshly trained in 
Chomskyan linguistics, all of these seemed so familiar to me, yet 
I understood nothing — as if it was written in another English, 
an English I could pronounce but not read. 
The arrival of this text in my non-comprehending hands led 
me through a maze that only later I came to understand as the 
so-called analytical–continental divide. In retrospect, it seemed 
silly to ask my professor in mathematical logic where to turn to 
gain an understanding of this seemingly inaccessible book. We 
don’t teach this in our philosophy department, he said. Back in 
218
going postcard
the Netherlands, the philosophy department of the University 
of Leiden told me to chase my lead at the comparative literature 
department. A few years later, in 2003, it became one of the first 
philosophy books I bought. By then, I had entered the European 
Graduate School.
There was a door in the linguistics wing of UMass’s South 
College, at the end of a corridor, that was never opened. Or, 
more precisely, I never saw it opened. Only later, much later, 
I understood from a friend who had been to “the other side” 
what was hidden behind that door: the CompLit department. 
Not even once during my exchange year had I entered it. That 
door no longer exists; the building has been renovated, and now 
has a different purpose. It houses the College of Humanities and 
Fine Arts.
***
The fourteen essays gathered in Going Postcard: The Letter(s) of 
Jacques Derrida all respond to a single request: to provide a gloss 
to one or multiple phrases from The Post Card. That this request 
is not a facile demand becomes theatrically clear in the opening 
lines of Peggy Kamuf ’s contribution: “A commentary? On ‘En-
vois’? No, really, you’re joking, right?” The Post Card, as Kamuf 
argues, demonstrates that the presuppositions underlying such 
a request are shaky, to say the least. This is extensively proven by 
the contribution of J. Hillis Miller, who, providing a gloss to the 
preface, inquires “to what genre does ‘Envois’ belong?” To all 
genres and none at all. 
Despite the wide range of topics and approaches extracted 
from The Post Card by the different contributors, several larger 
themes can be distinguished. Nicholas Royle, Hannah Markley, 
and Zach Rivers explore different aspects of telephony and other 
postal logics. Julian Wolfreys and Éamonn Dunne both address 
the theme of love, another relevant aspect of this text that also 
belongs to genre of amorous epistles. Nevertheless, it appears 
that being a shape-shifting, superbly elusive, and often self-de-
feating text, The Post Card resists commentary to the extent that 
219
postface
it has managed to derail and extemporize the present volume, 
destining it for a form of publication that truly adheres to the 
“postal logic”: open access — for all to read, sans envelope. 
***
Several authors have remarked about the fact that part of the 
correspondence has been burned, or so Derrida tells us. Mill-
er cites from the preface to “Envois,” the first half of the larger 
work, that its letters are “a recently destroyed correspondence. 
Destroyed by fire or what figuratively takes it place, more cer-
tain of leaving nothing out of the reach of what I like to call the 
tongue of fire, not even the cinders if cinders there are [s’il y a 
là cendre]” (PC, 3), a phrase which Miller provides with an ex-
tensive gloss. He also refers to a later episode in which Derrida 
writes about burning the collection at the roadside in suburban 
Paris. Michael Naas, conversely, examines the white spaces, the 
52-character “blanks,” which, rather than the result of consump-
tion by fire, are insertions standing in for erased passages of var-
iable length. How long, we (and Derrida) no longer know, be-
cause “I have totally forgotten the rule as well as the elements of 
such a calculation, as if I had thrown them into the fire” (PC, 5).
This burning of the letters, of correspondence, but also, by 
extension, of philosophical texts, is explicitly thematized at sev-
eral points in “Envois.” One of these places is where Derrida 
considers Plato’s Second Letter, written to the tyrant Dionysius. 
Towards the end of the letter, Plato asks Dionysius to “read this 
letter over repeatedly and then burn it up.”1 Derrida speaks of 
this order as “indeed the most amorous, most crazy order, which 
I had also given to you” (PC, 59). The unknown addressee of his 
envois, somehow, is thus expected to complete the task that he 
himself couldn’t finish, or, perhaps, Derrida himself is the ad-
dressee: “This order was not an order, despite the imperative, 
as they believe […]. My order was the most abandoned prayer 
and the most inconceivable simulacrum — for myself first of all” 
1 Plat. L. 2.314c.
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(PC, 59). Within the space of less than a page, Plato thus already 
starts to mirror Derrida while Dionysius becomes this elusive 
“you [tu].” This is far from the only time such a maelstrom of 
readdresses appears in The Post Card. As James Burt suggests 
in his contribution, it is the constant “proliferation of pronouns 
[…] that leaves [you] panting.”
As extensively treated by Kamillea Aghtan, The Post Card 
plays with the abbreviations “S.” and “p.” of “Socrates” and “pla-
to,” the latter written with a lowercase letter in reference to his 
smaller stature on the postcard reproduction (see p. 15) from 
Matthew Paris’s Prognostica Socratis basilei that Derrida found 
in the Bodleian library, the alleged beginning or impetus of 
the “Envois.” Several authors have picked up on aspects of this 
image. Nicholas Royle ana(para)lyses the “stingray” emerging 
underneath S.’s buttocks, while Wen-Chuan Kao sees links the 
emergence of the phallus with similar imagery from Bataille, 
and Eszter Timár sees in it a figure of autoimmunity. Burt, im-
agining a philosophical relay race, speaks of a “confused baton-
handover.”
But S. and p. are not the two only philosophical abbrevia-
tions; there is a third: the D. of — at first — Dionysius the Young-
er of Syracuse, the addressee of Plato’s letter. But one phrase, a 
page later, which initially seems to rephrase p.’s request to D. to 
burn the letter after reading, suddenly opens a vista upon the 
inaugural pyromania of philosophy. In a letter dated September 
4, 1977, Derrida writes, “P. asks D. to reread before burning, so 
be it, in order to incorporate the letter (like a member of the re-
sistance under torture) and to take it in him by heart. Keep what 
you burn, such is the demand” (PC, 60). 
Because Dionysius was not the only D. that p. related to by 
means of burning, this D. — and this must have been one of Der-
rida’s reasons to abbreviate — invokes also another philosopher, 
and one that p. never deigned to mention or address: Democri-
tus. What follows is a wider reading of some of the implications 
of this displacement of D.
In his own words, Democritus had always been the newcom-
er. Whereas Plato was the established Athenian, Democritus 
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was the stranger whom nobody in Athens knew.2 Despite this 
anonymity, Plato is reported to have had an enormous dislike 
for “the laughing philosopher,”3 sometimes also the “prince of 
the philosophers,” who managed to establish a good reputation 
among the Athenians. In his Lives of the Philosophers, Diogenes 
Laertius claims that Plato would have liked to see nothing more 
than all of Democritus’s works burned:
Aristoxenus in his Historical Notes affirms that Plato wished 
to burn all the writings of Democritus that he could collect, 
but that Amyclas and Clinias the Pythagoreans prevented 
him, saying that there was no advantage in doing so, for al-
ready his books were widely circulated. And there is clear 
evidence for this in the fact that Plato, who mentions almost 
all the early philosophers, never once alludes to Democritus, 
not even where it would be necessary to controvert him, ob-
viously because he knew that he would have to match himself 
against the prince of the philosophers.4 
Derrida projects Plato’s desire to obliterate Democritus’s oeuvre 
onto his own correspondence when he refers to his  “demand 
of the first letter: burn everything’” (PC, 59). Here, the letter as 
the result of an abbreviation and the letter as a piece of corre-
spondence impress upon each other, as “first letter” refers back 
to some previous epistle and the “first letter” of plato: p. “Burn 
everything,” is the demand of both. 
2 Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 2, ed. Walther Kranz 
(Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1935), 165, B116: ἦλθον γὰρ εἰς 
Ἀθήνας καὶ οὔ τίς ἔγνωκεν. — “For I came to Athens and no one knew me” 
(trans. C.C.W. Taylor, The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus: Fragments, 
A Text and Translation with a Commentary [Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999], D1).
3 Cf. L. Annaeus Seneca, “De Ira,” in Moral Essays, vol. 1, ed. John W. Basore 
(London/New York: Heinemann, 1928), 2.10.5: “Democritum contra aiunt 
nunquam sine risu in publico fuisse; adeo nihil illi videbatur senum eorum 
quae serio gerebantur.”
4 Diogenes Laertius, Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum, ed. H.S. Long 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), IX 7.40.
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Hannah Markley suggests in her contribution that the injunc-
tion to “burn everything” “appears only insofar as it haunts and 
recursively undoes ‘the single event of understood language,’” 
naming the “impossibility of legibility.” But the specific desire to 
burn Democritus’s writings, and by extension any philosophical 
text, is also, to speak with Rick Elmore, a “troubling line” that 
draws the foundation of the Western metaphysical tradition, a 
tradition that is firmly rooted in the work of small p. and not 
the atomism of prince D., whose philosophy, even though the 
former failed in his pyromaniac plot, has been all but forgot-
ten, with only snippets and fragments preserved here and there. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, two millennia later, was to become the first 
philosopher to cast a  light upon p.’s inaugural hatred for D. and 
lament the fate of the latter’s oeuvre: not destroyed by fire but 
by the steady grind of Christianity. In his early forays into pre-
Platonic philosophy, Nietzsche observed: 
Bad things have happened to the writings of Democritus: 
although they would be characterized as full of insightful 
judgments, as stylistic beauties, as model writings in a philo-
sophic presentation, they would be nonetheless destroyed 
because in later centuries their justification would be felt as 
more and more strange, and especially by Christianity as it 
discarded the grounds for comprehending Democritus, as 
Aristotle had taken exception to his rejection of teleology. All 
but the hardest fate had already caught up to them a half cen-
tury after the death of their composer: and this is truly the 
reason that the Christian scholars and monastic transcribers 
forced their hands from Democritus, to remove him as if he 
were possessed, a plan which Plato had kindled, to throw the 
collected writings of Democritus in the fire. […] We are still 
very much guilty of the death sacrifice of Democritus, and 
only to some extent have we made good on the indebtedness 
to him by the past.5
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted in Paul A. Swift, Becoming Nietzsche: Early Re-
flections on Democritus, Schopenhauer, and Kant (Oxford: Lexington Books, 
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This originary scandal has also not been left unnoticed by Der-
rida, who at several points in his oeuvre has hinted at the vio-
lence with which metaphysics has asserted its authority:
[T]he Democritean tradition [...] had been subjected since its 
origin, and first of all under the violent authority of Plato, to 
a powerful repression throughout the history of Western cul-
ture. One can now follow its symptomatology, which begins 
with the erasure of the name of Democritus in the writings 
of Plato, even though Plato was familiar with his doctrine. 
He probably feared that one might draw some conclusion as 
to the proximity, or even the filiation, of some of his philoso-
phemes.6
One of these philosophemes drawn by p. from D., Derrida sug-
gests elsewhere, is “khōra,” the “bastardly notion” from the 
Timeaus.7 Rivers picks up on this telephonic connection, pro-
posing to listen to correspondances as khōra-spondances. But 
that’s not the only leftover of the “Democritean tradition.” An-
other, perhaps even less known notion, is eteē, usually translated 
as “reality” or “truth.” It has, however, nothing to do with that 
quintessential Platonic and metaphysical concept, alētheia.8 Be-
sides lying at the foundation of the elusive science of etymology, 
eteē is closely (and indeed etymologically) related to the Socratic 
method of exetasis, of “examination,” “testing,” or “scrutiny,” and 
belongs to a juridical semantic field that also includes elengkhos 
“interrogation” and basanos “torture.” That which interrogation 
or examination is to bring out, in the Socratic method, is not so 
2008), 76.
6 Jacques Derrida, “My Chances/Mes chances: A Rendezvous with Some 
Epicurean Stereophonies,” trans. Avital Ronell, in Psyche: Inventions of the 
Other, vol. 1, eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg, 344–76 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 362.
7 Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara John-
son, 67–168 (London/New York: Continuum, 2004), 159.
8 See Jean-Pierre Levet, Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque 
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1976).
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much alētheia about the world, but the eteē of a person — the 
concordance between their words, actions, and character. This 
is not a trivial matter. As Socrates famously stated in the Apol-
ogy, “The unexamined life [anexetastos bios] is not livable for a 
human.”9
This incomplete and very tentative gloss allows us to inspect 
the second part of the phrase. p. is asking D. to reread his work 
before burning it, “in order to incorporate the letter (like a 
member of the resistance under torture) and to take it in him 
by heart.” As Avital Ronell has pointed out, the theme of torture, 
or basanos (and by extension elengkhos and exetasis), is deeply 
anchored in Greek origins of philosophical practice; torture, es-
pecially the torturing of a slave, was thought to be a fool-proof 
way at arriving at the truth.10 In his contribution, Wan-Chuan 
Kao discusses torture in yet another context, that of ecstasy and 
eroticism. But the way in which Derrida invokes torture here, as 
a case or example in which the incorporation of a letter, of tak-
ing it by heart, which is of vital necessity in order not to reveal its 
contents to the Gestapo, suggests a different paradigm. Rather 
than speaking the truth after the first or repeated infliction of 
pain, D. is asked not to say anything — knowing that all the ma-
terial evidence has been burned. Derrida thus inverts here the 
Greek paradigm. Rather than torture being a certain way of ar-
riving at the content of a letter, torture here provides the context 
in which a letter is incorporated and taken “by heart.” The Greek 
slave always speaks, whereas the member of the resistance never 
does. He therefore also highlights a contradiction within Plato’s 
own stance toward the burning of letters. Whereas in his letter 
to Dionysius, the burning becomes the guarantee for memoriza-
tion, the burning of Democritus’s writings would be the guaran-
tee for their oblivion.
Finally, the abbreviation D. suggests a subtext in which Der-
rida identifies with Democritus, albeit reversing the plot — a 
9 Pl. Apol. 38a: ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ.




reversal not unlike “S. before p.” — by burning his letters, his 
correspondence himself. This reading of D. for Derrida is also 
offered by Dragan Kujundžić, who moreover links it to the da 
of the Freudian fort–da (and, why not, to Alan Bass’s gloss in 
his introduction “L before K” on the “prefix of negation” dé- or 
dé “die”11). After first inverting the relation between incineration 
and memory, Derrida, in the third and final part of the above-
cited phrase, appropriates p.’s destructive desire — by burning 
his own correspondence: “Keep what you burn, such is the de-
mand.”
This collection has tried to obey this impossible demand. To 
keep what was presumed to be destroyed, on the threshold of to 
gloss and to gloss over.
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“W. dreams, like Phaedrus, of an army of thinker-friends, think-
er-lovers. He dreams of a thought-army, a thought-pack, which 
would storm the philosophical Houses of Parliament. He dreams 
of Tartars from the philosophical steppes, of thought-barbarians, 
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